FMFM 6-1

Marine Division

U.S. Marine Corps

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Change No.	Date of Change	Date of Entry	Organization	Signature

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Marine Division

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Chapter 1

Mission and Organization

Mission of the Marine Division

The Marine division is a multirole, expeditionary ground combat force. The division is employed as the ground combat element (GCE) of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) or may provide task-organized forces for smaller Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs). The MAGTF is a balanced combined arms team capable of a wide range of operations throughout the spectrum of war. The operations of the GCE are coordinated with those of the aviation combat element (ACE) and the combat service support element (CSSE) by the command element (CE) of the MAGTF.

The mission of the Marine division is to execute amphibious assault operations and such operations as may be directed. The Marine division must be able to provide the ground amphibious forcible entry capability to the naval expeditionary force (NEF) and conducting subsequent land operations in any operational environment. The division commander fights using combined arms tactics and tailors the force to the demands of each mission.

Organization of the Marine Division

The Marine division consists of organizations designed to provide command and control, maneuver, fire support, and logistic capabilities. The subordinate organizations of the division are identified in figure 1-1.

Headquarters Battalion, Marine Division

The primary mission of the headquarters battalion is to exercise command, control, and administration of the division. It contains a headquarters and service company; a division headquarters with a headquarters and service company; a reconnaissance company; a special security communications team; a communications company; a military police company; the division band; and a truck company. See figure 1-2.

Command and Control

The headquarters battalion contributes to the command and control (C^2) of the division by providing



Figure 1-1. Organization of the Marine Division.



Figure 1-2. Headquarters Battalion.

the preponderance of C^2 support assets, organic intelligence support, and facilities for the division headquarters. The principal providers of this support located in the headquarters battalion include the division headquarters, the headquarters and service company, the communications company, the special security communications team, and the reconnaissance company.

Maneuver

The headquarters battalion contributes to the maneuver of the division by providing assets that facilitate mobility, traffic control in the rear area, command and control, and security. The principal providers of this support located in the headquarters battalion are the headquarters and service company, military police company, truck company, and the division band.

Intelligence

Intelligence support to the division from the headquarters battalion includes that resulting from directed reconnaissance of the reconnaissance company; military police actions in the rear area to include route reconnaissance, handling of enemy prisoners of war, refugees, and other civilians; and the intelligence personnel assigned to the division headquarters. The special security communications team provides special intelligence communications support to the division commander and staff.

Fire Support

The headquarters battalion contributes to the delivery and coordination of fire support within the division by providing command and control, target acquisition capability, and rear area forces to the division headquarters. The reconnaissance company, military police company, and communications company are the principal providers of this support from the headquarters battalion.

Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability

The headquarters battalion is limited to providing manpower when necessary to these tasks. The military police company provides a measure of mobility assistance through the maintenance of area security and crowd control. The C^2 capability provided to

the division by the battalion contributes to the ability of other dedicated units to conduct mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks.

Combat Service Support

The headquarters battalion provides the preponderance of organic combat service support (CSS) capability to the Marine division. The headquarters and service company, military police company, and truck company are the principal providers of combat service support to the division.

Infantry Regiment, Marine Division

The primary mission of the infantry regiment is to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver, or to repel his assault by fire and close combat. The regiment is capable of limited independent operations when appropriate units are attached. The regiment contains a headquarters company and two or more infantry battalions (normally three infantry battalions) that provide the basic tactical units with which the regiment accomplishes its mission. The headquarters company of the infantry regiment contains a regimental headquarters, a communications platoon, and a reconnaissance platoon. When combined with other combat support and CSS units, the infantry regiment may form a regimental landing team. The basic means of ground mobility of the regiment is by foot, supplemented by light-weight vehicles for the transportation of electronics equipment, weapons, and limited amounts of ammunition and supplies. See figure 1-3.

Command and Control

The C^2 capability of the infantry regiment is designed to support the regiment and its subordinate units. However, the reconnaissance platoon can be directed to conduct operations in support of the division commander's information requirements. Any division requirements placed on the regiment for C^2 support degrades the regiment's ability to exercise it's own command and control.

Maneuver

The infantry regiment is the principal maneuver unit of the Marine division. It receives direction from the division commander and conducts maneuver in accordance with the division commander's intent.

Intelligence

The infantry regiment provides intelligence to the division through the directed reconnaissance of the reconnaissance platoon and standard reporting from the regiment's subordinate units.

Fire Support

The infantry regiment's contribution to the division is limited to short-range indirect fire support from infantry mortars and direct fires of subordinate units. Fires from organic weapons of the regiment are rarely sufficient to support any organization other than the infantry regiment.



Figure 1-3. Infantry Regiment.

Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability

The infantry regiment is limited to providing manpower to support the mobility, countermobility, and survivability of the division. Subordinate units of the regiment construct reinforcing obstacles, protective positions, and conduct security operations that enhance the overall mobility, countermobility, and survivability of the regiment and the division as a whole.

Combat Service Support

The infantry regiment is a CSS consumer. Organic transportation is limited and normally insufficient for anything other than subordinate unit combat trains.

Artillery Regiment, Marine Division

The mission of artillery in the Marine division is to furnish close and continuous fire support by neutralizing, destroying, or suppressing targets which threaten the success of the supported unit. Notionally, an artillery regiment requires five artillery battalions to provide adequate fire support for all the maneuver forces of a fully-committed Marine division. See figure 1-4. An artillery regiment is organized with a headquarters battery and four artillery battalions but may be augmented by an additional battalion from another (active or Selected Marine Corps Reserve) artillery regiment to meet the specific support requirements of a particular situation. Additionally, the artillery regiment may be augmented with a U.S. Army multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) battalion or battery to provide long-range, high-volume, rapid-fire general support and counterfire capabilities. The artillery regiment headquarters battery includes a counterbattery radar platoon equipped with weapons-locating radars to detect and locate enemy indirect fire weapons, survey and meteorological sections to assist in the accurate delivery of artillery fire, and an engineer equipment platoon to perform limited general engineering tasks in support of the regiment's mobility and survivability. The regiment's operations and actions are closely integrated with those of the maneuver forces to be responsive to rapidly changing tactical situations. To facilitate this close integration, the artillery regiment provides a fire support coordination section to assist in establishing and operating the division's fire support coordination center, and each artillery battalion and firing battery provides liaison personnel to its supported unit.

Command and Control

The artillery regiment provides C^2 connectivity throughout the division through a variety of radio and artillery fire support nets. When the division headquarters is destroyed or otherwise rendered inoperable, artillery regiment command and control may be required to communicate intent by the division commander. However, the use of artillery fire support nets for other than their intended purpose can delay the coordination and application of responsive artillery support.

Maneuver

The artillery regiment is the principal provider of the fires component of maneuver in the Marine division.



Figure 1-4. Artillery Regiment.

Intelligence

Counterbattery radars in the headquarters battery provide real-time target acquisition to the division. Forward observers located in the infantry regiments also provide significant intelligence to the division in the form of calls for fire and standard reporting through the fire support system.

Fire Support

The artillery regiment provides the preponderance of fire support to the division by: providing timely, close, accurate, and continuous fire support; providing depth to combat by attacking hostile reserves, reconnaissance forces, and disrupting enemy C^2 systems and logistic installations; and delivering counterfire within the range of the weapon system to ensure freedom of action of division maneuver units. Furthermore, the artillery regimental commander also serves as the fire support coordinator for the division.

Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability

The headquarters battery of the artillery regiment contains an engineer equipment platoon that performs limited general engineering support to the artillery regiment. When dictated by METT-T, these assets may perform tasks in support of the division as a whole.

Combat Service Support

The artillery regiment is a CSS consumer. Organic assets are seldom adequate to support the CSS requirements of other division organizations.

Tank Battalion, Marine Division

The mission of the tank battalion is to close with and destroy the enemy utilizing armor-protected firepower, shock effect, and maneuver, and to provide antimechanized fire in support of the division. A tank battalion consists of headquarters and service company that contains the battalion headquarters, organic combat service support, and an antitank platoon and four tank companies. The tank battalion is best employed as a maneuver force without detachment of units. However, the division commander may task-organize forces of tanks, mechanized infantry, and other division resources based on METT-T that require the cross-attachment of tank battalion and infantry regiment assets. Employment of the tank battalion must take advantage of the speed, mobility, and firepower of the organization. See figure 1-5.

Command and Control

The tank battalion is limited in capability to that required to exercise command and control of its subordinate units.

Maneuver

The tank battalion provides the division the preponderance of armored-protected firepower and mobility. In the defense, it can be employed in the security area, the main battle area, or rear area as a reserve. In the offense, it can be employed as the lead maneuver unit or main effort in the assault, as the reserve to exploit success of other division maneuver units, or as a supporting effort to deceive the enemy or support the main effort by fire.



Figure 1-5. Tank Battalion.

Intelligence

The tank battalion may provide subordinate units to support light armored reconnaissance (LAR) units conducting reconnaissance and surveillance. The tank battalion commander is also the duty expert in the division on the employment of armor and assists the G-2 and division commander as required during intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB).

Fire Support

The tank battalion may provide direct and indirect fires in support of other division units. The antitank platoon may provide overwatch antiarmor fires in support of the tank battalion or other division units as required by METT-T.

Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability

The tank battalion contains tanks equipped with mineplows that can support the overall mobility and survivability of the division. The battalion also contains armored-vehicle-launched bridges that provide the division with a limited gap crossing capability.

Combat Service Support

The tank battalion is a high-volume, CSS consumer. Organic combat service support is sufficient to meet routine needs of the battalion.

Assault Amphibian Battalion, Marine Division

The mission of the assault amphibian battalion is to transport the surface assault elements of the landing force from amphibious shipping to inland objectives in a single lift during the amphibious assault, to provide support to mechanized operations ashore, and to provide combat support for other operational requirements. The battalion is organized with a headquarters and service company and four assault amphibian companies. The organization of the assault amphibian company permits independent deployment for limited operations. Assault amphibious vehicles (AAVs) are primarily employed to transport personnel in tactical operations. See figure 1-6.

Command and Control

The assault amphibian battalion provides C^2 variants of the AAV to facilitate command and control of the division and its subordinate units during highly mobile ground and amphibious operations.

Maneuver

The assault amphibian battalion's primary mission includes transporting assault elements of the division during ship-to-objective maneuver. It provides the preponderance of tracked mobility for infantry units during amphibious and subsequent operations ashore.

Intelligence

The assault amphibian battalion commander provides intelligence support to the G-2 as a mechanized operations subject matter expert. He assists during IPB by evaluating terrain and other environmental conditions that can impact on the employment of friendly or enemy fighting vehicles.

Fire Support

The assault amphibian battalion provides direct and indirect fire support within the capability of organic weapons during amphibious operations and subsequent operations ashore.



Figure 1-6. Assault Amphibian Battalion.

Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability

The assault amphibian battalion provides minefield breaching assistance to subordinate division units employing AAVs.

Combat Service Support

The assault amphibian battalion transports selected equipment and supplies of the landing force during ship-to-objective maneuver and provides mobility for CSS units during subsequent operations ashore.

Combat Engineer Battalion, Marine Division

The mission of the combat engineer battalion is to enhance the mobility, countermobility, and survivability of the Marine division through close combat engineer support and provide limited general support required for the functioning of the Marine division. The combat engineer battalion consists of a headquarters and service company, engineer support company, and four combat engineer companies. Operations of task-organized combat engineer elements supporting forward units will generally be decentralized. See figure 1-7.

Command and Control

The combat engineer battalion provides utility support to include mobile electric power equipment to the division headquarters and other division units.

Maneuver

The combat engineer battalion provides maneuver support to the division through its principal functions of mobility, countermobility, and survivability. Tasked-organized engineer units may be formed to conduct specific maneuver tasks and controlled by the combat engineer battalion commander based on METT-T. The battalion also constructs and improves expedient vertical takeoff and landing sites.

Intelligence

The combat engineer battalion conducts engineer reconnaissance and intelligence collection within the division zone or sector.

Fire Support

The combat engineer battalion assists in the planning and conduct of fire support by planning reinforcing obstacles and barriers in support of the division and other subordinate units. These obstacles and barriers are integrated into the fire support plan to ensure maximum disruption of the enemy at the obstacle and the effectiveness of fires.

Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability

The combat engineer battalion participates in the planning and coordination of obstacle breaching from the high-water mark inland. It employs available assault bridging systems exclusive of the armored vehicle-launched bridge (AVLB). The battalion provides expedient repair and reinforcement of existing bridges and constructs expedient, short-span nonstandard bridges from local materials. The combat engineer battalion also provides temporary repair of existing roads and limited new construction of combat roads and trails; plans and constructs obstacles requiring special engineer equipment or technical skills; performs specialized demolition missions beyond the capability of other division units; and provides technical assistance and necessary equipment for the development of temporary protective positions for personnel and equipment.



Figure 1-7. Combat Engineer Battalion.

Combat Service Support

The assault amphibian battalion provides potable water for consumption and maintenance requirements.

Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion

The mission of the light armored reconnaissance (LAR) battalion is to conduct reconnaissance, security, economy of force operations and, within capabilities, conduct limited offensive or delaying operations that exploit the unit's mobility and firepower. The LAR battalion is capable of being employed as a separate maneuver force. The LAR battalion consists of a headquarters and service company and four light armored reconnaissance companies. See figure 1-8.

Command and Control

The LAR battalion contains C^2 variants of the light-armored vehicle that can be tailored for use with the tactical echelon of the division.

Maneuver

The LAR battalion provides the division a force capable of limited offensive and defensive operations. It can be employed in any area of the battlefield and when properly task-organized, it provides the division a highly mobile maneuver unit.

Intelligence

The LAR battalion is the principal provider of extended-range ground reconnaissance and surveillance in the division.

Fire Support

The LAR battalion is capable of providing limited direct and indirect fire support to other division units; however, this support is limited as the battalion's fire support capabilities are designed to support subordinate units of the battalion. The LAR battalion can position terminal controllers in depth to assist in the control of artillery, naval gunfire, and aviation in support of the division.

Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability

The LAR battalion provides support to mobility and countermobility actions of the division by locating and reporting on the nature of enemy obstacles, locating bypasses or lanes in enemy obstacles, and recommending locations for friendly reinforcing obstacles to the division engineer and G-3.

Combat Service Support

The LAR battalion is a CSS consumer. Combat service support of the LAR battalion requires detailed planning and support external to the battalion when operating at extended ranges. CSS assets within the LAR battalion are limited to those necessary to support the battalion during routine operations.



Figure 1-8. Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion.

Chapter 2

Command and Control

Command and Control Organization

The division commander must exercise command and control over a large and complex organization. His C^2 assets must be used to maximum advantage and organized to support his information requirements in a rapidly changing, high-tempo environment. Command and control for the Marine division must be organized to allow the commander to —

- Rapidly orient to the battle.
- Evaluate the situation.
- Estimate and anticipate the course of events.
- Determine what is critical.
- Measure risk.
- Take decisive action.
- Plan future operations.

Efficient operations of the division headquarters echelons can be attained by careful consideration of several time-tested precepts:

- A headquarters must be small to be efficient.
- Only one headquarters can be exercising control at any one time.
- The commander must limit the amount of information he receives.
- The commander conducts and receives briefings that are short, concise, and on time. Organization of orders and information briefs is dependent upon the type of operation and time available.
- Whenever possible, the commander will deliver orders in person to subordinate commanders.
- The headquarters echelons are organized to acquire and disseminate information in a prioritized fashion.
- The commander does not confine himself to a headquarters echelon. He observes the battle firsthand at the critical point.

Division Command

Command and staff relationships are established within the division's organizational structure. This structure includes the commander, an assistant commander, subordinate unit commanders, and the general and special staffs.

Division Commander

The commander is responsible for the accomplishment of assigned tasks and missions. With this responsibility goes the authority to direct forces and take actions that ensure success. Command authority is the basis through which control is extended. Decisive application of combat power hinges on the commander's ability to continually visualize the objective, conceptualize the battlespace, and make rapid decisions that shape the battle.

The division commander must be able to convey to subordinates a clear, concise statement that defines success for the division by establishing, in advance of events, the battle or campaign's end state. He issues his intent and ensures it is disseminated throughout the division to unify the division toward a common objective. Commander's intent provides subordinate commanders a way of gauging freedom of action. Commander's intent contains —

- The purpose of the operation.
- The critical vulnerabilities and center of gravity for both enemy and friendly forces.
- A vision of how the operation will be conducted in a broad scope.
- A description of the end state with respect to the relationship of the division, the enemy, and the terrain.
- A description of how the end state will facilitate future operations.

not specifically assigned to another general staff section. The AC/S, G-1 has staff responsibility for personnel strength, replacements, discipline, prisoners of war, graves registration, morale and personnel services, and organization of the internal arrangement of the main echelon.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. The AC/S, G-2 is the principal staff assistant in matters pertaining to the accomplishment of command intelligence functions. He directs the command's intelligence and counterintelligence efforts and is responsible for the collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence throughout the command. He is also responsible for the supervision of the command's intelligence training program.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3. The AC/S, G-3 is the principal staff assistant in matters pertaining to organization, training, and tactical operations. He is responsible for planning, coordinating, and supervising the tactical employment of units, integrating fire and maneuver, coordinating breaching and barrier plans, planning and supervising civil affairs activities (when a G-5 section is not established), and determining priorities for allocation of personnel, weapons, equipment, and ammunition.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. The AC/S, G-4 is the principal staff assistant in logistic matters and the CSS functions of supply, maintenance, transportation, medical/dental, passenger and freight transportation, engineer support, landing support, material handling, and food services.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5. The AC/S, G-5 is the principal staff assistant in matters pertaining to civil affairs. He is responsible for supervising the collection, care, and disposition of refugees and displaced persons. He provides assistance to the G-2 in collecting intelligence from civilian sources; plans the evacuation and hospitalization of sick, wounded, and injured civilians; controlling civilians to avoid interference with the military operations; and supervises the control of civilian activities to include public health, safety, property control, public works, utilities, and claims.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-6. The AC/S, G-6 is the principal staff assistant in matters pertaining to automated information and communications systems support. He is responsible for plans and supervising the installation, operations, and maintenance of communications system; disseminating communications-electronics operating instructions (CEOI); and the management of cryptographic material systems. He coordinates with the G-3 to ensure communications planning and training are compatible with the overall plan. The G-6 recommends, in coordination with the G-3 and headquarters battalion commander, the location of key installations within the headquarters echelons. To improve communications, he coordinates with G-6s of higher, reinforcing, adjacent, and supporting/supported units.

Special Staff

The special staff consists of staff officers whose activities pertain to particular military specialties. The division commander may meet unusual conditions by omitting sections not required, combining or adjusting responsibilities, and by creating additional sections. Special staff officers may be temporarily assigned from the MEF or Marine Corps Base based on the mission of the division and may include but are not limited to —

- Adjutant.
- Career planning officer.
- Chaplain.
- Disbursing officer.
- Embarkation officer.
- Engineer.
- Headquarters commandant.
- Staff judge advocate.

Liaison

The division establishes liaison to aid in coordination and parallel planning. Liaison teams must have their own transportation and communications links to their headquarters. Reciprocal liaison involves exchange of liaison teams. It is required when a formation is placed directly under the command of a headquarters of a different Service or nationality or when units of

different nations are adjacent. The liaison officer (LNO) represents the commander at the headquarters of another unit for effecting coordination and promoting cooperation between the units. He should be of appropriate rank and experience to ensure credibility of the liaison team and knowledge of the division organization and operation. When liaison is not reciprocal, responsibility for establishing liaison is normally that of the higher commander.

From Rear to Frontline Units of the Division

The LNO to the forward unit examines and reports on the forward unit's concept and intent and provides combat information and intelligence to his unit. The LNO's role is to provide information which allows his unit to parallel plan in real time. He may recommend positions for his unit to occupy as it moves forward. He may coordinate terrain management.

From Higher to Lower Echelon Unit

This liaison is normally established between the division and organizations attached or under operational control of the division. The division may also exchange liaison teams with the MEF CE. The primary role of these LNOs is to maintain continuity of information and operations.

From Supporting to Supported Unit

This liaison is similar to that from rear to frontline units and normally occurs when the division is given a follow-and-support mission.

From Moving Unit to Stationary Unit

This liaison is normally effected by collocation of tactical echelons to enhance the primary and special staff officer coordination.

Liaison Duties and Responsibilities

The liaison team's parent unit headquarters should provide the following:

- Transportation compatible with the mobility of the supported unit.
- Communications equipment with appropriate cryptographic and operating instructions.
- Maps and operations overlays covering the appropriate sectors and routes.
- Overlay material.
- The current operations orders for the parent and supported units and the most recent situation reports.
- Current information concerning the parent unit. At a minimum, it should include —
  - Mission.
  - Future operations.
  - Task organization.
  - Boundaries with changes and time effective.
  - Fire support and obstacle overlays and plans.
  - Current logistics situation.
  - Personnel situation and critical MOS shortages.
  - An intelligence situation update.

The receiving unit should ensure the liaison officer has access to all staff sections within the appropriate headquarters echelon. On arrival at the host unit, the LNO —

- Establishes communications with his unit and receives any information updates.
- Reports to the commander of the host unit and is prepared to brief his unit's situation.
- Visits each staff section, provides information as required, and obtains information he must transmit to his parent unit.
- Ensures his location at the host headquarters is known at all times.
- Acquires as much information as possible about the host unit mission, unit locations, future operations, and commander's intent.

On returning to his parent headquarters, the LNO will —

- Brief the commander concerning the mission of the visited headquarters, unit locations, future operations, and the commander's intent.
- Transmit mission requirements and requests for information from the visited headquarters.
- Brief representatives from all staff sections on information received during the liaison visit.
- Keep abreast of the situation and be prepared to perform the next liaison mission.

Headquarters Echelon

Normally, the division maintains three headquarters echelons — the *tactical echelon,* the *main echelon,* and the *rear echelon*. The division's headquarters echelons exist to support the commander wherever he may be on the battlefield. These echelons consist of personnel and facilities used by the division commander and staff to plan, direct, control, and coordinate operations of the division. The tactical echelon and rear echelon are extensions of the main echelon. See figure 2-2.

Tactical Echelon

The primary purpose of the tactical echelon is to support immediate tactical requirements of close operations and provide the commander with freedom of movement and information critical to his situational awareness. It should be minimally structured and manned to support maneuver, intelligence, and fire support. To provide the commander with the tactical support he requires, the tactical echelon is designed and manned to be small, highly mobile, and survivable. Its survivability is directly related to its small size and capability to rapidly displace. It contains only essential personnel and equipment. The tactical echelon is deployed forward near the lead regiments or even farther forward when the situation dictates.

Its main focus is the control of close operations; it should not be distracted from this purpose. The tactical echelon normally controls only those forces committed to or engaged in close combat. The tactical echelon is commonly referred to as the command group and typically consists of the commander, the G-2, the G-3, the fire support coordinator (FSC), and communications personnel. See appendix A. It must have the mobility and C^2 support commensurate with its purpose.

During an operation, the division tactical echelon —

- Continuously supports the close operation by coordinating and integrating the immediate tactical requirements of elements committed to it.
- Receives, posts, analyzes, and distributes combat information and tactical intelligence from higher, lower, and adjacent units to support the close operations.
- Integrates and expedites fires of all fire support assets supporting close operations.
- Coordinates and integrates mobility and survivability operations in support of the close operation.

Main Echelon

The division main echelon supports the direction of current operations and the planning of future operations. Immediate tactical decisions are rarely made at the main echelon. However, the main echelon will make decisions based on requests from the tactical and rear echelons that support immediate close and rear operations. It maintains the ability to see the battlefield and makes plans and decisions that will affect committed forces several hours out. It is specifically designed, manned, and equipped to direct all organic and supporting elements of the division. Threat acquisition and targeting capabilities, technology, and training will determine the dispersion of the main echelon necessary to survive. To function in the dispersed mode, the main echelon must have the requisite computer and communications assets that will allow it to electronically collocate. The main echelon contains both current and future operations staffs, the chief of staff, the G-1, G-2A, G-3A, G-4, G-5, G-6, and assistant FSC. See appendix A.

The current operations staff of the division —

- Supervises mission execution.
- Coordinates combat operations.
- Coordinates required combat support/service support.
- Conducts close and deep operations.

The future operations staff —

- Plans future close and deep operations.
- Monitors continuity of division operations.
- Determines possible courses of friendly/enemy action/reactions.
- Develops branches and sequels.

Rear Echelon

The rear echelon's primary mission is to support combat operations and is an extension of the main echelon. It should be located where it can fulfill its



TACTICAL ECHELON. Controls all units committed to combat in the close operation or moving to fight in the close operation.

MAIN ECHELON. Allocates, coordinates, and integrates available assets to support current and future operations and plans future operations.

REAR ECHELON. Controls all units supporting rear operations or moving through the division rear area.

Figure 2-2. Headquarters Echelonment.

primary mission and not engage in close combat. Its most critical role is to coordinate and integrate rear operations with close and deep operations. The division rear echelon performs the functions of sustainment, terrain management, movement control, security, and fire support.

Key division personnel normally located in the rear echelon include the G-1A and G-4A. Normally, the rear echelon is collocated with or sited near the CSSE's combat service support operations center (CSSOC). The rear echelon controls all elements functioning or transiting through the division's rear area. The rear echelon and the CSSOC jointly analyze future division plans for their impact on current and future rear operations to ensure logistic and personnel support is available. The division rear echelon monitors activity in the regimental and adjacent unit rear areas to prevent potential conflicts with the division rear operation. When properly augmented, the rear echelon may assume control of the fight if the main and tactical echelons can no longer function.

Headquarters Operations

Personnel

The quality of personnel is a constant factor that defines effective headquarters operations. The division headquarters echelons must be staffed with the requisite skills and MOSs to perform the functions of the section to which assigned. Each individual must be capable of performing his own job and understanding the relationship of his job to that performed by other staff personnel.

Division officers must be capable of assessing the tactical situation, anticipating the enemy's intent, and determining the long- and short-term impact of friendly actions. Officers issue instructions in accordance with the commander's guidance and intent. Primary staff officers must maintain a complete picture of the division operation and not be consumed by rudimentary activities that should be left for staff assistants.

Normally, staff noncommissioned officers (SNCOs) and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) focus on specific aspects of their duties or work area. Some specific responsibilities of SNCOs and NCOs include —

- Collecting, processing, and disseminating information within his section, throughout the echelon, and external to the headquarters echelon.
- Preparing and updating staff estimates and preparing and reviewing orders and plans.
- Coordinating and integrating internal and separate section activities, such as maintenance of map boards, status charts, shift changeover procedures, and health and welfare of Marines.
- Participating in site selection, reconnaissance, and movement.

Planning

The division conducts planning in two types of environments — *when it has a mission but is not committed to tactical operations against an enemy force* and *when it is currently committed.* However, once the division is committed to a tactical operation, planning time is greatly reduced and becomes a precious commodity. The commander's involvement is critical to the planning process and the ability of the division to dictate the tempo of operations.

Tempo. The speed of operations has quickened because of advances in the rate of intelligence and information flow. The ability to gather, manage, process and circulate information, in near real-time, among sensors, decisionmakers, weapons, and highly mobile forces give operational and tactical commanders the means to set battle tempo. Tempo is a function of speed of operations within time to accomplish the mission based on the commander's plan and available resources. Tempo is dictated by several elements:

- Sufficiency and reliability of information.
- Timely communications and intelligence.
- Ability and time to understand effects of actions.
- Mobility.
- Coordination and integration of combat power.
- Availability of logistic support.

Tempo requires both mental and physical agility by leaders and organizations. Commanders must understand these relationships and manage them effectively. Commanders must possess the mental agility and discipline to make timely decisions to modify the tempo to their advantage, to deny the enemy the initiative, and to decisively defeat him at the selected time and place. Advantages in range, speed, accuracy, kill potential, and sensor capabilities allow commanders to choose and vary the time, place, and form of attack. The staff provides decision support to the commander by thorough analysis of the situation that permits the commander to increase tempo, decrease the enemy's tempo, and generate uncertainty for the opponent.

Plans Section. The plans section is located in the main echelon and works for the G-3. The plans section allows the commander to maintain his ability to continually look towards the future and effectively transition from current to future operations. The plans section helps the division transition from one operation to another, the objective being to prevent a loss of tactical integrity and momentum. The following key factors are involved in the successful transition from one operation to another.

- Early anticipation by the commander and the assignment of one clearly articulated future operations mission.
- Rapid planning and development of a concept of operation that minimizes operational or tactical pauses.
- Continuous planning, coordination, and integration of future operations requirements with those of current operations.

Main Echelon. The main echelon, less the plans section, control the current operation. They allocate resources and establish priorities in the support of the current deep, close, and rear operations and monitor execution of the current plan. Staff sections work with the plans section to coordinate requirements for future operations. These staff sections are the primary conduit for transmitting and coordinating information for both current and future operations to subordinate organizations they control or advise.

Parallel Planning

Parallel planning is effective when dealing with reduced planning time and transitioning from one operation to another. Parallel planning is the act of

conceptualizing, developing, and coordinating a future operations plan with a current operation and its continually changing situations. It emphasizes continuous information sharing through verbal and written means to quickly distribute intelligence, planning guidance, and coordination instructions to subordinate, adjacent, and higher staff sections. Units need not wait for a detailed analysis or a published order to begin their own parallel planning. Continuous information sharing allows all units to receive information on the future mission early in the planning process.

Combat Operations

Combat operations are fast-paced, around-the-clock, and intense. Continuous operations are a combat multiplier when effective performance is sustained. Command and control of continuous combat operations requires the headquarters echelons to operate effectively over long periods of time until the division has accomplished its mission. Headquarters personnel will not function efficiently under the stress of combat without established work cycles that allow rest periods. To accomplish this, designated work shifts are established.

Staggering the Shift Change

Scheduling en mass shift changeover of the entire echelon is not effective. It degrades efficiency of the operations centers and staff functions. It allows a mass departure of the last shift and a complete loss of the collective knowledge of the period of time passed during that shift to include planning and coordination. Regardless of the thoroughness of the shift briefing, supporting decisions and rationale can be forgotten or deemed unimportant and not briefed. This places the oncoming shift at an information disadvantage, losing effectiveness in controlling the current operation and planning the future operation. A proven method of scheduling shifts and maintaining continuity of information is to stagger the shift change. See figure 2-3. It involves scheduling officers, SNCOs, and NCOs on overlapping shifts so that the new shift element has access to a body of knowledge four to six hours old.

Headquarters Echelon Displacement

Normally, an echelon does not shut down and transfer operations to another echelon while it displaces. Each headquarters echelon in the division must be able to displace during the operation and simultaneously conduct command and control. A preferred method of displacement is by organizing the echelon into two displacement increments. When one increment moves, it monitors the stationary increment which maintains functional operations. Once the moving increment establishes itself in the new location, an exchange of only that critical information received during the move is passed. Once this increment receives and understands the information, it accepts control and the stationary increment then moves to the new location or another location ahead of the first increment. During displacement operations, an echelon should only perform those functions absolutely critical to support the battle or operation. SOPs should determine the exact personnel breakout for displacement increments. During high-tempo operations, any or all headquarters echelons may have to operate continuously in a displacement mode to maintain contact with maneuver forces.

Headquarters Echelon Security

Security of the echelon takes many forms. The echelon employs electronic security and physical security measures. Mobile subscriber equipment and other wire communications enhance electronic security. Physical security is enhanced by the use of camouflage nets, mobility, patrols, checkpoints, sentinel/listening posts, and observation posts (OPs). A designated security force may be organized from military police, the division band, or any other element capable of performing the security mission. When the threat is significant, reinforced rifle platoons may be part of the security force. All efforts to disguise the headquarters are used to prevent enemy discovery of a high value target (HVT).

Information Management

Critical to effective control in the division's C^2 system is information management. Information must support its intended user, and its quality and flow determine C^2 effectiveness. Information management has one overriding purpose — to enable the commander to make timely decisions during the turmoil and confusion of battle. As the division commander's information manager, the chief of staff outlines and monitors the performance and

commander to see the battlefield without unnecessary clutter. Staff section maps normally contain more data to enable analysis prior to presentation of information to the commander.

Maneuver Information

All information relating to the maneuver of forces or the coordination and integration of maneuver units with combat support and combat service support is passed through the G-3 section. Maneuver information must be distributed between the G-3 representatives of each headquarters echelon. The need for timely maneuver decisions and the commander's ability to see the close operation require expedited transfer of information to the division tactical echelon by all committed units. The tactical echelon collates, posts, and analyzes maneuver information, turning it into current or updated close operations information which it then sends to both the division main echelon and the MEF tactical echelon. Maneuver information maintained at the tactical and main echelons of the division is identical in focus. The tactical echelon focuses on current information regarding the capabilities of units two levels down to make decisions on close operations. The main echelon uses information to make decisions affecting the division's current deep operations and future operations.

Intelligence Information

The G-2 section at the main echelon collates all information relating to intelligence functions. To be effective, the intelligence flow must allow for the access of information at any level of command within the division. All information received from subordinate and adjacent units must be analyzed to convert it from raw data into intelligence appropriate for the echelon of command for which it is intended. Unless specifically requested, raw intelligence data should not be routinely passed to a higher headquarters. Raw data increases the bulk of information, hampering staffs in effectively seeing the enemy and in anticipating actions in a timely way.

Battlespace Organization and Control

Battlespace organization is the way the division commander visualizes how he is going to fight the enemy and structure his command and control. See figure 2-4. Battlespace is an area of operations viewed in four dimensions — *air/space, surface, subsurface,* and *time*. The division commander relates his forces to each other in terms of command and control, maneuver, fires, and combat service support to the enemy in terms of time. He must know the location of the enemy, how fast the division can react to enemy initiatives, and how fast the enemy can react to actions of the division. The division commander's understanding of time and space relationships and systems capabilities determines his reaction time and ability to maintain operational momentum.

The division commander organizes the battlespace by assigning areas of responsibility to subordinate commanders. Key to this assignment is appreciation of the subordinate organization's capabilities, terrain, weather, and the enemy threat. The division commander also organizes his command, control, and intelligence (C^2I) support forces to ensure continuity of operations and disruption of the enemy's C^2 effort.

Friendly Forces

Friendly forces are assessed by the commander in terms of training, personnel strength, equipment readiness, and leadership. Subordinate organizations that are well led, are at full strength, and have high equipment and weapon system readiness, are not necessarily assigned the largest area of responsibility (AOR). Instead, it is advantageous to the division to reduce its AOR to focus this organization against a critical objective. Less capable organizations may be better employed in secondary areas or in economy of force operations over more extensive areas.

Terrain and Weather

Terrain and weather have a critical impact on the battle. The division commander considers the weather and both macro and micro terrain when assigning subordinates portions of the battlespace.

Terrain

Proper evaluation and utilization of the terrain mitigates incomplete information of the enemy. Terrain provides opportunities and imposes limitations. Analysis will include the unit's assigned AOR and the surrounding area which may affect the operation. The commander must recognize the battlefield's



Figure 2-4. Battlespace Organization.

natural structure and the means and techniques to exploit, improve, or overcome it to accomplish the mission. Terrain must also be viewed from the point of view of the enemy. The commander must see the battlefield as his enemy sees it to anticipate the influence of the terrain on the enemy's plan.

Weather

Weather affects observation, trafficability, control, performance of personnel, functioning of equipment, and the range and effect of weapons. The commander anticipates changes in the weather, capitalizing on them when possible. Inclement weather is exploited. Inclement weather and poor visibility help conceal movement and degrade the alertness of the enemy.

Enemy Threat

Enemy capabilities, limitations, and possible courses of action are evaluated. The division commander allocates battlespace based, in part, on the most likely and most dangerous courses of action the enemy might adopt and positions or avenues the enemy may select to support them.

Command and Control Support System

Afloat

The division utilizes four principal C^2 facilities afloat — the landing force operations center (LFOC), the tactical-logistical group (TACLOG), the supporting arms coordination center (SACC), and the intelligence center.

LFOC

The LFOC is used by the highest landing force command level afloat. The LFOC is normally organized to support the MEF CE. Ordinarily, the division will have representatives posted in the LFOC to assist and monitor operations.

TACLOG

The TACLOG contains detachments that represents the landing force (MEF), the division, and the division's regimental landing teams. The CSSE commander is responsible for forming and directing the landing force (LF) detachment. The division commander forms the GCE TACLOG detachment. Key personnel are provided from the G-3 and G-4 staff sections. It is collocated with the Navy control organization responsible for planning and conducting the waterborne and helicopterborne ship-to-objective maneuver. The commander, amphibious task force, (CATF) will designate either the central control officer or tactical air officer as the single point of contact for the GCE commander to resolve issues and make decisions affecting ship-to-objective maneuver.

SACC

Upon the initiation of planning, the CATF establishes a SACC. The SACC is under the supervision of the supporting arms coordinator (SAC), who is the direct representative of the naval commander charged with supporting arms coordination. The LF force fires coordinator may serve as the SAC. The LF force fires coordination center (FFCC) provides representatives to work in the SACC. The division provides fire support representatives which may include the AO, the naval gunfire officer (NGFO), and the target information officer. Requests for supporting arms from division units are coordinated by LF representatives with the SAC to ensure continuity of support.

Intelligence Center

The intelligence center aboard the ATF flagship is used by the highest landing force command afloat. It is normally organized to support the MEF CE. Additionally, a subordinate intelligence center will be established aboard the amphibious ship which the division headquarters is embarked. The mission of the intelligence center is to direct the intelligence effort during amphibious operations and to collect, process and disseminate intelligence to embarked and subordinate commanders.

Ashore

The division establishes each headquarters echelon ashore. Each echelon contains a combat operations center (COC) which contains the communications and personnel required to control the operations of the division. The primary purpose of the COC is to supervise the execution of the division commander's tactical decisions. It is staffed by representatives of the intelligence and operations sections with designated communication personnel. Normal COC functions include —

- Receiving and recording reports from subordinate organizations and transmitting reports to adjacent and higher headquarters.
- Maintaining situational awareness of current operations of subordinate organizations.
- Transmitting orders and tactical decisions of the commander to subordinate organizations.
- Advising the FSCC and other staff sections on events or information of immediate concern.
- Serving as the primary point of contact for liaison personnel from subordinate, supporting, or adjacent units.

Fire Support Coordination Center

The fire support coordination center (FSCC) is the division facility that centralizes the necessary communications and supporting arms personnel to plan and coordinate offensive air support, naval surface fire support, and artillery support and to execute the commander's plan. It maintains connectivity with the MEF FFCC if established, the SAC if the MAGTF FFCC is not established, and with subordinate FSCCs. The FSCC contains the designated FSC, supporting arms and aviation representatives, target information personnel, and the communicators. Coordination with the division engineer and combat engineer battalion commander is necessary to ensure obstacles are covered by fire and to plan the use of FASCAM.

Direct Air Support Center

The direct air support center (DASC) is the principal air control agency responsible for the direction of air

operations directly supporting ground forces. It functions in a decentralized mode of operation, but is directly supervised by the tactical air command center (Marine TACC). It is normally the first major air control agency ashore, and it lands in the same category as the division FSCC. It processes and coordinates requests for immediate air support and controls aircraft transiting its AOR. It coordinates air missions requiring integration with ground forces, including close air support, assault support, and designated air reconnaissance missions. Direct air support for the division commander's close operation is controlled and directed by the DASC.

The DASC collocates with the division FSCC. Ordinarily, this collocation will be by physical proximity. However, an electronic link may be an acceptable alternative. DASC siting requirements may differ from those of the division FSCC because of the necessity for line-of-sight communications. A direct air support center (airborne) (DASC(A)), consisting of an AN/UYQ-3A within a specially modified KC-130 aircraft, can also support division operations when the situation dictates. It is extremely flexible and adaptable to a variety of environments. Situations in which a DASC(A) can be employed include —

- Extended overland displacement.
- Supplementing the coverage of the primary DASC while it displaces or becomes degraded.
- Operations in geographic areas in which terrain characteristics adversely affect DASC communications.
- Amphibious operations to aid in control ashore from the Navy TACC to the DASC.
- Split sector operations while control is afloat or ashore.

The link between the DASC and the division FSCC is vital for coordination and integration of offensive air support missions with the employment of other supporting arms and the expeditious processing of immediate air requests. The fire support coordinator within the FSCC is the final arbitrator of all supporting arms integration conflicting requests for fire support assets. The FSCC provides the DASC with updates to unit boundaries and fire support coordination measures, positions, and other pertinent data. The DASC is responsible to the FSCC to provide timely information on —

- Predicted flight paths for aircraft under the DASC's control.
- Bomb damage assessment.
- Status of outstanding requests.
- Intelligence.
- Delays or cancellations to the air tasking order.

Also see FMFM 5-60, *Control of Aircraft and Missiles*.

Chapter 3

Amphibious Operations

The Division in Amphibious Operations

The Marine division's operational depth, speed, and flexibility is increased by integrating the capabilities of the division with that of the MEF and the NEF in the conduct of amphibious operations. Amphibious operations are part of operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS) and integral to naval power projection. An amphibious operation integrates virtually all types of sea, air, and land forces in a concerted military effort. It is conducted in the face of certain natural forces not normally encountered in land warfare. These forces include seas, surf, and features of hydrography. However, the advent of high mobility systems, long-range weapons, and modern surveillance systems offset many of these limitations and the capabilities of the enemy.

Types of Amphibious Operations

Amphibious Assault

An amphibious assault is the principal type of amphibious operation which establishes a force on a hostile shore. Amphibious assaults are essential to the landward dominance of battlespace. The division is organized and equipped to conduct an amphibious assault. It may be the entire ground element of the landing force or part of the assault element of a larger landing force. Maneuver of the division ashore is a logical extension of the maneuver of the ATF. When necessary, an amphibious assault against an integrated defense will require the NEF to focus overwhelming combat power to create a gap. The division must then exploit this window of opportunity created by the NEF.

Amphibious Raids

An amphibious raid is an attack from the sea involving swift incursion into hostile territory for a specified purpose, followed by a planned withdrawal. Raid forces may consist of aviation, infantry, engineers, artillery, or any other element with skills and equipment particularly needed for the mission. Amphibious raids are conducted in support of other operations or as independent operations directed against objectives requiring specific effects not possible with other power projection means. Generally, amphibious raids are conducted to —

- Destroy specific facilities, personnel, and/or equipment. Harass the enemy by attacks on isolated posts and headquarters and to capture or kill key personnel.
- Attack the enemy rear or flank coastal positions in support of other landing forces.
- Obtain information on hydrography, terrain, enemy dispositions, morale, strength, movements, and weapons.
- Create a diversion in connection with strategic or tactical deception operations.
- Evacuate individuals and equipment.
- Establish, support, or coordinate unconventional warfare activities.

Thorough, integrated rehearsals are essential to achieve precision and speed in executing a raid. All participating forces must be drilled in every detail of debarkation, movement ashore, operations ashore, withdrawal, and reembarkation. Timing, critically important in all raids, cannot be accurately estimated or adhered to without adequate rehearsals.

Amphibious Demonstrations

Amphibious demonstrations enhance deception and surprise. A demonstration is conducted to deceive the enemy by a show of force to induce him to adopt an unfavorable course of action. The value of the demonstration must be measured against its merit as a supporting effort and its impact on the main effort. The division may provide forces to make the demonstration more plausible. When an amphibious demonstration is applied within the framework of OMFTS, forces and assets providing an amphibious demonstration can be rapidly redirected to support operations elsewhere.

Effectiveness of a demonstration increases in direct proportion to the degree of realism involved in its execution. It should neither be underplayed not overplayed. It is crucial that the enemy receive a convincing impression of preparations for a landing. All visible, audible, and electronic aspects of the demonstration must appear to be authentic. A demonstration normally includes the approach of demonstration forces to the demonstration area, the launch of landing forces toward the coast, and fires. See figure 3-1.

Amphibious Withdrawals

An amphibious withdrawal is an operation involving the evacuation of land forces by sea in naval ships or craft from a hostile shore. Amphibious withdrawals may be conducted to extract a force under pressure, to assist in the repositioning of forces elsewhere in the theater, to reconstitute forces afloat, or to establish an operational reserve after introduction of heavy follow-on forces.

Characteristics

The amphibious withdrawal embraces the following distinguishing characteristics:

- Time available for planning and execution is normally limited.
- Facilities for embarkation and loading may be restricted, compounding logistic/CSS problems.
- All requisite fire support means may not be available.
- Means for controlling the withdrawal may be limited.
- The operation may be conducted under conditions of adverse weather, terrain, and hydrography.
- Circumstances may render it advisable to conduct the operation under limited visibility.
- The force to be withdrawn could be land forces not orginally inserted by amphibious operations. Therefore, forces to be withdrawn may be unfamiliar with amphibious procedures, complicating the operation.

The timing of a demonstration conducted in support of another operation must be coordinated to achieve the maximum desired level of reaction from the enemy force.

Prior to the main operation, a demonstration is conducted to —

- Draw enemy forces to the threatened area and away from the area of the main operation.
- Cause the enemy to disclose its positions.
- Provide protracted and systematic harassment.
- Divert the attention of the enemy from the main effort.
- Cause premature commitment of enemy forces.

Simultaneous with the main operation, a demonstration may commence at the same time as the main operation if it is desired to —

- Prevent redeployment of enemy forces.
- Deceive the enemy as to the location of the main effort.

Subsequent to the main operation, a demonstration may be conducted if the desired effect is to divert enemy forces or fire from the main effort. Successive demonstrations may be executed at a number of points after the main operation commences.

Figure 3-1. Timing Considerations for Amphibious Demonstrations.

Embarkation Area

The CATF in consultation with the commander, landing force (CLF) selects the embarkation area and beaches. Multiple embarkation beaches in the embarkation area are desirable to achieve maximum speed in embarkation and to provide passive protection against mass destruction weapons. Other factors to be considered when selecting the location and number of embarkation beaches include hydrography, distance from the transport area, availability of suitable assembly areas, proximity to the landing force as a whole, the covering force in particular, and protection from enemy observation and fires. Initial size of the embarkation area depends on several factors, such as —

- Terrain essential for defense in the event the embarkation is conducted under enemy pressure.
- Number of personnel and amount of equipment and supplies to be embarked.
- Artillery, naval surface fire support (NSFS), and air support available for defense, if required.
- Nature and extent of usable beaches.
- Time available for embarkation.

Additional Planning Considerations for the Amphibious Withdrawal

Good observation and fields of fire are necessary so that the enemy can be engaged at long ranges. Natural and manmade obstacles, including barrier systems, minefields, and demolitions, are used in combination with the terrain to minimize enemy interference with the withdrawal. Cover and concealment are sought for assembly areas and movement routes to embarkation beaches.

A covering force may be assigned the mission of preventing enemy interference with the withdrawal of the main body; its size should be the minimum consistent with providing adequate protection. The strength and composition of the covering force may vary in different portions of the embarkation area. A unit occupying a sector protected by a formidable obstacle may leave only minimum security posts, while units under attack may be required to remain at full strength.

Supporting forces are attached to the covering force consistent with requirements. Support requirements may conflict with the requirement for the early embarkation of heavy support equipment. Reconnaissance units, engineers, and medical personnel may be included as part of the covering force if necessary.

The requirement for supporting fires increases as the force withdraws and its capability to repel the enemy diminishes. Emphasis is placed on maximum use of external fire support agencies, including air support and NSFS.

Aviation requirements may include the use of transport helicopters to accomplish part of the withdrawal, naval gunfire spotting, close air support (CAS), antiair, reconnaissance, and interdiction.

The effect of the withdrawal on logistic support must be anticipated to ensure adequate support for the operation, to prevent the unnecessary destruction or loss of supplies, to provide for the destruction of supplies and equipment not evacuated, and to provide prompt evacuation of casualties.

Movement to embarkation beaches is controlled through the use of assembly areas, routes of withdrawal, initial points, and checkpoints. The plan for embarkation must emphasize speed and provide for maximum coordination between the arrival of units at embarkation beaches and the arrival, loading, and departure of landing craft. The amount of detail included in the plan is determined by the size of the operation, experience of personnel, and time available. The following may be included:

- Designation of embarkation beaches.
- Reactivation of the shore party as an embarkation combat agency and the assignment of precise responsibilities, including an officer in charge of embarkation.
- Detailed instructions concerning embarkation.
- Schedule and priorities for embarkation.
- Schedule for movement of units to embarkation beaches.

Embarkation is performed by the shore party, including ship's platoons and embarkation personnel. Control agencies, provided for each embarkation beach, summon and guide units from the assembly areas to the embarkation beaches and expedite loading.

General Sequence

The amphibious withdrawal is normally executed in the following sequence.

- Establish defense of the embarkation area by air, naval, and ground covering forces while organizing and embarking landing force (LF) personnel, supplies, and equipment not required for support of operations ashore.
- Progressively reduce troop and materiel strength ashore under protection of air, naval, and ground covering forces. Depending on limitations in afloat cargo capacity and/or loading time, all usable military materiel is either evacuated or destroyed. During this phase, specific provisions are made for the evacuation of casualties.
- Withdraw the ground covering force, with priority to heavy elements such as artillery and tanks, usually under cover of darkness and supported, as necessary, by air and NSFS.

Phases of Amphibious Operations

Amphibious operations are conducted within OMFTS to enable the introduction of larger forces, to support a main effort elsewhere, or to introduce forces designated the main effort in a campaign.

The threat of amphibious operations may serve as a deterrent to hostile action; to shield intent and objectives; and to disperse and fix in place enemy forces over an extended area. The phases of an amphibious operation are a sequence of events or activities. Certain phases may be conducted concurrently. The five phases of an amphibious operation are *planning, embarkation, rehearsal, movement,* and *assault.* However, forward-deployed amphibious forces may execute these phases in the following sequence: embarkation, movement, planning, rehearsal, and assault.

Planning Phase

The planning phase is the period extending from the issuance of the initiating directive (mission) to forces embarking in assigned shipping (embarkation). During this phase, the necessary preparatory measures are effected including coordinated planning. Even though planning is a continuous process, it is useful to distinguish between the planning phase and the subsequent operational phases, since a marked change occurs in the relationship between the commanders of the various forces. During the planning phase, the CATF coordinates planning. Any differences which the CATF and CLF cannot resolve are referred to the NEF commander (the common superior) at this time. At the commencement of the operational phases, the CATF assumes full responsibility for the entire force and the operation. The division commander may be designated the CLF or serve as a subordinate commander to the CLF (normally the MEF commander). Regardless, he provides recommendations for all basic decisions and must understand the general requirements of both the ATF and the LF commanders in the development of plans and orders.

Types of Planning

Amphibious planning procedures are characterized by detailed concurrent and parallel planning among all forces involved in an amphibious operation. Concurrent and parallel planning favor the assembly of commanders and staffs of corresponding echelons in the same locality. When such an arrangement is not practical, qualified liaison officers are exchanged to perform essential planning.

Basic Planning Considerations

All commanders are involved in amphibious planning. Though the CATF and CLF have overall responsibility for amphibious planning, the division commander and his subordinate commanders coordinate their planning with higher, adjacent, supporting, and supported forces. A specific amphibious operation may be related to other ongoing or future operations. Thus, the planning for an amphibious operation must ensure that the operation does not hinder or disrupt other actions. This is particularly critical

when the amphibious operation is a supporting effort. The division commander must also ensure that planning throughout the division is integrated to develop a coherent plan.

The CATF must determine the criticality of surprise, the need for a preparatory phase of deception operations to divert enemy forces from the amphibious objective area (AOA), and the need for protection of forces in transit. Commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) and operations security (OPSEC) planning guidance must be issued at the earliest possible time.

Accurate and adequate intelligence is a prerequisite for sound amphibious planning. Intelligence collection efforts directed toward satisfying the priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) must begin as soon as practical. National, theater, joint and advance forces, space, and other theater assets may be employed to collect information for the CATF and the CLF.

Development of the division's concept of operations ashore must precede detailed planning for surface and air operations in support of the amphibious operation. The division concept must be examined by all commanders concerned to determine its supportability, and it must be concurred with by the CATF, through the CLF, before detailed planning begins. All commanders who provide support for the assault must be prepared to alter and accommodate their supporting plans to reflect the changing requirements of the landing force as dictated by changes in the enemy situation.

Planning Documents

The CATF and subordinate commanders use the following documents to coordinate the planning effort at all levels of the amphibious task force.

Planning Directive. The CATF issues his planning directive to ensure interdependent plans are coordinated, planning is completed in the time allowed, and important aspects are not overlooked. The planning directive specifies the principal plans to be prepared and sets a deadline for completion of each major step in the planning process for the ATF command element and major forces assigned. The planning directive includes a mission statement, commander's analysis, assumptions, forces apportioned, proposed courses of action, OPSEC guidance, task assignments, administrative schedules, and coordinating instructions.

Planning Program. Using the ATF planning directive as a guide, each commander prepares a planning program that contains the schedule of planning events for his force. The division commander's planning program includes concept development, mission analysis, planning guidance, staff estimates, the commander's estimate, and the concept of operations.

Planning Memorandums. Planning memorandums are issued as additional information as intelligence is developed or received. These memorandums are issued to all commanders to ensure planning is based on the most accurate and current information available.

Preliminary Planning

Upon receipt of the warning order or other directive requiring the planning for an amphibious operation, the CATF conducts a thorough review of the mission and other information provided. As necessary, studies and initial estimates are prepared at both the landing force and ATF levels. These estimates provide information required to support the basic decisionmaking process and for the detailed planning that follows. See figure 3-2 for a description of basic decisions.

Detailed Planning

Once the CATF determines that the ATF can be supported, detailed planning begins. During detailed planning, the concept of operations and the adequacy of forces available is constantly evaluated.

Intelligence. During the planning phase, all subordinate commanders of the ATF have unique intelligence requirements. When the division is located outside the theater of war, it is particularly dependent on higher commands for meeting its intelligence requirements. However, the division may be tasked to conduct certain intelligence support functions and tasks for other forces. Regardless, the division commander coordinates with the CLF to ensure his requirements are met. The CLF has a number of

Basic decisions are those decisions that must be made before detailed planning for an amphibious operation can proceed. Some of these decisions may be provided in the initiating directive. Although discussed in the general sequence in which they are made, certain decisions may be made concurrently and others held pending further information.

Selection of the ATF Course of Action

CATF and the CLF jointly select a general course of action for the ATF that will accomplish the mission assigned. It is based on the NEF commander's intent and the guidance of tasks he assigns the ATF.

Selection of ATF Objectives

The CATF and CLF jointly select ATF objectives essential to the operation. The objective(s) are enemy critical vulnerabilities that, when neutralized, lead to mission accomplishment. When the purpose of the operation is to enable introduction of heavier follow-on land forces, the ATF objectives may take the form of terrain objectives (ports and airfields) or destruction of specific enemy capabilities (aviation, long-range weapons, and C^2).

Determination of the LF Mission

Based on the ATF mission, general course of action, and ATF objectives, the CLF develops a mission statement for the LF and submits it to the CATF for concurrence.

Designation of Landing Sites

A landing site is a continuous segment of coastline over which troops, equipment, and supplies can be landed by surface means. Landing sites must be of sufficient length to contain at least one penetration point. CATF designates the potential landing sites within the AOA and fumishes the CLF with pertinent information concerning them.

Designation of LF Objectives

The CLF determines LF objectives, attainment of which are necessary to accomplish the ATF mission.

Selection of the Landing Area

The landing area is that part of the objective area within which the landing operations of an amphibious force are conducted. It includes the penetration points, approaches, transport maneuver area, fire support areas, airspace, and landward extension of the battlespace to landing force objectives.

Formulation of the ATF Concept of Operations

The ATF concept of operations is usually a written and graphic representation of the CATF's intent about the operation. It gives an overall picture of the operation, including maneuver of the ATF to and within the AOA, and form of maneuver for ship-to-objective maneuver of the LF, ATF, and LF objectives, linkup plans, subsidiary landings, and the end state to be achieved by the ATF.

Selection of Penetration Points

A penetration point is a point through or over which the landing force pierces the coastline en route to inland objectives. Evaluation of potential penetration points includes consideration of beaches and helicopter landing zones (HLZs).

Beaches. A landing beach is that portion of a shoreline required to support a surface penetration of the high water mark. The CLF selects specific beaches. Principal factors in selection of landing beaches are —

- ATF concept of operations.
- Suitability for beaching landing craft and assault amphibious vehicles.
- Trafficability.
- Location, type, and density of obstacles, including underwater obstacles.
- Nature of the terrain immediately inland from the beach.
- Expected weather and tidal conditions.
- Known enemy coastal defense and force dispositions.

HLZs. An HLZ is a specified area for landing assault helicopters to embark or disembark troops and/or cargo. A landing zone may contain one or more landing sites. The CLF selects HLZs and advises the CATF. Principal factors in the selection of HLZs are —

- ATF concept of operations.
- Enemy capabilities and dispositions, in particular air defense capabilities.
- Nature of the terrain where the force must operate after landing.
- Combat service support.
- Fire support considerations.
- Capabilities of the assault support aircraft to move personnel, equipment, and supplies ashore in support of the operation.

Selection of Fixed-wing Aircraft LZs and DZs for Air-transported and Airborne Operations

When airborne or air-transported forces are employed, the CLF selects the landing zones (LZs) and drop zones (DZs) after consulting with the CATF.

Selection of the Tentative Date and Hour of Landing

If not specified, the CATF selects the tentative date and hour of landing. Principal factors in the selection for landing are shown in figure 3-3.

Figure 3-2. Basic Decisions for Amphibious Operations.

DATE FOR LANDING

				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	31

- Availability of forces
- Readiness of forces
- Present and projected enemy situation
- Seasonal conditions in the area under consideration
- Local conditions of weather, tide, current, phase of moon (duration of darkness and daylight)
- Designation of limiting dates by a higher authority
- Coordination with preliminary operations

HOUR FOR LANDING



- Known enemy routine
- Duration of daylight
- Need for tactical surprise
- Concept of operations ashore of the landing force
- Favorable conditions of wind, tide, and phase of moon
- Requirements for conducting certain operations during hours of darkness
- Most effective employment of supporting arms

Figure 3-3. Factors for Selecting the Tentative Date and Hour of Landing.

intelligence responsibilities during the planning phase. These responsibilities include —

- Identifying and forwarding LF intelligence requirements to CATF and/or the appropriate intelligence support agency.
- Procuring and distributing basic intelligence materials (maps, charts, imagery) to LF units.
- Collecting, producing, and disseminating intelligence in support of mission planning and execution.
- Assisting in the preparation and distribution of the Intelligence Annex to the ATF Operation Plan.
- Establishing liaison with ATF, joint task force (JTF), and theater intelligence organizations, as appropriate.

Command and Control. Maintaining seamless command and control in an amphibious operation requires significant planning and redundancy in assets. The division commander must evaluate his own communications capabilities, his C^2 requirements, and how the situation affects his ability to maintain connectivity to his subordinate units, higher commanders, adjacent commanders, and any other forces that support the operation. The division commander uses his estimate of the situation to recommend C^2 organization and support requirements to the CLF. The CLF is responsible for —

- Establishing adequate LF communications during the planning phase.
- Developing and promulgating a plan that integrates air operations ashore with air support from air elements outside the AOA.
- Determining requirements for communication facilities controlled by higher headquarters and submitting these requirements to the CATF.
- Determining requirements for shipboard communication facilities and services while embarked.

- Maintaining liaison with CATF and subordinate LF units in all C^2 planning matters.
- Developing and promulgating a coordinated plan for the LF and submitting this plan to CATF for review, coordination, approval, and inclusion in the ATF plan, as appropriate.
- Developing and promulgating a plan for link-up operations with other ground forces ashore.

Fire Support. The nature of amphibious operations places a premium on sound fire support planning and execution. The division commander must rely primarily on assets from supporting forces during the initial stages of the operation. Based on METT-T, the division commander identifies his fire support requirements and coordinates the use of NEF, ATF, and landing force assets to meet these requirements with the CLF. The CLF is responsible to the CATF for the following fire support planning requirements:

- Establishing fire support agencies at each appropriate level of the LF agency to discharge and implement LF fire support coordination responsibilities throughout the planning and execution of the operation.
- Determining the supporting arms requirements of the LF and ensuring that requirements are integrated with the planned scheme of maneuver of the ATF.
- Coordinating requests for supporting arms for the LF.
- Providing coordinated requests for naval surface fires and offensive air support to the CATF.
- Preparing the artillery fire plan.

Combat Service Support. An amphibious operation requires detailed sustainment planning. With the exception of amphibious raids of short duration, all amphibious operations rely on the ability of the ATF to provide sustainment to all subordinate forces. The division's concept of operations is legitimized by the sustainment capabilities available. The division commander coordinates his sustainment requirements with the CSSE commander, the ACE commander, and the ATF, through the CLF. The CLF is responsible to the CATF for determining the overall logistic and CSS requirements of the landing force, to include special equipment and shipping. In addition, the CLF is responsible for —

- Determining logistic and/or CSS requirements that cannot be met by the LF and submission of these requirements to CATF.
- Determining and allocating the means to meet logistic and/or CSS requirements of the LF.
- Developing plans for the assembly of supplies and equipment to be embarked, to include the supplies and equipment of other forces that the LF is responsible for embarking.
- Preparing the LF embarkation and ship loading plans and orders in coordination with the CATF.
- Planning for the coordination of logistics and combat service support required by all elements of the LF.
- Preparing the logistic and CSS annex to the LF operation plan.

Ship-to-Objective Maneuver. The division must be organized to permit the seamless and continuous application of combat power to distant inland objectives. The following guidelines apply to organization for ship-to-objective maneuver:

- Provide for the concentration of combat power at the critical time from dispersed locations.
- Provide maximum shock effect at the penetration points to overcome enemy resistance at the beach.
- Provide for the timely employment of combat, combat support, and combat service support elements required to support the commander's concept.
- Provide depth to the assault to ensure exploitation of gaps created or located by the NEF.
- Provide sufficient flexibility to exploit opportunities discovered during execution of the operation.

The requirements of ship-to-objective maneuver must be determined by the CLF. The division commander's concept of operations, the CSSE commander's concept of support, and the ACE commander's concept of operations all require thorough integration and detailed planning. Based on these subordinate concepts of operation and the CLF's and CATF's intent, landing means are dedicated to place the appropriate forces and support at the most decisive location. The division commander must consider the mobility requirements of his C^2

assets, each maneuver unit, fire support units, and his reserve and how to best arrange their maneuver in time and space to achieve his end state. These requirements are submitted to the CLF for approval and reflected in the landing force's landing plan. When he has received the requirements of his subordinate units, the CLF is responsible to the CATF for —

- Determining ship-to-objective maneuver requirements and presenting them to CATF.
- Advising the CATF of the availability of LF assault support aircraft, rubber and rigid-hulled boats, obstacle breaching equipment, and amphibious vehicles.
- Preparing landing plans.

NBC Defense. The CLF is responsible for determining and prescribing the active and passive NBC defense measures required for the landing force. The CLF then presents to CATF the NBC defense measures that should be provided by other forces. NBC active defense measures are employment of fires to eliminate enemy NBC capabilities, increased air defense measures, increased air reconnaissance, and increased communications security (COMSEC) measures, including the use of appropriate countermeasures. NBC passive defense measures are dispersion of units, protective clothing and equipment, distribution of trained NBC defense personnel, establishment of a monitoring system, creation of NBC salvage units, and development of plans for mass casualty handling.

Embarkation Phase

The embarkation phase is the period during which forces, with their equipment and supplies, embark in assigned shipping. This phase commences the operational phases of the amphibious operation. The primary goal of this phase is the orderly assembly of personnel and material and their embarkation in assigned shipping in a sequence designed to meet the requirements of the ATF concept of operations ashore. Force protection measures are crucial to ensure the secure embarkation of the force and preclude compromise of the impending operation.

The CATF and the CLF respectively prepare the plans for assembly of assault shipping and for movement of the division to embarkation points. These plans must be coordinated and distributed as soon as possible to permit initiation of preliminary movements and preparations. The CLF is responsible for —

- Determining LF requirements for assault shipping associated with the assault echelon and assault follow-on echelon.
- Developing the LF organization for embarkation.
- Determining the means required from forces afloat and external agencies at the embarkation points during loading.
- Designating shipping in which Marine units will be embarked and preparing detailed embarkation and loading plans for the CATF's approval.

Rehearsal Phase

The rehearsal phase is the period during which the prospective operation is rehearsed for testing the adequacy of plans; the timing of detailed operations; ensuring combat readiness of participating forces; ensuring all are familiar with plans; and testing communications. The rehearsal phase may be conducted concurrently with other initial phases of the amphibious operation but it is most often associated with the movement to the objective phase. It is during this period that one or more rehearsal exercises are conducted by the ATF, ideally under conditions approximating those to be encountered in the objective area. Although OPSEC may be the major limiting factor during this phase, the CATF's objective should be to exercise as much of the force and the operational plan as the situation permits.

Rehearsal Plans

Rehearsal plans should be issued separately from actual plans and they should require execution of the various tasks and functions paralleling those required during the actual operation. See figure 3-4 for planning considerations.

The number, nature, and scope of rehearsals will be influenced by the following considerations:

- Complexity of the tasks assigned to the ATF.
- Time available for rehearsals.
- State of training of the forces.
- Suitability of available rehearsal areas.
- Special or unusual problems to be faced in the actual operation, the solution to which must be given special attention in rehearsals.
- Intelligence and counterintelligence considerations.
- Adequacy of the communication plan.
- CSS availability to replenish, replace, or repair assets used during rehearsals.
- Degree of OPSEC required to prevent disclosure of the intent, the timing of, or the location of the amphibious operation.

The dates on which rehearsals are conducted and the time allocated for them must provide for —

- Complete and careful execution of the entire rehearsal.
- Reembarkation of all troops, equipment, and supplies.
- Replenishment, repair, or replacement of equipment and supplies used during rehearsals, including landing craft, ships, or aircraft.
- Critiques at all levels of command for evaluation and correction of mistakes.
- Time to revise plans in those areas that the rehearsal has disclosed to be necessary.

Selection of the rehearsal area is influenced by the following:

- Similarity of rehearsal area to actual landing area.
- Feasibility of employing live fire.
- OPSEC.
- Susceptibility to enemy interference.
- Location of the rehearsal area in relation to the AOA and to points of embarkation.
- Health conditions at the rehearsal area.
- Activity of civilians, vehicles, shipping, and small craft that may interfere with the rehearsal.

Testing the adequacy of the communication plan will be influenced by the following:

- State of training of assigned communications personnel.
- Material status of communication equipment.
- OPSEC and COMSEC restrictions.
- Advanced training time available before the rehearsal phase.

Figure 3-4. Planning Considerations for Rehearsal Plans.

Rehearsal Security

Strict security must be enforced during rehearsals because of similarity with the actual operation. Reconnaissance, selection of, and arrangements for the use of rehearsal areas are to be accomplished carefully. Deception measures should be planned to ensure the security of the rehearsal. Restricting movement of ships and personnel and establishing patrols around the rehearsal area, at sea and ashore, are primary means of establishing security. Rehearsals may have to be timed to coincide with those time periods when satellites cannot observe the rehearsal area. Particular attention must be given to signal security.

Movement Phase

The movement phase is the period during which the components of the ATF move from the points of embarkation to the objective area. This move may be via rehearsal, staging, and/or rendezvous areas. The movement phase is completed when the components of the ATF arrive in their assigned positions in the objective area. Movement of the ATF to the AOA includes departure of ships from loading points in an embarkation area; passage at sea; and approach to, and arrival in, assigned positions in the AOA.

Organization for Movement

Based on the landing plan, the ATF organizes its ships, self-deploying aircraft, and airlift for embarkation and deployment. This organization is based on the time-phased force requirements of the ATF, the NEF, and other Service units in the objective area.

Transport Groups

Transport groups are those elements that deploy and support the landing and are functionally designated as transport groups in the ATF task organization. Transport groups provide for the embarkation, maneuver within the AOA, landing, and sustainment of the LF. Navy landing craft and cargo off-loading and discharge systems to be employed during ship-to-objective maneuver are organic or attached to the transport groups. Multiple transport groups are formed when required to support multiple penetration points. Each is combat loaded to support the landing plan for the penetration point assigned. Each group is assigned assault shipping required by the LF in its assigned area.

Movement Planning

The CATF is responsible for preparing a movement plan during the planning phase. In operations in which several attack groups are involved, the CATF usually prepares a general movement plan in which coordinating measures are included as necessary. Subordinate force and group commanders prepare their own detailed movement plans.

Sea Routes to the AOA. Sea routes and route points from ports of departure to the AOA are determined by the CATF, subject to approval by the NEF commander. Alternate routes are also planned to avoid interference between forces and to permit diversion should the enemy threaten or the weather prevent use of the primary routes. The CATF determines sea routes in the AOA that support the maneuver of the ATF. Sea routes must take into consideration the missions of various task forces, groups, units, and subordinate elements of the ATF. The CLF should be familiar with sea routes within the AOA so his landward maneuver capitalizes on the effects of maneuver at sea.

Approach to the AOA. Approach to the AOA includes arrival of various movement groups in the vicinity of the AOA and deployment of movement groups from cruising formations, reforming as necessary according to assigned tasks and proceeding to designated positions in the AOA. During this critical period, additional protective measures are taken beyond those provided during passage.

Preassault Operations. A preassault operation is an operation conducted in the AOA before the assault phase begins. It may include reconnaissance, minesweeping, fires, underwater demolition, and destruction of beach obstacles. Preassault operations are conducted by subordinate elements of the ATF that are normally organized as an advance force. These operations may be conducted to —

- Isolate the penetration points.
- Gain information about the enemy.
- Prepare the penetration point(s) for the assault.

Supporting Operations Before Arrival of the Advance Force. The joint force commander (JFC) may provide forces to support the ATF before the arrival of an advance force in the AOA. Any or all of the following tasks may be accomplished before the arrival of the advance force.

- Deception.
- Isolation of the penetration points and attainment of air, surface, and subsurface superiority.
- Destruction of specific targets.
- Harassment.
- Psychological operations.
- Intelligence collection.
- Destruction or neutralization of distant forces and installations.
- Special operations.
- Mine countermeasures.

Advance Force Operations. An advance force is a temporary organization within the ATF. The decision to employ an advance force is made early in the planning phase by CATF, after consultation with the CLF. The decision to employ an advance force must be weighed against the relative advantages of surprise and requirements for preparation of penetration points. The advance force commander is responsible

for detailed planning for advance force operations and ensuring plans fulfill overall requirements of the ATF. The advance force commander prepares NSFS, air operations, penetration point reconnaissance, underwater demolition, mine countermeasures (MCM), and pre-D-day landing plans. Landings or demonstrations to be conducted are planned in consultation with the landing group commander of the advance force. The advance force may conduct any or all of the following tasks:

- Destruction of defenses ashore.
- Preparation of seaward maneuver space.
- Preparation of landing sites and approaches.
- Conduct of reconnaissance and surveillance.
- Isolation of the penetration points and maintenance of local air superiority.
- Conduct of demonstrations and other deception operations.
- Collection of meteorological and oceanographic information.

Assault Phase

The assault phase is the period between the arrival of the assault forces of the ATF in the AOA and the accomplishment of the mission. Development of the area for its ultimate use may be initiated during this period. The assault phase encompasses —

- Fires to disrupt enemy defenses and support amphibious breaching.
- Amphibious breaching when required.
- Ship-to-objective maneuver.
- Link-up operations between surface and air-landed assault forces.
- Fires in support of maneuver inland.
- Provisions for continuous combat service support throughout the phase.

Organization for the Assault

The ATF and LF are organized to retain the tactical integrity of assault elements during the ship-to-objective maneuver. The division organizes the infantry regiments into assault elements, normally retaining one or more regimental-sized elements as the reserve. The reserve provides the division commander the means to influence the course of the action ashore. The ability to commit the reserve quickly is dictated by availability of landing craft, AAVs, and assault support aircraft; command and control; and rapid planning.

Fire Support Coordination

The division FSCC is charged with the accomplishment of coordinated planning of supporting arms. The division exercises responsibilities for fire support coordination through the division FSCC. The FSCC is comprised of the designated FSC, supporting arms representatives, a target information officer, and the required operations, intelligence, and communication personnel. The coordination of supporting fires is under the supervision of the operations officer. The FSCC is an advisory, planning, and coordinating agency that does not possess either command or control of supporting arms means. The artillery, naval gunfire, and air officers have special staff functions that provide them access to the commander and his staff in the routine performance of duty.

The commander of the artillery regiment is designated as the division FSC. He exercises such authority as is delegated to him to accomplish the tasks of planning and coordinating fire support. The FSC supervises overall fire support planning and coordination. The individual fire plans (artillery, naval gunfire, air) are prepared by supported arms representatives and/or their control agencies. Also see FMFM 6-18, *Techniques and Procedures for Fire Support Coordination.*

Termination of the Amphibious Operation

The termination of the amphibious operation is predicated on the accomplishment of the mission of the ATF in accordance with the specific conditions contained in the initiating directive.

Chapter 4

Offensive Operations

Characteristics of Offensive Operations

The division conducts offensive operations in support of the MEF operation. The offensive is the division commander's primary means of gaining the initiative, forcing the enemy to conform to his intent, and retaining freedom of action. When the opportunity for decisive action presents itself, the division commander commits all necessary resources. Failure to take advantage of all opportunities may result in slow, inconclusive attacks and heavy losses.

Combat power in the offense is maximized by organizing responsive combined arms forces that can move rapidly, deliver accurate fire, and maintain continuous situational awareness. Offensive plans must provide flexibility to use any favorable advantage that develops during the attack.

Surprise is always sought when operating in the offense. It can be gained by deceiving the enemy's defense and by choosing an unexpected time for, place of, direction of, and form of maneuver. Cover and security aid in achieving surprise. Night and limited-visibility attacks with smoke also increase the probability of achieving surprise. Applying pressure day and night can deny a weakening enemy relief from battle, recoup of losses, or the opportunity to gain the initiative.

The division commander task-organizes subordinate organizations based on METT-T. The success of the attack depends on the proper application of the principles of war (see FMFM 6) and the five characteristics of the offense — *concentration, audacity, speed, flexibility, and surprise.*

Concentration

Concentration may be achieved by narrowing the zone of action of the division's main effort, thereby achieving an advantage of combat power at the point of attack. It may also be achieved by allocating and shifting priorities of fire support. This will require an economy of force from elsewhere in the division area, using supporting efforts to fix and deceive the enemy. Concentration of division forces must be conducted from dispersed locations as rapidly as possible to minimize vulnerability and rapidly redispersed once the end state has been achieved. Concentration includes the massing of combat support and CSS resources as well as maneuver forces.

Audacity

The division and subordinate commanders must be audacious and capable of taking advantage of windows of opportunity. As battles and engagements progress, the enemy will make tactical errors or vulnerabilities will be created by our own actions. These windows of opportunity will usually be of short duration, forcing the division commander to make bold decisions that have significant impact on current and future operations. Even though the division commander may not have all the intelligence or combat information he would desire, he cannot allow himself to wait for the complete tactical situation to be developed. The commander that cannot or will not take risks will eventually be overcome by enemy actions.

Speed and Flexibility

Speed and the flexibility to rapidly shift the main effort to take advantage of enemy vulnerabilities and weaknesses contribute to the success of the division's attack. Speed allows division forces to maneuver quickly, to disrupt enemy decisionmaking, and to rapidly mass at the decisive location. Speed provides an inherent amount of security as the enemy target acquisition efforts are hampered. Flexibility, built into plans by constantly developing branches to current operations, and planning future operations,

allows the division commander to maintain the initiative and continue operations without unintended operational pauses.

Surprise

Surprise is achieved by attacking at unexpected locations and times. Surprise permits a smaller force to overwhelm a larger, more powerful force. An enemy taken by surprise often reacts without coordination, mutual support, or knowledge of the attackers strength. Plans of attack are developed that promote surprise through the use of limited visibility, operations security, attacks from unexpected directions and with unexpected techniques or methods.

Forms of Maneuver

The division commander selects the most decisive form of maneuver to achieve his purpose. His decision is influenced by the type of offensive operation he is conducting (see Types of Offensive Operations on page 4-11); by rear operations and affects of available sustainment; and by the shaping of the battlespace through division and MEF deep operations. Though forms of maneuver are normally associated with close operations, they can also be conducted in deep (deep maneuver) and rear operations (security operations). Furthermore, the division commander considers the effects of deep operations and the success or failure of deception which may permit him to adopt an otherwise unfavorable form of maneuver. The forms of maneuver are *frontal attack, flanking attack, envelopment,* and the *turning movement.*

While frequently used in combination, each form of maneuver attacks the enemy in a different way and poses different opportunities and challenges to the division. The commander may orient his attack on the front, flank, or rear of the enemy. Helicopterborne operations that place forces on the enemy's flanks or his rear can be used during all forms of maneuver. The distinction in the form of maneuver employed exists primarily in the intent of the commander, since subordinate units may use other forms of maneuver. The mission of the division, characteristics of the area of operations, disposition of opposing forces, and relative combat power of opposing forces are analyzed to determine the best form of maneuver.

Frontal Attack

A frontal attack normally involves attacking the enemy on a broad front by the most direct route. See figure 4-1. Frontal attacks are used when the attacker possesses overwhelming combat power, against lightly held or disorganized forces, as rapidly as possible to deny the enemy time to react, and to sustain the attacker's momentum. Subordinate units of the division conducting a frontal attack are not



Figure 4-1. Frontal Attack.

restricted to conducting frontal attacks themselves or maintaining alignment with adjacent units.

The frontal attack is most often selected by commanders tasked with conducting supporting attacks, during a pursuit, or for fixing an enemy in place. During a frontal attack, commanders seek to create or take advantage of conditions that will permit a more decisive penetration of the enemy positions.

The goal of a frontal attack is to achieve a penetration. A penetration divides the enemy and allows him to be defeated in detail. As forces attack frontally, successful units will rupture portions of the enemy defense. The penetration usually progresses in three stages: rupturing the forward enemy defensive positions, widening the rupture to permit the employment of follow-on forces, and overrunning or seizing deep objectives to destroy the continuity of the enemy defense. The division commander may conduct feints or demonstrations in other areas to weaken the enemy effort at the breach by causing him to shift reserves to the attacker's advantage. The main effort may be shifted and combat power is brought to bear at the point of penetration to widen the breach, defeat enemy counterattacks, and attack the enemy in depth.

Follow-on forces may be used to widen the rupture after the leading force has ruptured the enemy position, or they may pass through the leading force and maintain the momentum of the attack by overrunning or seizing assigned objectives in the enemy rear. Follow-on forces may also be employed to attack enemy forces isolated or bypassed by leading forces.

Fire support contributes to the violence of the attack and reduces friendly casualties. Preparation fires cover the movement of the main effort and then concentrates to weaken the enemy at the point of the rupture. Fires are also directed against targets to limit enemy movement and neutralize his reserves. When the rupture is effected, fire support is shifted to support attacks to widen the breach, on deep targets to defeat counterattack forces, or on defensive positions in depth to facilitate exploitation. Objectives are selected in the enemy rear to break up the continuity of his forces and to make his forward defensive positions untenable. Objectives are selected at least to the depth of the enemy reserve and include his fire support means, command and control installations, and reserve. To facilitate the momentum of the main effort, lateral movement should not be unduly restricted by boundaries or obstacles. Intermediate objectives are assigned to the main effort only if they are essential to the accomplishment of the mission. Liaison must be maintained with forces in contact to facilitate one force passing through another. Successful penetrations —

- Disrupt enemy command and control.
- Force the enemy to expend resources against supporting attacks.
- Force the premature commitment of the enemy reserve.
- Create psychological paralysis in enemy commanders

Flanking Attack

A flanking attack is a form of maneuver where the main effort is directed at the flank of an enemy. See figure 4-2. A flank may be created by fires, terrain, and/or enemy dispositions. A flanking attack seeks to strike the enemy while avoiding the frontal orientation of his main weapon systems. A flanking attack is similar to an envelopment but is conducted on a shallower axis and is usually less decisive and less risky than a deeper attack. Ordinarily, flanking attacks are conducted by subordinate units of the division in support of the division's scheme of maneuver.

Supporting efforts strike along the enemy's front to fix the enemy. Units conducting supporting attacks may attack by fire or by maneuver. Fires in support of the flanking attack fix frontline enemy units and counterattack forces. Security forces are employed in depth to prevent the attacking units from being flanked themselves. As the maneuver units make contact with enemy units on the flank, fires are shifted along the enemy's front and intensified against reserves and counterattack forces. As the enemy's frontline defensive positions are overwhelmed, the flanking attack is exploited by continuing the attack into the depth the defensive system. Supporting efforts that achieve success may become the main effort to ensure maintenance of momentum into the enemy rear.



Figure 4-2. Flanking Attack.

Envelopment

An envelopment is an offensive maneuver in which the main effort passes around or over the enemy's principal defensive positions to attack the objective while avoiding the enemy's main combat power. See figure 4-3. By nature, it requires surprise, superior mobility (ground and/or air), and successful supporting attacks. An envelopment generally —

- Strikes the enemy where he is weakest.
- Severs enemy lines of communication.
- Disrupts enemy command and control.
- Interrupts enemy combat service support.
- Forces the enemy to fight on a reverse front.
- Minimizes the attacker's losses.
- Compels the defender to fight on ground of the attacker's choosing.

The enveloping force avoids the enemy's strength en route to the objective. Superior mobility and surprise are key. An enveloping force should deploy in depth and secure its flanks to avoid being outflanked in turn. Supporting attacks, which are designed to fix the enemy's attention to his front and which force him to fight in two or more directions simultaneously, contribute to the main effort's ability to maneuver to the enemy's rear. A vigorous supporting attack holds the enemy in position and prevents him from maneuvering against the enveloping force. In some situations, the supporting effort may deceive the enemy as to the existence or location of the enveloping attack. Supporting efforts must have sufficient combat power to seize limited objectives and keep the enemy engaged.

Rapid movement is essential to prevent the enemy from redeploying his forces against the enveloping force or occupying prepared supplementary positions. If the enemy extends his front to cut off the enveloping force, the commander may decide to penetrate the enemy's extended front. The reserve normally follows the enveloping force but the commander is alert to exploit success of the enveloping or supporting attacks.



Figure 4-3. Envelopment.

Preparation fires may precede the enveloping attack and/or the supporting attack. When used to support the enveloping attack, preparation fires are short and intense. Fire support is used to help hold the enemy in place and prevent his maneuvering against the enveloping attack. Fire support is also used to neutralize enemy forces bypassed by the enveloping attack and to disrupt the depth of the enemy defense.

Envelopment objectives include C^2 installations, fire support means, and routes of escape. The enveloping force and supporting efforts may be launched simultaneously or they may be conducted at different times to confuse the enemy. Minimum control measures are assigned to the enveloping force.

Turning Movement

A turning movement is a form of maneuver in which the main effort seizes objectives so deep as to force the enemy to abandon his position or divert major forces to meet the threat. See figure 4-4. The intent of a turning movement is to force the enemy out of his position without assaulting him; the act of seizing a key objective to his rear makes his position untenable.

The main effort usually operates at such a distance from supporting efforts that its units are beyond mutual supporting distance. Therefore, the main effort must be self-sufficient and reach the objective before becoming decisively engaged. Once a key objective has been seized, the enemy is then destroyed at a time and place of the commander's choosing. Normally, the division is the smallest organization capable of conducting a successful turning movement.

Offensive Planning

The division commander plans his attack to ensure the division avoids unintended pauses or loss of momentum. His vision of how the overall operation will unfold, to include making transitions from one type of offensive operation to another or to the defense, is key to his planning. The division commander must develop a flexible plan that will allow him to adjust to battlefield changes created by friendly actions or enemy operations.

The division plan of attack must be consistent with the MEF commander's intent and concept of operations. The division commander must also rely on



Figure 4-4. Turning Movement.

connectivity with the MEF and the ACE to ensure his plan is supportable and that it takes advantages of the strengths and minimizes the limitations of the other elements of the MEF. In particular, the MEF's deep and rear operations have significant impact on the number of viable options the division may adopt.

A division plan for offensive operations usually takes into account all four types of offensive operations. The plan may include plans for gaining contact through movement to contact; for attacking the enemy in depth, using one of the forms of maneuver; for conducting an exploitation by designating tentative exploitation forces; and for conducting the pursuit of the enemy to finish his destruction. Offensive planning is a continuous process. In the offense, the commander and staff plan branches and sequels to current operations and future operations. In the defense, the commander and staff plan future offensive operations and offensive sequels to the current defensive battle.

Planning The Attack

The planning sequence begins with the receipt of a mission. Based on information available to him from his staff and from higher, lower, and adjacent units, the commander initiates his estimate by analyzing and restating the mission and issuing his planning guidance. Based on this guidance, the staff prepares and presents estimates and recommendations. The commander then completes his estimate by analyzing the opposing courses of action. He then compares the advantages and disadvantages of the various courses of action and makes his decision. He states his decision in terms of who, what, when, where, how, and why. During the process of analysis and comparison of courses of action, the

commander will develop his concept of operation which provides the staff with sufficient guidance to translate the decision into plans and orders.

Task Organization

The division commander implements his decision by allocating combat power to support his plan of attack. In accomplishing this, he may form temporary task forces consisting of combat, combat support, and CSS units. The battalion is the basic maneuver organization of the division. The division's organization lends itself to the formation of task forces based on the infantry battalion and regiment. The division reconnaissance company, artillery regiment, tank battalion, assault amphibian battalion, light armored reconnaissance battalion, combat engineer battalion, and CSS units are designed to facilitate task-organizing around basic infantry formations.

Distribution of Forces

Successful offensive action requires the concentration of all assets. Available maneuver forces, artillery, engineers, air defense, aviation, and command and control warfare (C^2W) must be integrated at the decisive point and time to ensure success. This requires the division commander and staff to analyze the division's mission and translate it into specific objectives that, if successfully achieved, facilitate the destruction of the enemy force. Designation of the main effort and assignment of supporting efforts contribute to the understanding of responsibilities of attacking organizations. The division commander will designate a main effort, supporting effort(s), and the reserve.

Main Effort

The division commander provides the bulk of his combat power to the main effort to maintain momentum and ensure accomplishment of the mission. The main effort is provided with the greatest mobility and the preponderance of combat support and combat service support. The division commander gives the main effort priority of fires. Reserves are echeloned in depth to support exploitation of the main effort's success. The commander can further concentrate the main effort by assigning it a narrower zone of action.

All other actions are designed to support the main effort. The commander disguises the main effort until it is too late for the enemy to react to it in strength. He accomplishes this through the use of demonstrations or feints, security, cover and concealment, and by dispersing his forces until the last instant and achieving mass at the critical time and place. When the main effort fails to accomplish assigned tasks, the commander's C^2 system must facilitate a rapid shift of the main effort.

Supporting Effort

A supporting effort in the offense is carried out in conjunction with the main effort to achieve one or more of the following:

- Deceive the enemy as to the location of the main effort.
- Destroy or fix enemy forces which could shift to oppose the main effort.
- Control terrain that if occupied by the enemy will hinder the main effort.
- Force the enemy to commit reserves prematurely.

There may be more than one supporting effort. A supporting effort may achieve unexpected success, in which case the division commander must be ready to quickly shift combat power and redesignate that force the main effort. The commander assigns the minimum combat power necessary to accomplish the purpose of each supporting effort.

Reserve

The reserve is held under the control of the division commander as a maneuver force to decisively influence the action. The primary purpose of the reserve is to attack at the critical time and place to ensure the victory or exploit success. Its strength and location will vary with its contemplated mission, the form of maneuver, the terrain, the possible enemy reaction, and the clarity of the situation. When the situation is obscure, the reserve may consist initially of the bulk of the force, centrally located and prepared to be employed at any point. When the situation is clear and the enemy capabilities are limited, the reserve may consist of a smaller portion of the force disposed to support the scheme of maneuver. However, the reserve must always be sufficient to effectively exploit success.

The reserve provides the commander the flexibility to react to unforeseen developments. When the reserve is committed, the next higher commander is notified. The reserve should be —

- Positioned to readily reinforce the main effort.
- Employed to exploit success, not to reinforce failure.
- Committed as a maneuver force, not piecemeal.
- Reconstituted immediately.

Scheme of Maneuver

The scheme of maneuver represents the integration of the division's subordinate units activities in time and space to achieve the commander's desired end state. It is the basis for subordinate unit maneuver, fire support prioritization, intelligence collection activities, and CSS operations. Graphically portrayed, the scheme of maneuver normally contains —

- Time of attack.
- Subordinate unit boundaries, axes of advance, directions of attack, and tactical areas of responsibilities.
- Phase lines, checkpoints, coordination points, passage points, assembly areas, the line of departure, and other coordination measures.
- Fire support coordinating measures such as the coordinated fire line (CFL), fire support coordination line (FSCL), and free fire areas (FFA), etc..
- Initial locations of headquarters echelons and key C^2 nodes.

Fire Support Plan

The fire support plan is the plan of supporting fires for the scheme of maneuver. It is fully integrated and concurrently developed with the maneuver of division units. Fire support planning involves not only the translation of the commander's concept into a definitive plan which portrays the supported unit's requirements, but also involves the detailed planning which must be accomplished to effect delivery of the supporting fires.

Fire support is used to suppress, neutralize, fix, or destroy pockets or resistance prior to direct fire engagement by maneuver units. The division FSC develops the fire support task organization and the coordinating measures for the attack, exploitation, pursuit, and contingency plans. Fire support systems are positioned to ensure continuous fires throughout the operation. Mutual support of fire support systems promotes responsive support and provides the commanders of maneuver units freedom of action during each critical event of the engagement or battle. Direct support artillery moves with supported units and aviation is used to destroy enemy fire support means and key enemy units and facilities. Counterbattery radars are positioned to maintain radar coverage for forward maneuver forces. The artillery regiment manages radar coverage to ensure continuous coverage during rapid movement forward.

Deep Operations

Deep operations are military actions conducted against enemy capabilities which pose a potential threat to friendly forces. These military actions are designed to isolate, shape, and dominate the battlespace and influence future operations. Deep operations are conducted primarily through the employment of fires. They seek to open the window of opportunity for decisive maneuver and are designed to restrict the enemy's freedom of action, disrupt the coherence and tempo of his operations, nullify his firepower, disrupt his command and control, interdict his supplies, isolate or destroy his main forces, and break his morale.

The enemy is most easily defeated by fighting him close and deep simultaneously. Well-orchestrated deep operations, integrated with simultaneous close operations, may be executed with the goal of defeating the enemy outright or the goal of setting the conditions for successful future close operations. Deep operations enable friendly forces to choose the time, place, and method for close operations.

Deep operations in the MEF are primarily planned, coordinated, and executed by the MEF CE. Although deep operations are primarily the responsibility of the MEF CE and may be conducted largely with ACE resources, the division has a significant role. The division contributes to the deep operations of the MEF by recommending deep operations objectives and targets that will help shape the future division battlespace. The division must also be prepared to provide resources to execute deep

operations as directed by the MEF CE, and may in fact be tasked to control certain deep operations missions on behalf of the MEF. Additionally, the division may plan and execute deep operations within its own area of operations to shape the division battlespace. Deep operations conducted in support of the offense may include —

- Deception.
- Deep interdiction through deep fires, deep maneuver, and deep air support.
- Deep reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition.
- Command and control warfare.
- Offensive antiair warfare.

Deception plays a major part in shaping the battlespace, and the division plays a major role in the MEF's deception operations. Deceptive measures such as demonstrations or feints can disrupt enemy plans, divert enemy forces away from the actual point of battle, and delay enemy reactions thereby placing the enemy at a disadvantage when forces come in contact. Deception activities of the division must be well coordinated with the MEF to ensure efforts are directed towards a common goal. Division deep interdiction capabilities include the long-range fires of its artillery and rockets and its high-speed, mobile maneuver forces. The division may contribute to deep surveillance and target acquisition efforts with its organic reconnaissance forces and the counterbattery radar platoon of the artillery regiment. Command and control warfare and offensive antiair warfare conducted in support of deep operations are normally outside the capability of the division.

The coordination and integration of the MEF and division deep operations help to ensure constant pressure on critical enemy capabilities throughout the battle. Because of the scarcity of resources with which to conduct these activities, deep operations must be focused on those enemy capabilities which most directly threaten the success of the projected friendly operations.

Close Operations

Close operations are military actions conducted to project power decisively against enemy forces which pose an immediate or near term threat to the success of current battles and engagements. These military actions are conducted by committed forces and their readily available tactical reserves, using maneuver and combined arms. These operations require speed and mobility to enable the rapid concentration of overwhelming combat power at the critical time, application of that combat power at the critical place, and the ruthless exploitation of success gained. The division is the MEF commander's principal tool for the conduct of close operations. The opportunity to make a decision will be lost if the division commander fails to exploit success.

Command and Control

The command group (the tactical echelon), augmented by other special staff as desired by the division commander, is positioned well forward to see the battle. The division commander can thus better sense the tempo of the battle, personally observe critical events, improve communications, and influence the main effort through his presence. The command group routinely moves about the battlefield and relies on the main echelon to maintain communications with adjacent and higher headquarters.

The tactical and main echelons are required to move frequently during offensive operations. The main echelon will continue to perform its essential current battle coordination; however, the main will weight its effort toward future battle planning. The rear echelon is committed to coordinating and facilitating the pushing of combat service support forward to sustain the attack. The rear echelon is initially concerned with sustaining forward units, providing rear area security, clearing main supply routes, evacuation of casualties, equipment, and enemy prisoners of war, and preparing to reestablish CSS stockpiles forward.

Maneuver

The tactical advantage being sought through maneuver is the disposition of the division in such a manner as to facilitate the destruction of the enemy. The ability to maneuver is related to mobility, the ability to place accurate fires on the enemy, the ability to protect the division from enemy fires, and the initiative of subordinate commanders. The division commander determines the most decisive location on the battlefield — where he can inflict the most serious damage on the enemy — and determines the form of

maneuver that will place his main effort at that location.

When the division commander is out of contact with the enemy, he determines what type of contact he requires, if any, before striking an enemy critical vulnerability with his main effort. This may require the division commander to conduct a movement to contact to more fully develop the situation before committing the bulk of the division in the attack.

Though fires and supporting actions are critical to the division's success, it is through maneuver of his subordinate forces that the division commander can achieve a favorable decision. In any operation, the one constant requirement for success is the intelligent maneuver of division forces to gain *positional* advantage, followed by the ruthless exploitation of that advantage with fires and close combat.

Intelligence

Intelligence support in close operations focuses on maintenance of an accurate picture of the battlespace and rapid identification of critical enemy vulnerabilities which can be exploited during offensive operations.

The results of the IPB process should define the possibilities and limitations presented by the environment and identify enemy strengths and weaknesses. This intelligence helps shape the concept of operations. Information gaps that have the potential to effect the success of the operation are designed as the commander's PIRs. PIRs form the basis for the intelligence collection plan and further IPB analysis.

The G-2 develops the collection plan, relying heavily on the division's organic reconnaissance and surveillance assets. Coordinating with the G-3, FSC, LAR battalion and division reconnaissance company commanders, and the regimental S-2s, he prepares a detailed reconnaissance and surveillance plan which focuses on the PIRs and is fully integrated with the concept of operations. The G-2 also submits requests for intelligence support to the MEF to help satisfy those requirements which exceed the division's organic capabilities.

During the operation, the G-2 rapidly processes incoming information, producing and disseminating intelligence to influence the decisionmaking process. He helps the division commander maintain situational awareness, supports force protection and the targeting effort, performs battle damage assessment, and continuously updates his IPB analysis. The results of reconnaissance operations are used to "pull" the division to avoid enemy strengths and exploit critical vulnerabilities. In this effort, the G-2 makes use of intelligence from all available sources: the MEF, the ACE, CSSE, and other adjacent units.

Fire Support

Fire support can deliver a variety of munitions to support close offensive operations. To effectively integrate fire support, the division FSC must understand the mission, the division and the MEF commander's intents, and concept of operations. The FSC develops fire support plans that focus on enemy capabilities and systems that must be neutralized. Specific considerations for the employment of fire support in offensive operations include —

- Employing weapon and target acquisition systems well forward to provide continuous in-depth support.
- Weighting the main effort and assigning priorities of fire support to lead elements.
- Isolating enemy forces at the point of attack.
- Softening enemy defenses by delivering effective preparatory fires.
- Suppressing enemy weapon systems to reduce enemy stand-off capabilities.
- Supporting screening forces adjacent to enemy units.
- Suppressing bypassed enemy elements to limit their ability to disrupt friendly operations.
- Interdicting enemy counterattack forces, isolating the defending force, and preventing its reinforcement and resupply.
- Providing counterfire to reduce the enemy's ability to disrupt friendly operations and to limit the enemy's ability to rapidly shift combat power on the battlefield.

Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability

The combat engineer battalion commander and the division engineer help plan and coordinate mobility,

countermobility, and survivability tasks with the G-2, G-3, G-4, and FSC to support the offensive operation. He coordinates these tasks with the G-3, FSC, G-2, and G-4. Priority during the offense is normally to mobility. This requires task-organizing maneuver and engineer assets to breach obstacles, maintain momentum, and ensure routes are open to facilitate logistic support. Combat engineer companies also support reconnaissance concerning bridges and cross-country trafficability. Countermobility in the offense includes the coordination of scatterable mines to protect flanks along avenues of approach, fix enemy counterattack forces, and close routes for engaged enemy units. Survivability in the offense includes support to guard forces on the flanks, protection of prestaged sustainment, and the protection of critical C^2 nodes, such as observation posts and electronic relay sites. The combat engineer battalion commander must receive clear guidance and priorities for engineer effort. He is vital to development of the scheme of maneuver.

Combat Service Support

CSS operations in the offense are designed to maintain the momentum of the attack. The G-4, in coordination with the force service support group (FSSG) G-3, prepares and executes a logistic plan developed to support the division's tactical plan. The specific logistic needs of the division are identified and coordinated by the G-4 with subordinate unit S-4s. The G-4 tailors mobile CSS packages to be pushed forward to support the regiments and separate battalions. Specific locations for ammunition transfer, maintenance collection, and main supply routes are coordinated between the FSSG, the division, and the subordinate units of the division. Priority resupply classes are displaced forward to support the momentum of the offense, without impeding maneuver units, to ensure continuous support.

Air Defense

The division commander relies on the MEF and wing for the vast majority of its air defense requirements. The division may receive priority of light antiaircraft missile assets for defense of critical division capabilities. The division also benefits from those medium air defense assets in general support of the MEF or in direct support of the aircraft wing. The G-3 must understand the commander's intent and concept of operations for the offense to properly plan specific air defense tasks. All division units practice air defense early warning and passive air defense measures. Considerations for employment of air defense in the offense include the following:

- Mix gun and missile systems (when possible).
- Concentrate air defense to achieve massive fires at decisive points.
- Integrate air defense systems throughout the division.
- Weight the main effort with air defense protection.
- Identify potential choke points and plan their protection.
- Provide the supporting air defense units with the same mobility as the protected force.

Types of Offensive Operations

There are four general types of offensive operations — *movement to contact, attack, exploitation,* and *pursuit.* Though described in a logical or notional sequence, these operations may occur in any order or simultaneously throughout the battlefield. A movement to contact may be so successful that it immediately leads to an exploitation, or an attack may lead directly to pursuit. Isolated or orchestrated battles will become increasingly rare, as the division will fight the enemy throughout the depth of the battlefield.

Movement to Contact

Movement to contact is an offensive operation conducted to develop the situation and to establish or regain contact with the enemy. A properly executed movement to contact allows the division commander to make initial contact with minimum forces and expedites the employment and concentration of the force. See figure 4-5. The commander must foresee his actions upon contact. He organizes his force to provide flexible and rapid exploitation of the contact gained. The division utilizes battle drills that focus on overcoming initial contact quickly. These procedures must be practiced and thoroughly rehearsed to permit the entire division to act without detailed guidance. Failure to prepare accordingly results in delay and confusion, granting the enemy time to seize the initiative and dictate the conditions under which the engagement is fought.



Figure 4-5. Movement to Contact.

The division commander's intent will dictate the extent his forces will be engaged. The desired contact may be by observation, physical contact between security forces, or physical contact with main forces. In each instance, the task organization, scheme of maneuver, and support required may differ significantly. In addition, the division commander must consider and arrange for additional support required from the MEF. Every reconnaissance and security means is employed so that the main force will be committed under the most favorable conditions.

To maintain his freedom of action once he makes contact, the commander deploys an advance guard capable of locating and *fixing* the enemy. The size and composition of this force is METT-T dependent. For the division, a reinforced infantry regiment, supported by the light armored reconnaissance battalion, normally provides forward security as the advance guard. The advance guard conducts reconnaissance, develops the situation, destroys enemy reconnaissance elements, secures key terrain, reports and breaches obstacles, and prevents premature deployment of the main body. The advance guard must ensure the uninterrupted progress of the main body. It must contain sufficient combat power to overcome security and delaying forces, and provide time for the commander to deploy the main body at the critical location. This allows the commander to choose the best possible time and location to exploit the meeting engagement, maintain pressure upon the enemy, and transition to another type of offensive operation.

Long-range surveillance assets may locate the enemy before physical contact is made. To counter the enemy's surveillance capabilities, security for the main body must operate far enough from it to allow the division commander adequate reaction time. Security is enhanced by rapid movement, by continuous ground and air surveillance of the division area of operations, and command and control warfare. The division integrates fire support assets into the march formations of the advance guard, the main body, and security elements to the flanks and rear. Air defense protection is provided by all elements observing and providing fires with all available weapons. Air defense assets are located on selected sites along the routes of march and are displaced as necessary.

The main body is positioned so as to remain uncommitted, capable of maneuvering without effective enemy interference, at the time of the commander's choosing. Premature deployment of the main body is costly in terms of time, resources, and disclosure of the main effort. The decision to attack, bypass, or defend must be made rapidly at each echelon. This decision is governed by the understanding of the MEF and division commander's intent. Commanders should not hesitate to take appropriate action in the absence of orders. While efforts to retain the initiative remain decentralized, the decision to commit the entire force or to halt the attack remains with the division commander. A movement to contact ends when ground enemy resistance requires the deployment of the main body.

Attack

The purpose of the attack is to defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy. Offensive action emphasizes maximum application of combat power, coupled with bold maneuver, shock effect in the assault, and prompt exploitation of success. There are four principal tasks in an attack:

- Prevent effective enemy maneuver or counteraction.
- Maneuver to gain an advantage.
- Deliver an overwhelming assault to destroy him.
- Exploit advantages gained.

The division commander and his subordinate commanders must expect to make adjustments during an attack. Skillful commanders provide for the means and methods to work these adjustments rapidly in order to maintain the momentum of the attack. Flexibility in the scheme of maneuver, organization for combat, and universal understanding of the commander's intent provide means to adapt to these changes on the battlefield.

The division commander presses the attack although his troops may be exhausted and his supplies depleted against a weakened or shaken enemy. However, the commander must strive to accomplish his objectives prior to the division reaching its culminating point. If the division is incapable of accomplishing its mission before reaching its culminating point, the commander must plan to phase his operation accordingly. The differences between the types of attacks lie in the degrees of preparation, planning, coordination, and the effect desired on the enemy.

Hasty Attack

A hasty attack is an attack in which preparation time is traded for speed to exploit opportunity. To maintain momentum or retain initiative, minimum time is devoted to preparation. Those subordinate organizations and units readily available are committed immediately to the attack. A hasty attack seeks to take advantage of the enemy's lack of readiness and involves boldness, surprise, and speed in order to achieve success before the enemy has had time to improve his defensive posture. By necessity, hasty attacks are simple and require a minimum of coordination with higher and adjacent commanders. Hasty attacks are most likely the result of movements to contact, meeting engagements, penetrations, or fleeting opportunities created by disorder, enemy mistakes, or the result of our own actions.

To minimize the risks associated with the lack of preparation time, organizations should utilize standard formations, proven standing operating procedures, and rehearsals. Major reorganization of the division should be avoided, and habitual relationships maximized when the division commander task-organizes the force.

There are three phases to a hasty attack: advance of reconnaissance and security elements, deployment and assault by security forces, and assault by major subordinate maneuver units. Attacking units may bypass obstacles and pockets of resistance that do not threaten the overall success of the attack. The division needs to retain some ability to reinforce with fires and redirect maneuver with minimum communications. The most effective way to accomplish this is with an operation overlay that reflects the division commander's intent and scheme of maneuver.

The most critical control measures are objectives, phase lines, checkpoints, axes of advance, and unit boundaries. On-order objectives are used to orient following forces and reserves quickly and increase the flexibility of tactical maneuver throughout the division. Fire support planning for the hasty attack is continuous. The operation needs extremely responsive fire support to compensate for the lack of



Figure 4-6. Reconnaissance in Force.

Exploitation

The enemy may still be capable of fielding cohesive units after an attack. In the exploitation, the division extends the destruction of the defending force by maintaining constant offensive pressure. The objective of the exploitation is the disintegration of enemy forces to the point where he has no alternative but surrender or flight. When an attack succeeds, the enemy may attempt to disengage, withdraw, and establish or reconstitute an effective defense. Attacks that result in annihilation of the defending force are rare.

The division commander must be prepared to exploit every attack without delay. While exploitation following an attack is fundamental, it is especially important in a deliberate attack where the concentration necessary for success requires accepting risk elsewhere. Failure to exploit aggressively the success of the main effort may provide the enemy sufficient time to detect and exploit those risks and thus regain both the initiative and the advantage.

The division commander's principal tool for the conduct of an exploitation is his reserve. However, he may designate other exploiting forces through the issuance of a fragmentary order. Commanders of exploitation forces must be given as much freedom of action as possible and efforts must be characterized by boldness, aggressiveness, and speed. However, the commander needs sufficient centralized control to concentrate his forces and to prevent his units from becoming overextended.

Essential to the exploitation is the knowledge of the enemy's condition and identification of the critical vulnerabilities. The division commander's knowledge of the situation must be so complete as to prevent premature commitment of the exploitation force or loss of the opportunity by acting too late. Events such as increased enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), lack of organized defense, loss of enemy unit cohesion upon contact, and capture of enemy leaders indicate an opportunity to transition to an exploitation. Once begun, an exploitation is executed relentlessly to deny the enemy any respite from pressure.

Enemy troops encountered are not engaged unless they are a threat to the division or cannot be bypassed. The decision to bypass or engage these forces normally rests with division commander and may be destroyed by division units in the main body or another supporting force. The lead maneuver units of the division habitually attack from the march column to reduce roadblocks and pockets of resistance and perform reconnaissance necessary to develop the situation. Typical missions for the exploitation force include cutting lines of communications, isolating and destroying enemy units, and disrupting enemy command and control.

Pursuit

When it becomes clear that organized enemy resistance has completely broken down, the commander transitions to the pursuit. The difference between an exploitation and a pursuit is the condition of the enemy. The object of a pursuit is annihilation of the enemy force. Like exploitation, pursuit requires broad decentralized control and rapid movement.

The division commander must ensure that all assets, to include allocated MEF assets, are used to maximum effectiveness during the pursuit. The division commander task-organizes the division into a direct-pressure force and an encircling or envelopment force. The direct-pressure force must have sufficient combat power to maintain pressure on the enemy. The encircling force must have significant firepower and greater mobility than the enemy. The capabilities of the ACE make it particularly valuable as an encircling force by destroying and denying the enemy routes of escape. To maintain tempo and pressure, the MEF commander may shift the main effort to the ACE during a pursuit. A pursuit is pushed to the utmost limits of endurance of troops, equipment, and especially supplies. If the force must stop for rest, maintenance, or reorganization, the enemy may be able to pull together scattered units, emplace obstacles, or break contact altogether.

Rear Operations

Rear operations are those actions necessary to sustain the deep and close operations. Rear operations ensure the freedom of action of the division and the ability to conduct continuous operations. Rear operations include sustainment, terrain management, movement control, and security. As these activities are conducted throughout the division's zone of action in support of offensive operations, they are not considered "rear operations" solely by geographic location. The division commander will, in fact, conduct rear operations throughout the division battlespace to support the conduct of a single division battle.

The division's rear operations include all activities conducted to the rear of maneuver units in contact to ensure freedom of maneuver and sustainment of deep, close, and rear operations. Most of the divisions CSS assets will be located in the division's rear area. This area may also contain host nation, MEF, and joint facilities such as airfields, forward logistic bases, and civilian population centers. The rear echelon is responsible for the control of rear operations. During offensive operations, the rear echelon's ability to retain connectivity between the subordinate maneuver units and the FSSG will be critical to continuous support over extended distances.

Sustainment

The basic mission of combat service support is to sustain the battle. Sustainment functions consist of those actions that move and maintain personnel and equipment. CSS planning must be fully integrated with planning for terrain management, movement control, and rear area security. Sustainment planning is the responsibility of the division G-4. He coordinates these plans with the G-1, the civil affairs officer, the division engineer, and the G-3 of the division, and subordinate unit S-4s.

During offensive operations, sustainment is pushed forward to ensure support at critical times in the battle. Mobile combat service support detachments (CSSDs) are configured with the specific support anticipated to be required by the maneuver units. These CSSDs are initially controlled by the rear echelon of the division. At a time or event of the commander's choosing, control is passed to the supported maneuver unit to ensure continuity of support

without overburdening the supported commander. When the offensive operation is of relatively short duration or conducted over a limited distance, mobile CSSDs may remain under division control until the end state has been achieved and then rapidly displaced forward to rearm, refuel, and fix subordinate units.

Movement Control

Movement includes planning, coordination, conduct, and integration of mode operations, terminal operations, and movement control. Movement makes sustainment possible. Supplies and personnel replacements constantly move from the sustainment base into the division rear area and then forward to support subordinate maneuver units.

The rear echelon controls movements in the rear area to include the employment of maneuver forces responding to enemy threats. The rear echelon monitors and deconflicts movement of nondivision forces through the rear area. It ensures routes are cleared and immediate CSS support is available as required. It coordinates engineer, NBC decontamination, and MP support.

The G-4 designates main supply routes (MSRs) after consultation with the G-3, division engineer, and G-2. He determines and disseminates MSR conditions based on information received from rear area units. He maintains the status and expected recovery time of those routes in disrepair or otherwise untrafficable. The rear echelon establishes a process of tracking convoys and mobile CSSDs from the rear area to their destination and back. Further, it —

- Monitors lines of communications to determine problems in movement flow.
- Develops alternatives to ensure movements remain constant.
- Keeps transportation users informed of available assets.
- Programs back-haul availability to cut down on delayed returns.
- Directs MSR maintenance and security.
- Processes convoy clearance requests for units requesting movement on division MSRs.

Terrain Management

Terrain management demands highly centralized planning and control. The major problem in positioning units within the rear area comes from the competing demands of mission and security. Positioning of units in the rear area requires a fine balance between the needs of units, the requirement to support the concept of operations, and the need to provide security to units. Terrain management should facilitate current and future operations. Faulty terrain management can result in congestion, interruption of rear area traffic patterns, and degradation of support operations.

Terrain management requirements should be analyzed using the factors of METT-T. A unit's mission must be analyzed to determine specific terrain requirements. Artillery units must be within range of intended targets; transportation units should be near road networks; supply units near lines of communications. Unit missions must also be evaluated and prioritized to determine their importance to the division mission. Conflicts between unit requirements can be resolved, and units positioned.

IPB of the rear area will provide much of the data needed to accurately assess terrain management needs. The rear echelon uses the intelligence estimate and other intelligence products from the main echelon to analyze enemy capabilities and to determine possible threats. Combat units such as the division reserve or a reaction force may be positioned close to likely enemy landing zones and ground avenues of approach.

When possible, CSS units should be located near established air, road, rail, and water lines of communications (LOCs). Positioning must simplify receipt of supplies and material from higher commands and ease of movement forward to committed units. The rear echelon analyzes the terrain to determine trafficability, available facilities, and natural obstacles which can support security or hinder sustainment or movement operations. Planners in the rear echelon must know the division's task organization and which units are located in the rear area.

Security

The Threat

A thorough understanding of the threat to the rear area is needed to ensure proactive security operations. IPB for the rear area identifies the effects of terrain and weather, enemy capabilities, and potential enemy courses of action in the rear area. The following enemy capabilities are examined in detail because of their potential impact on rear area operations:

- Long-range fires.
- Airborne and air assault forces.
- Unconventional warfare.
- NBC.
- Command and control warfare.

Levels of Response

Security operations in the rear area are based on economy of force measures and are designed to provide a graduated response to threat activity. There are three levels of response:

- **Level I.** Response to threats which logistic base defense forces can defeat.
- **Level II.** Response to threats which are beyond the capabilities of base defense forces but which rear area reaction forces can defeat.
- **Level III.** Response to threats which necessitate a command decision to commit tactical combat forces.

CSS Security

Every CSS unit is responsible for its own security. It must be capable of detecting and defending against enemy forces. Units should employ both active and passive measures to avoid detection. If detected, it must be able to defeat or withstand the enemy until assistance arrives. Units operating in the rear area must —

- Prepare a defensive plan.
- Rehearse the plan.
- Organize a reaction force.
- Recommend movement or repositioning of the unit to enhance security.
- Coordinate mutual support from other bases or units.
- Coordinate reaction force operations.
- Adjust the defense as required.
- Constantly improve positions to improve survivability.

Response Forces

Response forces normally consist of military police units weighted by fire support units. Fire support may consist of artillery or aviation. When MP units are committed to other priority missions or be unavailable for commitment in sufficient strength for response force operations, other forces may be formed for the mission. Engineer or logistic units, elements of the division reserve, or combat units transiting the rear area may be designated the response force.

Response forces are only effective if they can react swiftly. They must be familiar with the locations and dispositions of bases in the threatened area. When threats materialize, the rear echelon conducts an assessment and, if appropriate, commits additional response force assets. If the threat exceeds the capability of response forces, a tactical combat force (TCF) may be committed. The response force maintains contact with the enemy and provides spot reports to the rear echelon and TCF commander until the TCF arrives to engage the threat.

Tactical Combat Force. The primary mission of the TCF is to defeat those enemy forces in the division rear area that exceed the capabilities of response forces. A TCF must be flexible, capable of either day or night operations, and have a mobility advantage over the enemy. The TCF is normally a task-organized combined arms force comprising ground or air maneuver units, fire support assets, and a headquarters capable of planning and coordinating combat operations. Under the division commander's guidance, the G-3 designates or dedicates one or more forces as TCFs. A TCF may be designated with an on-order mission or task-organized under the rear echelon. It should be organized under the rear echelon when the commander determines the threat to his rear area is sufficient to justify the employment of combat forces of battalion size or larger.

A designated TCF is not committed to rear area security operations. It is normally given a "be prepared" mission to respond to threats. Once committed to rear operations, a designated TCF is under the operational control of the rear echelon until the enemy is defeated. It can then be released to parent unit control.

MEF Assistance. When a threat in the rear area exceeds the division's capability to defeat it, the division must request assistance from the MEF. The MEF may then provide additional ground forces (in a multidivision MEF), aviation assets, or coordinate forces from adjacent organizations. Normally, liaison established by the division with adjacent divisions (Marine, U.S. Army, or multinational) will enhance the employment of reaction forces from other units in the division rear area.

Chapter 5

Defensive Operations

Defensive Fundamentals

The division will rarely achieve a decision through defensive operations. However, the division commander may decide to assume the defense or be forced into the defense by enemy actions. Regardless, the division defense must be viewed as a temporary condition during which the commander maintains an *offensive mindset.* The commander conducts a maneuver-oriented defense, executing offensive actions such as spoiling and counterattacks, while always searching for the opportunity to make the transition to offensive operations.

Though the offensive is preferred, the division commander may decide to conduct a defense when the situation and terrain are so favorable that they provide an advantage. When terrain permits the ambush of the enemy and does not permit sufficient maneuver space for enemy counteraction, the defense may be established to permit the destruction of the enemy force through fires and rapid maneuver. When the enemy has established operational patterns that can be exploited or when the situation is well-known to the commander, the defense may provide an opportunity to reduce enemy capabilities that are essential to his success. When the enemy has reached his culminating point, he can then be attacked by the reserve and the counterattack exploited by uncommitted forces of the division.

Offensive action is key to successful defense. A defense that relies on positional or defending units is subject to the enemy's will. The division commander plans and conducts spoiling attacks, counterattacks, and attacks against enemy vulnerabilities whenever and wherever the opportunity presents itself. Reconnaissance units are positioned in depth to ensure enemy vulnerabilities are discovered and the division commander exploits these vulnerabilities by fires or by maneuver of subordinate units. Not only does offensive action confuse the enemy commander and reduce enemy combat power, it also maintains the initiative and morale of subordinates.

Terrain must be exploited to advantage. The division takes advantage of terrain that maximizes effective direct fires; emplacement, movement of, and observation for indirect fire assets; cover and concealment; surprise; and maneuver. Though the enemy chooses the time and location for his attack, the division commander can direct the energy of the attack into locations that permit effective counteraction. Natural obstacles such as rivers, cliffs, and bogs are exploited and reinforced with mines, wire, trenches, and other reinforcing obstacles that canalize and slow the enemy. These obstacles are disguised and covered by fire to enhance surprise and to maximize the enemy's exposure to effective fires while negotiating the obstacle. Obstacles that are not integrated with the scheme of maneuver and plan of supporting fires will not contribute to the defense plan. Terrain should be sought that possesses good defensive qualities, provides depth to the defense, and contains sufficient maneuver space for making the transition to the offense from dispersed locations without delay.

Organization of the Defense

The defense is organized in depth into three areas — the *security area, main battle area,* and *rear area.* See figure 5-1.

Security Area

The division's security area is the area forward of the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) and assigned to the security forces. It is here that security forces execute assigned tasks. The commander adds depth to the defense by extending the security area as far forward as is tactically feasible, to inflict the greatest possible damage and disruption to the enemy



Figure 5-1. Organization of the Defense.

attack by the time it reaches the main battle area. Normally, the commander extends the lateral boundaries of subordinate units forward of the FEBA, giving those units responsibility for the security area within sector to the forward extension of their boundaries.

Main Battle Area

The main battle area is the area extending from the FEBA to the rear boundaries of the forward subordinate units, normally the regimental rear boundaries. The commander positions forces throughout the main battle area to destroy or contain enemy assaults. Reserves are employed in the main battle area to reduce penetrations, regain terrain, or destroy enemy forces. The greater the depth of the main battle area, the greater the maneuver space for fighting the main defensive battle afforded subordinate commanders. It is in the main battle area that the decisive defensive battle is usually fought.

Rear Area

The rear area is the area extending forward from the division's rear boundary to the rear boundary of the main battle area. This area is provided primarily for the performance of CSS functions. Rear operations include those functions of security and sustainment required to maintain continuity of operations by the force as a whole.

Division Task Organization

The division commander organizes his force as follows: *security forces, main battle forces,* and *reserves.*

Security Forces

Security forces are employed forward of the main battle area to delay, disrupt, and provide early warning of the enemy's advance and to deceive him as to the true location of the main battle area. These

forces are assigned **cover**, **guard**, or **screen** missions. Operations of the security forces must be an integral part of the overall defensive plan. Every unit assigned responsibility for a portion of the security area establishes a security force, under a single commander, forward of the FEBA. The mission assigned those forces is based on the situation. At each higher level, available resources allow the security force to operate at a greater distance forward of the main battle area.

The division commander may provide the bulk of the MEF's **covering force**, which operates apart from the main force for the purpose of engaging, delaying, disrupting, and deceiving the enemy before he can attack the main force. The covering force accomplishes this by conducting offensive and/or defensive operations. Covering forces must have the tactical mobility and operational flexibility to accomplish its mission over large expanses of terrain. It may operate at extended distances and should be self-sufficient, when possible. When operating for longer durations, provisions for reconstitution must be developed to ensure continuity of operations. Covering forces have a high degree of reliance on aviation support and may have aviation assets attached when dictated by METT-T. The size of the covering force is METT-T dependent and its ground combat assets may include tanks, light-armored vehicles, AAVs with embarked infantry, artillery, engineers, and CSS assets. The covering force may be controlled by the division or the MEF, depending upon the situation.

The division may designate a **guard force** for protection from enemy ground observation, direct fire, and surprise attack for a given period of time. A guard force allows the commander to extend the defense in time and space to prevent interruption of the organization of the main battle area. An organization with a guard mission fights to accomplish these tasks. Observation of the enemy and reporting of information by the guard force is an inherent task of the guard force, but secondary to its primary function of protection. A guard force is organized based on METT-T. The division commander determines the orientation of the guard force and the duration the guard must be provided. Normally, guard forces are oriented to the flanks for the minimum amount of time necessary to develop an integrated defense. When the division commander determines the requirement for a guard force has expired, the guard force may receive a cover or screen mission with the requisite loss or gain of resources.

The division may establish a **screening force** to gain and maintain contact with the enemy and observe, identify, and report information. In most situations, the minimum security force organized by the division is a screening force. Normally, the screen force only fights in self-defense, but may be tasked to —

- Repel enemy reconnaissance units as part of the GCE's counter-reconnaissance effort.
- Prevent enemy artillery from acquiring terrain that enables frontline units to be engaged.
- Provide early warning.
- Attack the enemy with supporting arms.

Security forces at all levels warn of the enemy approach and, within capabilities, strip away enemy reconnaissance and security elements, deceive the enemy as to the true location of the main battle area and principal defensive positions, and disrupt, delay, and damage him as much as possible without becoming decisively engaged. Security forces destroy as much of the enemy as possible, within capabilities, without losing the freedom to maneuver.

At a predetermined location, control of the battle is transferred to security elements established by the next subordinate command. This location is known as a handover line. A handover line is a control feature, preferably following easily defined terrain features, at which responsibility for the conduct of combat operations is passed from one force to another. This transfer of control must be carefully coordinated. The security forces conduct a rearward passage of lines at designated passage points, and the senior command's security force withdraws in preparation for its subsequent mission. The subordinate unit's security force supports the disengagement of the division's security force.

Security forces in one part of the security area do not withdraw automatically because adjacent forces have been forced rearward. Adjusting to the enemy advance and securing its flanks to avoid being cut off, security forces should continue their mission

when possible. Retaining forward positions in part of the sector provides surveillance and control of supporting arms into the enemy's depth, allows the commander to concentrate temporarily on a narrower front in the main battle area, and provides access to the enemy's flank for a counterattack.

All units of the division provide **local security**. The depth of local security is dictated by terrain, communications, target acquisition capabilities, and the enemy threat. All units employ passive security measures to reduce exposure to the enemy, to include observation, electronic exposure, and fires. Communications procedures, camouflage, movement control, and other individual continuing actions are strictly enforced.

Active security measures are employed by the division and coordinated at all levels. Active security measures include combat patrolling, use of sensors and target acquisition radars, surveillance, and employment of false visual and electronic signatures. In addition, skills of certain units within the division enhance the security posture of the organization. For example, engineers contribute to survivability, mobility, and countermobility, all of which contribute to security.

Main Battle Forces

Main battle forces engage the enemy in decisive combat to slow, stop, canalize, disorganize, and defeat his attack. Main battle forces occupy defensive positions within the main battle area. Positions are oriented on the most likely and most dangerous avenues of approach into the sector. The most dangerous approach is normally assigned the initial main effort. The commander can strengthen his defense at this point by narrowing the sector of, and providing the priority of support to, the unit astride it.

Reserves

The reserve is a part of the force, held under control of the commander as a maneuver force to influence the action. Missions assigned to the reserve normally consist of counterattack, reinforcement of the main effort, protection of flanks, and supporting committed units by fire. Movement of reserves must be planned carefully due to vulnerability to indirect fires and air attack while moving. Until employed, reserves normally occupy covered assembly areas in the rear area, protected from enemy fires. Selected routes should provide cover and concealment while rear area security and counter-reconnaissance operations decrease the probability of enemy stay-behind or special forces observing reserve locations. Effective command and control warfare can degrade the enemy's ability to attack the reserve.

The weaker the defender and the less that is known of the enemy or his intention, the more important is the defender's reserve and the greater the proportion of combat power that must be held in reserve. The division commander withholds his reserve for decisive action and refuses to dissipate it on local emergencies. Once a reserve has been committed, a new reserve must be created or obtained. The reserve provides the defender flexibility and balance to strike quickly with concentrated combat power on ground of the defender's choosing.

The tactical mobility of mechanized and helicopterborne forces make them well suited for use as the reserve. As the reserve, mechanized forces are best employed offensively. In suitable terrain, a helicopterborne reserve can react quickly to reinforce main battle area positions or block penetrations. However, helicopterborne forces often lack the shock effect desired for counterattacks.

Timing is critical to the employment of the reserve. As the area of probable employment of the reserve becomes apparent, the commander moves his reserve to have it more readily available for action. The commander's intent must clearly state the circumstances calling for the commitment of the reserve. When he commits his reserve, the commander must make his decision promptly and with an accurate understanding of movement and deployment times. Committed too soon or too late, the reserve may not have a decisive effect.

To conserve forces, the division commander may choose to use security forces as part or all of his reserve after completion of their security mission. However, the commander must weigh the decision to do this against the possibility that the security force may suffer a loss of combat power that may reduce its capability to accomplish its subsequent mission as the reserve.

Forms of Maneuver

There are two forms of defensive maneuver — *defend* and *retrograde*. Most schemes of maneuver developed by the division commander will incorporate a combination of these two forms. For example, the division commander may task a foot-mobile infantry regiment to defend in restrictive terrain and a mechanized infantry regiment to delay (a type of retrograde operation) to force the enemy into that terrain, establishing conditions suitable for counterattack by the tank battalion and his remaining regiment. The form(s) of defensive maneuver adopted by the division commander is based on the MEF commander's intent and METT-T.

The form of maneuver selected takes advantage of enemy vulnerabilities and division strengths. Units within the division are more suited than others for specific defensive tasks. For example, the light armored reconnaissance battalion is structured to provide mobility over extended ranges and may be most appropriately used in a reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, or security operation. The tank battalion's firepower and mobility is best employed offensively, as part of the reserve or counterattack force. Mechanized infantry provides both the ability to strike offensively or quickly establish positional defenses at critical points after discovery of the enemy main effort. Foot-mobile infantry regiments may provide the positional component of the division defense or, when combined with adequate assault support, provide a portion of the reserve that can be rapidly employed at a critical location on the battlefield.

Defend

When a unit defends, it does so around a series of tactical localities, the retention of which ensures the integrity of the defense. Main battle forces occupy defensive positions where they can best defeat the enemy. Considerations include good observation and fields of fire, cover, concealment, and the opportunity for surprise and deception. Whenever possible, positions are located in depth and should be mutually supporting. Defending units utilize defensive sectors, battle positions, blocking positions, and strongpoints.

Sector

The division commander may assign a defensive sector to a subordinate unit that defends. Assignment of a defensive sector provides the subordinate commander maximum latitude to accomplish defensive tasks. The subordinate commander may, in turn, assign his subordinate commanders sectors, battle positions, or strongpoints from which to defend; or assign retrograde missions to subordinates within the sector. The subordinate commander's sector will normally contain his security area, main battle area, and rear area; subordinate sectors or positions; fire support units; and reconnaissance units. Sectors should be large enough for the subordinate commander to fight his own defensive battle, yet not larger than he can influence. Assigning a subordinate too large a sector will create gaps that must be covered by other division assets or the assumption of risk in those areas. Likewise, the division commander should not assign a subordinate a sector that contains more likely enemy avenues of approach than he has the capability to protect. When the division is operating in an area that presents the enemy numerous avenues of approach, the division commander should consider the use of a mobile-type defense.

Battle Position

A battle position is a designated location from which a subordinate unit will conduct its principal defensive battle. The division commander may assign a subordinate a battle position when a specific area must be protected or retained. Battle positions restrict subordinate commanders; however, it is usually desirable to task a subordinate to occupy, prepare, or reconnoiter one or more battle positions within an assigned sector. A subordinate unit tasked to occupy a battle position within an assigned sector is permitted additional latitude, though not as much as when assigned a sector without additional constraints. Battle positions are continuously improved for all-around defense and may or may not be manned for extended periods of time. Battle positions *provide* an ability to mass fires, maintain mutual support within the position, and enhance making the transition to the offense by the concentration of subordinate units.

The division commander assigns battle positions when a particular avenue of approach or key terrain warrants the inherent *restrictions* of a battle position, e.g., reduced maneuver space, presentation of a relatively dense target to the enemy, a requirement for detailed coordination of disengagement criteria, displacement, and with adjacent units.

Blocking Position

A blocking position is similar to a battle position and designed to deny the enemy access to a specific area or along an avenue of approach. Blocking positions are normally designed to impede the enemy once he has entered an engagement area to permit his destruction by fires; or to anchor the defense to permit a maneuver component to strike the enemy on a flank or to the rear. Blocking positions are also used during retrogrades to slow the enemy or to deceive him as to the location of main battle area forces of the division. Units assigned blocking positions are normally supporting efforts that block ancillary enemy forces from interfering with the division main effort or counterattack forces during the main battle area battle.

Strongpoint

A strongpoint is a strongly fortified defensive position designed to successfully defeat enemy armor and mechanized attacks. A strongpoint is located on a terrain feature that is critical to the overall defense and is intended to be occupied for an extended period of time. A strongpoint normally is occupied by a company or larger organized for all-around defense. A unit or organization holding a strongpoint may be cut off and lose its freedom of maneuver, thus requiring its own combat service support. A strongpoint is established only after the commander determines that a position must be retained at all costs.

Retrograde

A retrograde operation is a movement to the rear or away from the enemy. A retrograde may be a planned movement or one forced by enemy action. Retrogrades may be classified as delay, withdrawal, or retirement. The division or its subordinate units may conduct retrograde operations to —

- Preserve combat power by gaining time.
- Avoid combat under unfavorable conditions.
- Reposition forces to eliminate exposed flanks or shorten lines of communications.
- Draw the enemy into an unfavorable situation.
- Harass, exhaust, resist, delay, and damage the enemy.

Delay

A delay is an operation in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy's momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without becoming decisively engaged. The division commander must specify the amount of time to be gained by the delaying force to successfully accomplish the mission. Time may be expressed in hours or in events to be accomplished by the main battle area forces.

Delays may be used appropriately in the security area, main battle area, or rear area. The division commander will task-organize delay forces to ensure they have the requisite mobility and firepower to accomplish the mission. The typical delay force will include mechanized or motorized infantry, LAR units, tanks, artillery, and engineers. The delay force may also have the preponderance of assault support and CAS during the delay to ensure that they do not become decisively engaged. The division commander must also preposition combat service support and make provisions for mobile CSSDs to support the delay force. Sufficient depth of area is required for a delay. Delays are conducted —

- When the division's strength is insufficient to defend or attack.
- To reduce the enemy's offensive capability by inflicting casualties.
- To gain time by forcing the enemy to deploy.
- To determine the strength and location of the enemy's main effort.
- When the enemy intent is not clear and the commander desires intelligence.
- To protect and provide early warning for the main battle area forces.
- To allow time to reestablish the defense.

Fundamentals of the Delay

A delay differs from the defense in that decisive engagement is to be avoided. Special consideration is given to the following fundamentals:

Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution. A delaying action is normally characterized by operations on a wide front with the majority of delaying forces forward and minimum forces in reserve. This results in a series of independent actions across the sector in which each commander must have freedom of action while engaging the enemy.

Maximum Use of Terrain and Obstacles. Obstacles are emplaced and natural obstacles are enhanced to canalize and delay the enemy. Blocking positions may be located on terrain commanding avenues of approach that provide long-range fields of fire and facilitate disengagement. Engineers within the delay force provide mobility support, countermobility support, and limited survivability support to the delay force. In particular, the engineers within the delay force may be required to supervise the breaching and closing of minefields, the construction of obstacles to the flanks, and demolition of key bridges or other structures critical to enemy maneuver. Desirable characteristics of delaying positions are —

- Natural obstacles on the front and flanks.
- Long-range observation and fields of fire.
- Cover and concealment for forces on the delaying position.
- Covered and concealed routes of withdrawal.
- Sufficient distance between successive positions to require the enemy to reorganize before attacking the next position.

Maximum Use of Fires. Long-range fires are brought to bear against the enemy to destroy high-payoff targets and force the enemy to deploy. These fires must be thoroughly planned and coordinated by the division and the MEF to ensure unity of effort and proper utilization of all available Marine and joint fire support means. Reconnaissance units of the division must be echeloned in depth to permit the accurate application of fires to destroy high-payoff targets and facilitate disengagement of delay forces.

Force the Enemy to Deploy and Maneuver. Delay forces must be strong enough to force the enemy to deploy prematurely, thus slowing his advance. Strong delay forces can also disguise the location of the main battle area, disguise the division's main effort, and help identify the enemy's main effort.

Maintain Contact. Maintaining contact with the enemy prevents him from bypassing delaying forces; advancing unimpeded by forcing him to maintain his combat formations; slows his mobility by forcing him off high speed avenues of approach; and provides continuous information to the division commander.

Avoid Decisive Engagement. Units decisively engaged lose their freedom of maneuver and must fight the engagement to a decision. Consequently, they lose the ability to continue to accomplish the assigned delay mission.

Minimum Logistics. Logistic planning must provide for early movement to the rear of all logistics installations and material not required to support the delaying operation. Plans must be made for the destruction of material which cannot be evacuated. Supplies required to support the delay are stockpiled at selected locations along planned routes.

Deceive the Enemy. Deception measures are employed to deceive the enemy as to the strength and disposition of forces remaining in contact, the time of withdrawal, and the locations of new positions. Security is obtained through both active and passive security measures to include —

- Employment of counter-reconnaissance forces to deny the enemy knowledge of the scheme of maneuver as long as possible.
- Employment of helicopterborne forces to enhance flank security and to patrol unoccupied terrain between delaying forces.
- Conduct of attacks to facilitate disengagement and deceive the enemy as to friendly intentions.
- Movement during periods of reduced visibility or under cover of smoke to deceive the enemy and reduce the effectiveness of enemy target acquisition means.

Techniques for Delaying

Units conducting a delay can delay from successive or alternate positions, or a combination of the two. The method adopted depends largely on the width of the assigned sector and the forces available.

Delay From Successive Positions. This is a technique for delay in which all delaying units are positioned forward in a single echelon. See figure 5-2. Units delay continuously on and between battle positions throughout their sectors, fighting rearward from one position to the next, holding each position for a specified period of time or as long as possible. When initial delay positions are occupied prior to the establishment of contact with the advancing enemy, a division covering force or security elements from committed units are sent forward to establish contact and to delay the enemy advance toward the initial position.

Delay From Alternate Positions. This is a technique of delay in which a unit delays in sector with subordinate units deployed in depth. See figure 5-3. As the forward unit delays, another subordinate unit occupies the next position in depth and prepares to assume the fight. The forward unit disengages and passes through the next rearward position and prepares for subsequent delay at the third position in depth after handing over the battle to the second unit. This technique may be used when the sector is narrow enough to permit the deployment of the delaying force in depth. Delay from alternate positions has the advantage of providing more time for the improvement of delaying positions and the maintenance of material. This technique has a disadvantage in that it may create a lucrative target during frequent passages of lines.

Withdrawal

A withdrawal is a planned operation in which a force in contact disengages from an enemy force. The division commander's intention in a withdrawal is to put distance between his force and the enemy as quickly as possible and unnoticed. A withdrawal may be undertaken —



Figure 5-2. Delay from Successive Positions.



Figure 5-3. Delay From Alternate Positions.

- If the objective of the operation cannot be achieved and the force is in danger of being destroyed.
- To avoid battle under unfavorable conditions.
- To draw the enemy into an engagement area.
- To allow for the use of the force or parts of it elsewhere.

There are two types of withdrawal — *a withdrawal under pressure* and *a withdrawal not under pressure.* Withdrawals not under pressure provide freedom of action since the division commander selects the time of withdrawal. They facilitate deception and reduce the effectiveness of observed enemy fires since the commander can take advantage of darkness or other conditions of reduced visibility. A withdrawal under pressure envisions fighting to the rear. When surprise is lost, a withdrawal not under pressure is executed similar to a withdrawal under pressure. A prudent commander always attempts to conduct a withdrawal not under pressure, but plans to execute the withdrawal under pressure.

Withdrawal Under Enemy Pressure. The successful conduct of a withdrawal under enemy pressure depends on local air superiority, speed, decentralized execution, and effective employment of security forces. Subordinate units use delaying tactics to fight their way to the rear.

The division normally employs a task-organized covering force consisting of infantry, LAR, artillery, tank, engineers, and other combat support and combat service support units. The covering force accomplishes its mission from prescribed areas forward of the new security area. In addition to covering the withdrawal of the main battle area forces, the covering force assists the main battle area forces to break contact and to delay.

The least engaged units of the main battle area withdraw first. The more heavily engaged units withdraw under cover of the division covering force and the massed fires of available fire support means. Smoke can be used to screen movement and to reduce enemy observation and accuracy of enemy fire.

Movement is expedited. Normally, assembly areas are not used. The division's movement and operations are similar to those of a delay on alternate positions. The use of alternate covering positions by the covering force and the disengaged main battle area units continues until the entire division breaks contact with the enemy or reaches the planned delaying positions.

Withdrawal Not Under Enemy Pressure. The division normally specifies the time of withdrawal. To gain the utmost advantage from secrecy and deception, the division commander takes maximum use of conditions of limited visibility. The withdrawal should commence as soon as enemy observation is reduced to the point where the enemy cannot effectively deliver observed fires.

The division commander controls the movement of subordinate units to successive delaying positions by designating times and specific routes of withdrawal, including alternate routes, designating priority of movement, and enforcing traffic control measures. Maneuver units in contact with the enemy designate detachments left in contact to protect the initial movement of the main body to the rear and to simulate normal activity. These forces may be provided additional transportation capabilities.

The withdrawing force moves to the rear in sequence by dispatching units to reconnoiter and prepare the next position, displacing CSS units followed by artillery not essential to the support of detachments left in contact, and then by relocating the division covering force. Once completed, the main body moves, and finally, the detachments left in contact and their direct support artillery are withdrawn.

Units in the main battle area execute the withdrawal on a broad front. Units move directly to the rear and proceed to designated locations. To further the reorganization and assembly of units, the division or major subordinate units may designate assembly areas for subordinate units. Such areas are widely dispersed and are occupied for minimum periods. When all elements of the division, except the detachments left in contact, have disengaged from the enemy and formed for movement, the withdrawal is considered completed. Further movement to the rear or away from the enemy is classified as a retirement.

The detachments left in contact have a limited capability for resistance and must depend on deception and long-range fires to accomplish their mission. The division coordinates their employment; however, infantry regiments specify their times of withdrawal in consonance with the actions of adjacent units.

Retirement

A retirement is an operation in which a force out of contact moves away from the enemy. A retiring unit normally is protected by another unit between it and the enemy. However, the retiring unit must establish security. Often a retirement immediately follows a withdrawal. Depending on the number of routes available, the division may retire in one or several columns. Each column is organized with a main body, an advance guard, flank guards, and rear guard. The advance and flank guards should be made sufficiently mobile to permit accomplishment of their mission without delaying the main body. The rear guard conducts the delaying actions required to prevent enemy interference with the main body.

Supplies and equipment are displaced prior to the movement of combat units. Necessary dumps of supplies are established along the retirement routes. CSS units may move prior to or with the main body. While not in contact with the enemy, deployed units assemble, march formations are organized, and rearward movement initiated. While in contact, units not required to support the withdrawal from action assemble, organize march formations, and commence the rearward movement.

Deep Operations

Deep operations are conducted in support of the defense to identify and attrit the enemy's main effort, degrade his attempts to mass his forces and concentrate his effort, interrupt his momentum, disrupt his command and control, and neutralize his supporting arms. Deep operations in the defense may include —

- Deep reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition.
- Deep interdiction through deep fires, deep maneuver, and deep air support.
- Command and control warfare.
- Offensive antiair warfare.

Although deep operations are primarily the responsibility of the MEF CE, the division plays a significant role in recommending surveillance and targeting priorities. The division must also be prepared to provide resources to execute deep operations and may be tasked to control certain deep operations. The division's long-range fires, highly mobile maneuver forces, and reconnaissance assets are division resources that may be employed to extend the defense in time and space thus optimizing the employment of MEF and division combat power in the main battle area.

Close Operations

The defense strives to achieve conditions to gain and maintain the initiative for decisive action. The division commander accomplishes this through the assignment of subordinate missions that provide the division protection and facilitate offensive action once the enemy has reached his culminating point, or has exposed a critical vulnerability during the course of the battle. The division defense contains two principal components — positional, or static components, and mobile, or maneuver components. These positional and maneuver forces execute an integrated scheme of maneuver and fire support plan. The positional elements provide stability and pivot points from which the mobile elements of the defense can strike enemy vulnerabilities created by his attacks against or maneuver around the positional elements. Positional elements defend to accomplish assigned tasks from designated sectors, battle positions, and strongpoints. Mobile elements conduct retrogrades or offensive operations against the enemy, such as delays, counterattacks, or spoiling attacks, to accomplish assigned tasks.

Similarly, there are two types of defenses — *mobile* and *position*. However, each type incorporates positional elements and maneuver elements into their schemes of maneuver. In this respect, neither is purely mobile or static. However, they do convey the division commander's visualization of the defensive battle. At the division level, the mobile defense is normally the preferred type of defense as it is more likely to create opportunities for decisive maneuver or resumption of the offense. Position defenses are normally used when the division lacks the requisite mobility to strike offensively from dispersed locations or key terrain retention is critical to the overall operation, such as in the initial stages of introducing heavy follow-on forces into a lodgment or undeveloped theater of war.

Mobile Defense

The mobile defense orients on the destruction of the enemy through offensive action. See figure 5-4. The bulk of the force is held as a mobile counterattack force with strict economy applied to dedicated positional supporting efforts designed to canalize, delay, and disrupt the attack. The mobile defense requires the capability to mass overwhelming fires and to provide adequate maneuver space in depth. This allows the commander to take advantage of vulnerabilities created in the enemy's effort to defeat the positional elements of the defense.

Command and control warfare and the division commander's interpretation of the enemy's operational intent are used to focus him on a noncritical objective and then counterattack him from an unexpected direction. It requires effective counter-reconnaissance coupled with recognition of enemy C^2 nodes, sustainment elements, and fire support units. The combination of assets and information allows the division commander to blind the enemy, then strike throughout the depth of the enemy force at the decisive moment.

To succeed, the mobile element of the defense must have mobility greater than that of the enemy. Terrain is traded in order to extend the enemy and expose his flanks and allow the defender to maximize the benefit of the terrain for purposes of counterattack. In order to draw the enemy into an engagement area, a mobile defense requires depth.

Position Defense

The position defense is conducted to deny the enemy access to critical terrain for a specified period of time. See figure 5-5. The bulk of the defending force is deployed in a combination of static defense



Figure 5-4. Mobile Defense.

and small, mobile reserves. Mutual support and positions in depth force the enemy to expose his force in the attack of each position. Principal reliance is placed on the ability of the forces to maintain their positions and to control unoccupied terrain by fire. The reserve is used to blunt and contain penetrations, to reinforce the main effort, and counterattack to destroy enemy forces.

The position defense is seldom capable of achieving the outright destruction of the attacking force due to its limited mobility. The attacker may disengage when dealt a tactical set-back or take advantage of other opportunities to maintain the initiative. Thus, the position defense relies on other simultaneous or subsequent operations by adjacent or reinforcing forces to achieve decisive results. The following circumstances may require or favor the conduct of a position defense:

- Specific terrain is so militarily or politically critical it must be defended.
- Defender possesses less mobility than the enemy.
- Maneuver space is limited.
- Terrain restricts the movement of the defender.
- Terrain permits surprise fires to be massed on the bulk of the enemy force.
- Terrain does not permit the attacker mutual support.



Figure 5-5. Position Defense.

Commanders may conduct position and mobile defenses simultaneously to take advantage of the strengths of subordinate organizations. Units with significant mobility may be designated part of the reserve or tasked to conduct mobile-type defenses, given the situation and terrain within their assigned sector. Other units without a mobility advantage over the enemy force may be assigned a position defense mission. Irrespective of the type of defense employed, the defender must conduct a decisive counterattack or resume the offensive once the enemy is defeated or reaches his culminating point. Without a compelling reason to defend, the defender attacks.

Rear Operations

As in offensive operations, rear operations provide sustainment to the deep and close operations. Rear operations in the defense include sustainment, terrain management, movement control, and security. Rear area forces conduct these functions during defense operations similar to that during offensive operations. However, the characteristics of the defense require each function to be carefully assessed to ensure continuity of support. For example, sustainment in the offense is normally characterized by push-logistics provided by mobile CSSDs. In a mobile defense, sustainment may include a combination of push-logistics, such as that required to support security forces and counterattack forces, and stockpiled supplies to support delaying and defending units.

The success of the division defense may depend on its success in conducting rear operations. Enemy operations in the division rear, ranging in size from

individual saboteurs and terrorists to enemy special operations, airborne, or infiltrated infantry units, will target key division units, facilities, and capabilities. Division defensive planning must address the early detection and immediate destruction or containment of enemy forces attempting to operate in the division rear area. Additional emphasis on rear operations may be required based on the type of defense and form of maneuver selected. The degree of risk accepted during a mobile defense includes an increased threat to supporting rear area forces as gaps normally exist in division maneuver unit dispositions. Likewise, a defense that can be characterized as positional in nature will normally provide an increased amount of security for rear area units *during initial stages of the defensive battle*. As the battle progresses, rear area units must maintain situational awareness as enemy forces that successfully penetrate frontline units can be expected to seek CSS units for destruction.

Defensive Preparation

The division commander initiates defensive preparations any time the division is not in the offense. This is usually concurrent with offensive planning for anticipated future operations. Preparations for the defense include reconnaissance and development of assembly areas, tentative positions, and counterattack routes and objectives; establishment of security and priorities of work; rehearsals; determination of the engineer effort and barrier planning; and development of fire plans. The division commander must visualize the defensive battle and how these activities contribute to the accomplishment of the mission. The extent of the division's defensive preparations are based on the amount of time available. In this respect, a defense is considered either hasty or deliberate. In either case, a defense is constantly evaluated and improved.

Deliberate Defense

A deliberate defense is a defense normally organized when out of contact with the enemy or when contact with the enemy is not imminent and time for organization is available. A deliberate defense normally includes fortifications, strongpoints, extensive use of obstacles, and fully integrated fires. The commander normally is free to make a detailed reconnaissance of his sector, select the terrain on which to defend, and decide the best tactical deployment of forces.

Hasty Defense

A hasty defense is a defense normally organized while in contact with the enemy or when contact is imminent and time available for organization is limited. Reconnaissance of the sector must be curtailed and the defense assumed directly from the current positions of units. Depending on the situation, it may be necessary for a commander to initiate a hasty attack to seize terrain suitable to his defense. Or, the commander may employ a security force to delay the enemy while deploying the bulk of his force to more suitable defensive terrain. A hasty defense is improved continuously as the situation permits and may eventually become a deliberate defense.

Defensive Planning

Planning for the defense begins when the division commander receives a mission or warning order to defend or anticipates a need to do so. To facilitate preparations, concurrent planning at all levels of command is essential. The defensive plan should accentuate the natural strengths of the terrain and that of the division.

The division commander develops a flexible defensive plan that can deal with a number of enemy courses of action. Branches are developed to take advantage of opportunities and offensive sequels are planned for transition to the offense. In particular, counterattack plans must be well developed and rehearsed to ensure counterattack forces are committed at the most decisive time and place; to ensure the counterattack force's maneuver is unimpeded; and to ensure as much support as possible is available from defending units to the counterattack force.

Intent

The division commander's intent will guide the subordinate organizations' defensive effort. It reflects the MEF commander's intent and depicts the division's role in the MEF battle. At a minimum, the division commander must consider the —

- Enemy and environment as described by his IPB.
- Combat power of each subordinate unit.
- Impact of deep, close, and rear operations of the MEF.
- Use and availability of fires, obstacles, C^2W assets, and aviation.
- Logistic supportability of each defensive course of action.
- Training, morale, and experience of subordinates.

Command and Control

The division commander, with key staff, normally fights the defensive battle from the tactical echelon. It allows him to remain near the major actions or critical events. The main echelon is located as far rearward as possible and still maintain contact with subordinate units and the tactical echelon. It focuses on monitoring progress of the battle, forwarding information and support requests, and coordinating supporting units. The rear echelon anticipates future support requirements; it coordinates with the FSSG and mobile CSSD commanders to ensure continuous logistic support to enable friendly units to regain the offensive. It also focuses on continuity of support for current operations and control of mobile CSSDs moving forward from the rear area. The rear echelon must monitor the battle and be prepared to immediately assume the role of the main echelon.

Intelligence

In defensive operations, the focus of the intelligence effort is on identification of the enemy's probable courses of action and the development of a collection plan to detect the approach of enemy units as far forward of the defensive area as possible. The division commander requires specific intelligence about —

- Avenues of approach and mobility corridors into the defensive area.
- Location of potential assembly areas and firing positions for supporting arms.
- Size, composition, organization, rate of movement, and tactics of enemy first and second echelon forces.
- Locations of enemy reserves, fire support, and CSS elements supporting the main effort.
- Enemy C^2 systems.
- Enemy intelligence capabilities, with emphasis on his reconnaissance capabilities.

The G-2 develops a thorough intelligence collection plan focused on providing early warning of the movement of enemy forces toward the division's defensive area. He uses the results of his IPB process to focus the collection effort on the most likely enemy courses of action, but allocates some collection resources against all possible enemy actions to guard against surprise and the enemy's use of deception. The collection plan is integrated with activities of the security forces and the fire support plan in order to engage the enemy as far forward as possible. While the division's organic reconnaissance assets will carry out most of the collection tasks, the G-2 coordinates his efforts with those of the MEF, drawing on force assets, in particular unmanned aerial vehicle (UAVs) and electronic warfare units, to provide coverage deep into the area of interest.

In a separate but related effort, the G-2 coordinates with the G-3 to develop detailed force protection measures with particular emphasis on the preparation of a counter-reconnaissance plan. The early detection and identification of enemy reconnaissance efforts is critical to prevent the enemy from seeing and reporting the strength, composition, and location of the division's defensive positions.

Maneuver

The scheme of maneuver for the defense includes —

- Initial positions to be occupied, prepared, and reconnoitered, withdrawal routes, and passage points for the security force per METT-T.
- Primary, alternate, and supplementary positions for main battle area forces.
- Counterattack plans.
- Contingency plans to block penetrations or reinforce threatened areas.
- Dummy positions designed to deceive the enemy.
- Planned retrogrades to draw the enemy into engagement areas.
- Obstacles and barriers integrated with the scheme of maneuver and fire support plan.
- Counter-reconnaissance and other force protection measures.

Fire Support

The division commander weights the main effort by establishing priorities of fires. Close fires, deep fires, and counterfires are coordinated with maneuver forces to disrupt and weaken the enemy's offensive action and to provide windows of opportunity for friendly offensive action. The FSC uses the IPB process, full integration of intelligence gathering resources, and the target value analysis process to focus fire support on the HPTs vital to the enemy's success.

The fire support plan must support the scheme of maneuver. It is normally designed to place the enemy under increasing volumes of fire as he approaches a defensive position. Long-range fires are delivered by aircraft, artillery, and rockets. Fires are planned along expected enemy routes, in engagement areas, integrated with obstacles and barriers, and within the defensive positions. The degree of completeness and centralization of defensive fire planning depends on the time available to prepare for the defense. Ordinarily, defensive fire support plans are based on terrain, friendly positions, and barriers rather than on known or suspected enemy dispositions. Indirect and aviation fires are closely integrated with infantry, tank, and antitank direct-fire weapons.

Control of fire support assets is centralized for defensive operations. Artillery and mortars preposition ammunition and survey firing positions in advance. The FSC focuses his planning effort on the following tasks:

- Engaging the enemy early to disrupt the cohesion of his attack and reduce his intelligence gathering capability. As the enemy enters the security area and main battle area, fire support continues to reduce the enemy's intelligence gathering effort and ability to mass combat power.
- Supporting rear operations.
- Providing deep fires to delay and disrupt follow-on echelons.
- Screening friendly movements.
- Providing counterfire to permit friendly maneuver and limit the enemy's ability to shift or mass his own fires.
- Integrating fires with the barrier plan and subordinate unit's countermobility effort.

The defender engages the enemy with long-range fires as early as possible unless fires are withheld to prevent the loss of surprise. Commanders make maximum use of fire support to destroy and disrupt enemy formations as they approach the main battle area. As the enemy closes, he is subjected to an ever-increasing volume of fires from the main battle area forces and all supporting arms. Obstacles and barriers are located to delay or canalize the enemy and are covered by fire to destroy him while he is halted and concentrated on the process of breaching. Main battle forces maintain an offensive spirit throughout the battle, executing local counterattacks by fire and maneuver whenever there is a probability of success.

Air Defense

Air defense priorities within the division will normally shift successively from the division covering force or other forward security forces, to the division fire support elements, combat service support, and C^2 facilities.

Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability

The priority of engineer effort in the security area is normally given to mobility of the passing units of the covering force, then to countermobility to delay the advance of the enemy. Priority for support in the main battle area is determined by the division commander based on METT-T. Countermobility and survivability requirements must be thoroughly examined as they normally compete for the same limited resources. Obstacles are emplaced in depth to support the scheme of maneuver and are integrated into the fire support plan to maximize the effects of fires. Counterattack plans may require a mobility effort to improve routes and mobility corridors. Priority of engineer support in the rear area is given to mobility, then survivability for command and control, the reserve, and CSS assets.

Combat Service Support

Logistic support to the division must be coordinated. The G-4 and FSSG commander must understand the division commander's intent so that CSS priorities can be established and operations planned to ensure the supportability of the defense. CSS plans must be flexible enough to support opportunities for maneuver units to transition to the offense and other future operations.

Chapter 6

Other Tactical Operations

Overview

This chapter describes operations which are routinely conducted by the division. These tactical operations are relief in place, passage of lines, linkup operations, breakout from encirclement, infiltration, helicopterborne operations, river crossings, mechanized operations, and military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT). The division may conduct any or all of these operations during the offense or the defense to ensure mission accomplishment.

Relief in Place

A relief in place is a combat operation in which one unit replaces all or part of another unit in a combat area. The relief in place is conducted when the outgoing unit is on the defense. The incoming unit may have the mission of continuing the defense or preparing for a subsequent attack. The division may be directed to conduct a relief in place during the course of a joint, multinational, or MEF operation. Secrecy and speed characterize this operation. Centralized planning by the division staff and decentralized execution by major subordinate commands are the key to its success. A relief in place may be conducted to serve one or more of the following purposes:

- To relieve a depleted unit in contact.
- To relieve units stressed by prolonged operations in adverse conditions.
- To rest a unit after extended periods in a contaminated area.
- To decontaminate a unit or avoid excess radiation.

The higher headquarters directs when and where to conduct the relief and establishes appropriate control measures. The order for the relief in place must specify, as a minimum, the time for commencing and completing the relief and the priorities using the routes involved. The higher headquarters should normally direct the relief to be carried out during reduced visibility. The division may be required to conduct a relief in place under enemy pressure or without enemy pressure. A relief in place conducted without enemy pressure normally entails a one-for-one transfer of like units and equipment from occupied positions.

Relief in Place Planning

During a relief in place, the sequence of relief is executed by stages — rear to front or front to rear. See figure 6-1. This procedure establishes the strongest defense. In determining the sequence of relief, both commanders should consider the following:

- Subsequent mission of the division that is conducting the relief.
- Strength and combat efficiency of the unit presently in the main battle area.
- Capability of the enemy to detect and react against the relief.
- Characteristics of the area of operations.
- Need to vary the pattern of relief.
- Size and type of elements involved in the relief.
- Requirement to retain surprise.

The incoming unit commanders and staffs must be briefed and become thoroughly familiar with the existing defensive plan to include fire plans, barrier plans, and counterattack plans. The outgoing unit leaves liaison personnel with the incoming unit. These liaison personnel usually remain until the incoming units become familiar with the situation.

On receipt of the order, the division commander and staff analyze the mission, issue internal warning orders, and establish liaison and communications with the in-place division's main echelon. The relieving division's tactical echelon moves to collocate with



Figure 6-1. Relief in Place.

the defending division's tactical echelon. The tactical echelon monitors the current situation and coordinates withdrawal procedures. The LAR battalion moves forward concurrently to reconnoiter routes to regimental assembly areas and proposed battle positions. Reserves are relieved first, followed by relief of forward elements. When minimum forces are employed on the forward line of own troops (FLOT), the relief is conducted from rear to front. When maximum forces are on the FLOT, the relief is conducted from front to rear. Once the relief in place is begun, the division staffs are primarily concerned with —

- Supervising the timing and movement of subordinate units.
- Coordinating use of transportation between incoming and outgoing units.
- Supervising the execution of traffic control.
- Preparing for exchange of overall control after transfer of command.
- Continuously monitoring the situation so they can react swiftly to any emergency or required change in the plan for relief.

The time or circumstances under which the incoming commander assumes responsibility for the area must be clearly established. During the relief, the outgoing commander retains responsibility for the area and mission and exercises operational control over all subordinate elements of the incoming division that have completed their portion of the relief. Responsibility passes to the incoming commander when all the subordinate units in the main battle area have been relieved and adequate communications have been established.

Arrangements must be made for a thorough reconnaissance by commanders and staffs of the incoming division. Reconnaissance should include an inspection of terrain to the front, defensive installations, relief routes, assembly areas, weapon positions, and CSS installations.

All units must prevent the enemy from learning that a relief in place is taking place. In addition to conducting the relief during periods of reduced visibility, the following security measures should be taken:

- Normal activities in the area of operations must be maintained during the relief.
- Restricting the size of advance parties and reconnaissance parties must be enforced. Infiltration should be the movement technique used to position these parties.
- Communications during the relief are conducted on the command frequency of the outgoing unit until the relief is completed.
- An integrated deception plan should be executed by both the incoming and outgoing units.

The outgoing unit transfers to the incoming unit all information and intelligence concerning the enemy and the area of operations, and detailed information related to any emplaced sensor/surveillance systems which remain active.

The method of relieving fire support units must be clearly established. Normally, the artillery of the outgoing unit will remain in position until the units in the main battle area have been relieved. Depending on available firing positions, artillery units may take over the outgoing artillery unit's position or select new positions from which the same fire missions can be accomplished. Until command passes, registration and all other fires of the incoming artillery units are controlled by the commander of the outgoing artillery. The headquarters ordering the relief may direct that the artillery of the outgoing unit remain in position to support subsequent operations of the incoming unit.

The time available for and other circumstances influencing the relief may require that certain weapons and other equipment be exchanged between the incoming and the outgoing units. Command authority for execution of demolition targets and demolition target folders are exchanged between commanders.

Pertinent CSS matters such as the transfer of supplies, use of installations, transfer of enemy prisoner of war (EPWs), operation of civilian collection points, displacement of CSS units, use of transportation, and traffic control must be coordinated between the incoming and outgoing units.

Arrangements between the incoming and outgoing units must be made for the control of units moving into and out of the area. Coordination for movement control must include —

- Routes to be used and priorities for their use.
- Responsibility for traffic control.
- Location of assembly areas.
- Provision of guides for incoming units.
- Common use of transportation.

Passage of Lines

A passage of lines is the coordinated movement of one or more units through another unit. See figure 6-2. The passage of lines is an operation designed to facilitate another tactical operation. Elements of the passed unit remain in position and support the attacking unit until their fires are masked, at which time they may remain in position, be withdrawn, or be committed to other action. Passages of lines are either forward or rearward. They are conducted to —

- Continue an attack or counterattack.
- Envelop an enemy force.
- Pursue a fleeing enemy.
- Withdraw a security or main battle area force.

The division normally uses multiple passage lanes through a defending unit. This technique supports decentralized movement of units and the division's capability to infiltrate and remain undetected. The passage of lines places both passing and in-place divisions in danger while both occupy the same terrain. A passage of lines should be rapid to minimize this vulnerability.

When possible, the areas selected for the actual passage of lines should be the unoccupied areas between the elements of the unit in position or on its flanks. This procedure reduces the vulnerability that results when one unit passes directly through the occupied positions of another. Vulnerability also is reduced when the subordinate units of the division making the passage move directly to the areas of passage or into the attack without delay. Division reconnaissance units conduct initial reconnaissance to the rear of the stationary unit, and route reconnaissance from the division's assembly areas to passage lanes. The stationary unit conducts aggressive counter-reconnaissance operations to the front to deny enemy knowledge of the passage.



Figure 6-2. Passage of Lines.

The unit in contact provides all possible aid to the unit passing through. The stationary division engineer must pass all information concerning emplacement, turnover, execution, and breaching of all obstacles in sector. Additional engineer support from the stationary unit may be required for creating or opening gaps and providing guides to the attacking forces through obstacles along the FLOT. The FSC of the passing unit coordinates the fires of the artillery of the stationary unit to support the passing unit after control has been transferred. The stationary unit also provides other assistance to the passing unit to include —

- Evacuation of casualties and EPWs.
- Control of civilians.
- Use of areas and facilities, e.g., water points.
- Route priority and traffic control.

Planning Considerations

The higher headquarters is responsible for planning and coordinating the passage of lines. Certain basic considerations must be integrated into the planning process:

- Plans for the conduct of the passage must facilitate transition to the subsequent missions of both the passing and stationary divisions.
- Responsibility for control of the zone or sector passes from one division to the other at a time and place directed by the higher common superior or mutually agreed upon by the stationary and passing commanders.
- The passing division uses multiple routes through the stationary division and avoids the use of assembly areas. It does not halt within the stationary division's forward positions.

- Deception and smoke are planned at dummy and actual unit locations and passage points.
- Combat support and CSS assets of the stationary division are integrated into the plan to support the movement of the passing division.

Route Priority

The unit passing through must have priority for use of routes to and within the area of the unit in contact. Route priority should be established by the headquarters directing the passage of lines. Traffic control in the area of the unit in contact is the responsibility of that unit until the responsibility for the zone is transferred to the passing unit. When possible, routes dedicated for the passing unit use should be different from stationary unit supply routes to avoid congestion and confusion. These routes must extend to the passing unit's final destination.

Receipt of Warning Order

Upon receipt of a warning order which directs an operation requiring a passage of lines, the division commander and his staff will make early contact with the unit in contact. Tactical echelons are collocated to facilitate a smooth passage and transfer of responsibility for the zone or sector. An order of movement setting priorities on which units move and when they move, precludes confusion and congestion. Divisions conducting the passage of lines coordinate and pass to subordinate commanders —

- Exchange of intelligence, tactical plans, and recognition signals.
- Exchange of SOPs.
- Arrangements of reconnaissance by elements of the passing regiments.
- Security measures during the passage.
- Selection of passage areas and provisions for guides.
- Priorities for use of routes and facilities and provisions for movement control. The passing unit must have priority.
- Time or circumstances when responsibility for the control of the area of operations will be transferred.
- Fire support and other combat support to be provided by the stationary unit.
- Combat service support to be provided by the stationary unit.
- Exchange of liaison personnel.
- Collection and exchange of information on friendly minefields and other obstacles.
- Command and support relationship between incoming combat support and CSS units and facilities and the stationary unit in whose area they may plan to locate.
- Measures to minimize vulnerability to enemy NBC munitions.
- Tactical cover and deception plans to retain secrecy and to aid in gaining surprise.

Linkup Operations

Linkup operations are conducted to join two friendly forces. See figure 6-3. It may occur during an amphibious operation where forces are landed by both surface and aviation means, during the relief of an isolated unit, or to join the division with other U.S., allied, and/or indigenous forces. Forces may be moving toward each other, or one may be stationary. A linkup may be part of an offensive or defensive operation. The division conducts linkup operations to —

- Complete encirclement or envelopment of an enemy force.
- Assist in the breakout of an encircled friendly force.
- Join an attacking force with a force inserted in the enemy rear.

Planning

Planning for the linkup must be timely. Plans of the forces involved in the linkup are coordinated in advance. Provisions are made for the prompt exchange of information between the two forces. The two organizations involved exchange as much information as possible prior to the operation. Division representatives meet to coordinate the following:

- Command relationship and responsibilities. The headquarters directing the linkup must establish the command relationships and responsibilities of the forces involved.
- Command and staff liaison. Liaison is established during planning and continues throughout the operation.



Figure 6-3. Linkup.

- Communications. The communications plan includes the channels for radio communication and recognition signals between the two forces.
- Coordination of schemes of maneuver and control measures.
- The location and description of primary and alternate linkup points.
- Fire support coordinating measures.
- Actions following linkup.

To support the linkup, the division G-2 employs reconnaissance and surveillance assets near linkup points to identify enemy movement toward the division's position. Fire support coordinating measures permit both divisions to increase or decrease positive control as required as the forces converge. Obstacle zones are planned on enemy avenues of approach into the division sector based on METT-T. These obstacle zones include the full spectrum of obstacles to include conventional and scatterable mine systems. Logistic planning considerations include the distance to the objective area, the amount of time the objective area is to be held, planned operations or movement out of the objective area, resupply of the stationary unit, and movement of support for helicopterborne forces.

Linkup of a Moving Force with a Stationary Force

In an operation where one force is moving to link-up with a stationary force, the following planning procedures are necessary:

Coordination of Ground Linkup Points

Linkup points are coordinated at locations where the axis of advance of the moving force intersect the security elements of the stationary force. Alternate linkup points are established. Enemy action may force linkup to occur at places other than those planned. The number of linkup points established depends on the capability of the stationary force, the number of routes being used by the linkup force, and the nature of terrain and enemy threats to the operation. Troops manning the points, as well as the units contacting them, must be familiar with procedures for mutual identification and plans for the rapid passages of the advancing units. Assistance by the stationary force includes removing obstacles, providing guides, and reserving assembly areas for the reorganization of linkup forces.

Fire Support Coordination

For linkup operations, a restrictive fire line (RFL) may be required to preclude fires from the converging forces from affecting each other. As the linkup becomes imminent, the RFL is moved as close to the stationary force as possible to allow maximum freedom of action to the linkup force. A single FSCL should encompass both forces; offensive air support delivered in the area between the two forces that is not under control of a terminal controller must then be cleared by the FSCC of both the linkup force and the stationary force. On linkup and when recommended by the responsible commander concerned for fire support coordination for the force as a whole, responsibility for fire support coordination is transferred to the designated commander. The force having primary interest in the operation following linkup is normally given this responsibility.

Air Defense Considerations

The division must ensure timely dissemination of information and coordination so that air defense units do not engage friendly aircraft that may be supporting the linkup units.

Actions Following Linkup

When the linkup is made, the linkup force may join the stationary force or may pass through or around and continue the attack. If the linkup force is to continue operations with the stationary force, a single commander for the overall force is designated.

Linkup of Two Moving Units

Linkup between two moving units is one of the most difficult operations and is normally conducted to complete the encirclement of an enemy force. Primary and alternate linkup points for the moving forces are established on boundaries where the two forces are expected to converge. As linkup units move close to one another, fires must be coordinated to ensure the enemy does not escape between the two forces. Leading elements of each force should monitor a common radio net. Considerations for fire support coordination, air defense, and actions following linkup are identical to those discussed above for stationary linkup.

Breakout From Encirclement

A division is encircled when all ground routes of evacuation and reinforcement have been cut by enemy action. Due to the nonlinear nature of the modern battlefield, the division may have to fight while encircled. See figure 6-4. The division may be encircled by enemy design, when ordered to remain in a strong position on key terrain to deny the enemy passage through a vital choke point following an enemy breakthrough, or when left to hold the shoulder of a penetration. When this occurs, it is vital that the encircled commander have a clear understanding of the higher commander's intent so the unit can continue to contribute to the mission.

The senior commander within the encirclement assumes control of all forces. He informs his superior of the situation. Simultaneously, he begins to accomplish the following tasks regardless of his subsequent mission.

- **Reestablish a chain of command.** Fragmented units are reorganized, and a clear chain of command is established. Personnel not essential to combat support and combat service support are organized for combat operations or provided to maneuver units as replacements.

- **Establish a viable defense.** The command quickly established all-around defense; assigns sectors, battle positions, or strongpoints; and institutes an aggressive patrolling plan.

- **Establish a reserve.** A reserve must be constituted and positioned to take advantage of interior lines.

- **Organize fire support.** Indirect fire assets are centralized for breakout operations. Artillery and mortars are positioned throughout the pocket to limit their vulnerability to counterfire. The available fire support from outside the encirclement is coordinated by the FSC.



Figure 6-4. Breakout From Encirclement.

- **Reorganize logistics.** An early assessment is made of the logistics posture of the encircled command. Temporarily, all combat service support comes under the centralized control of the senior logistician or designated individual. He rations key supplies, authorizes cannibalization, identifies equipment to be destroyed, and develops a casualty evacuation plan.

- **Maintain morale.** Commanders and leaders at all levels maintain the confidence of subordinates by resolute action and positive attitude. Subordinates are kept informed to suppress rumors.

While planning for the breakout, the division continues to defend on the most defensible terrain, holding the entire perimeter. It may reduce the size of its perimeter to maintain a strong defense; however, it must maintain sufficient maneuver space. The division employs reconnaissance units to determine enemy strengths and weaknesses near the planned breakout point. It conducts counter-reconnaissance operations to deny the enemy information on friendly breakout plans.

The division selects the rupture location and routes of march that avoid enemy strengths, increasing the chance for surprise. The route selected may not be direct; it may be over less favorable terrain. The division avoids the most obvious route toward friendly lines unless there is no alternative. However, the division may use the most obvious route for a diversionary attack.

The division may respond to encirclement in several ways. It can stay in position and defend. However, the effect on the enemy may be limited and the

division may lose combat effectiveness or be destroyed unless it successfully breaks out. The division can also attack to break out of the encirclement and link up with friendly forces. Another way is to attack deeper toward enemy forces and facilities to interfere with enemy command and control, to disrupt follow-on forces, and to destroy fire support and CSS assets. Lastly, the division can infiltrate by small groups. Depending on the method selected, the commander uses the same planning considerations as are normally used in other defensive, offensive, and infiltration operations.

Defense While Encircled

The division can respond to an encirclement by maintaining its position and defending in place. This may inflict damage on the enemy, divert an enemy attack, restrict enemy maneuver and logistic support, or acquire intelligence. Encircled forces also defend in-place if they are tying up sufficient enemy forces to weaken the enemy's main effort. This decision is based on METT-T and the higher commander's intent.

Breakout Toward Friendly Forces

The division can attack to break out of the encirclement and link up with friendly forces when linkup is necessary and time is crucial. If a commander uses a breakout attack toward friendly forces, it is important that the breakout attack take place as soon as possible after the encirclement since the enemy force may not realize that it has encircled a division. The longer the commander waits to conduct the attack, the more organized the enemy forces are likely to be.

The attack to break out of an encirclement differs from other attacks in that a simultaneous defense in other areas of the perimeter is maintained. To achieve a breakout, the commander should accomplish the following tasks:

- Task-organize the force for the breakout.
- Deceive the enemy as to time and place of the attack.
- Exploit vulnerabilities in the encircling force.
- Exploit darkness and limited visibility.
- Concentrate combat power at the breakout point.
- Coordinate with supporting efforts.

When the division is involved in an attack to breakout, division forces can be task-organized into five distinct tactical groups — rupture force, reserve force, main body, rear guard, and diversionary force.

Rupture Force

The rupture force attacks, creates a gap in the enemy force, and holds the shoulders for the remaining forces to pass through.

Reserve Force

The reserve force follows the rupture attack to maintain attack momentum and to secure objectives past the rupture. After the rupture force secures the gap, the reserve force normally becomes the division's lead element.

Main Body

The main body contains the headquarters elements, casualties, combat support, and combat service support; it moves as a single group. It usually follows the reserve through the gap created by the rupture force. One commander should be given command of this element to ensure orderly movement.

Rear Guard

The rear guard consists of the personnel and equipment left on the perimeter to provide protection for the rupture and diversionary attacks, if a diversionary attack force exists.

Diversionary Force

Attention must be diverted from the location of the rupture by a show of force elsewhere. Mobile weapon systems and tanks are ideally suited for the diversionary force. The diversionary attack should be directed at a point where the enemy might expect a breakout.

Attack of Deeper Enemy Forces and Facilities

The division can attack deeper toward enemy forces and facilities to interfere with enemy command and control, disrupt follow-on forces, and destroy fire support and CSS assets (usually C^2 facilities, logistic centers, and other CSS assets). Units temporarily encircled may continue attacks to their objective if the enemy force cannot contain the encircled force and the encircled force can sustain the attack.

Infiltration

If success of a breakout attack appears questionable and a relief operation is not possible, then the division can infiltrate by small groups. Infiltration may be considered when the division needs to link-up with another unit, but time is not a crucial consideration. An infiltration effort can distract the enemy from its overall operation and produce intelligence for the higher headquarters. Infiltration is usually a last resort for an encircled force.

Infiltration

Infiltration is the movement through or into an area or territory occupied by either friendly or enemy troops or organizations. The movement is made either by small groups or individuals at extended or irregular intervals. Infiltration can be used to support deception, reposition units in friendly or enemy territory, collect intelligence, or to move a unit to a position of advantage for an attack. In an infiltration, infiltrating units seek to avoid enemy defenses and pass through gaps in the defense. Units are then postured to attack lines of communications, support units, installations, or other objectives in the rear of the forward defense areas, or are postured to seize key terrain to facilitate other operations.

The division normally conducts infiltrations in three phases. The first phase is aggressive patrolling to find gaps in the enemy's forward defense. The second phase is the actual infiltration through the enemy forward defensive positions. The third phase is assembly in attack positions in the enemy's rear. The characteristics of terrain and the nature of the conflict influence the use of infiltration as a movement technique. Infiltration may be favored when —

- Enemy maneuver forces are dispersed. Dispersion allows passage of the infiltrating force through the unoccupied areas of the enemy dispositions.
- The enemy cannot easily mass against the infiltrating force without endangering his own force.
- Seizure or neutralization of objectives in the enemy's rear is critical.
- Terrain provides infiltrating forces relative protection from detection and destruction.

Command and Control

Coordination and integration of all combat functions are much the same as that for any other type of operation. Careful consideration must be given to measures to deconflict and control fire support and movement through enemy counter-reconnaissance forces. Command and control of infiltrating forces requires simplicity. The tactical echelon is best suited to monitor and control infiltrating units. It will normally locate well forward to monitor and support tactical requirements of infiltrating forces. The regiments executing the infiltration, or controlling subordinate infiltrating units, report to the division tactical echelon.

The primary means of controlling an infiltration are tactical control measures and SOPs. Control measures for an infiltration must be simple. See figure 6-5. Due to inherent dispersion of forces during an infiltration, command and control is a difficult undertaking. In addition to phase lines, boundary areas, and fire support coordinating measures used in any other operation, infiltrating forces normally use these additional control measures:

- The rear assembly area is located in a hidden or concealed position to the rear of the FEBA. It must be close to the lanes to be used for the forward passage of lines through friendly forces.
- Forward passage lanes must be close to the rear assembly areas as the tactical situation permits. The distance between the assembly areas and passage lane will impact on the available time the infiltrating unit has to coordinate with the stationary unit and to conduct reconnaissance of the passage and infiltration lanes.



Figure 6-5. Infiltration Control Measures.

- Attack position(s) should be as close as possible to the objective without compromising security. An attack position must be large enough for the force to deploy and to provide a covered and concealed position for infiltrating units to converge. It should be reconnoitered and secured before occupation. The position also can be used to make final adjustments prior to the attack. Linkup points are designated short of the attack position to facilitate security and movement of elements from the infiltration lanes.
- Hide positions are designated along the infiltration lanes for operations longer than one day. Infiltrating forces use these hide positions during the daylight hours to remain hidden from the enemy. Hide positions must provide covered and concealed locations which hide and disperse the force until movement resumes.
- Infiltration lanes must be reconnoitered prior to movement by infiltrating forces. They contain a start point, release point, target reference points, hide areas, and checkpoints. They are selected to avoid predicable routes which lend themselves to enemy ambush. The number of

lanes required depends on the size of the infiltrating force, time constraints, the availability of covered and concealed routes, and the nature of terrain.

- Rally points are designated along each infiltration route by the infiltrating unit. They allow the dispersed infiltrating forces to rapidly regroup in response to unforeseen enemy contact and continue movement to the attack position. They should be easily identifiable and provide cover and concealment.

Intelligence

Intelligence operations to support an infiltration requires early efforts to locate and assess enemy capabilities along infiltration lanes, objectives, and potential reactions once infiltration terminates and the attack begins. Information from intelligence reports, reconnaissance and patrol reports, weather and light data, and aerial photographs is used to determine infiltration lanes, locations of rally and contact points, enemy security elements, gaps in the enemy defense, and strength of enemy defenses on the objective.

During the infiltration, division intelligence personnel develop and maintain as accurate a picture as possible of the enemy and his activities. They should concentrate on enemy C^2 systems to determine if the enemy has discovered the infiltration operation and what his reaction will be.

Fire Support

Fire support must be available to infiltrating forces throughout the operation. Regimental-sized infiltrations will normally have an artillery battalion in direct support (DS). DS artillery must be well forward to support both the infiltration and attack on the objective. Additional artillery units should be placed in a reinforcing role to the DS battalions during the infiltration. Artillery can support deception efforts by firing false preparations and programs into other areas. CAS is planned for use during infiltration and attack of the objective once the infiltration is completed. Counterbattery radars are positioned to support the infiltrating force.

Mobility and Survivability

Infiltrating forces will have limited mobility, countermobility, and survivability assets. These are normally limited to combat engineers task-organized into infiltrating groups. They can conduct limited breaching of enemy obstacles during the attack on the objective. Bangalore torpedo sections, limited demolitions, pioneer tools, and a limited number of mines are all they can realistically be expected to carry on a foot mobile infiltration. The primary concern when task-organizing maneuver elements with engineers is the mobility and survivability requirements during the attack on the enemy position. Considerations will normally focus on assault breaching and then on any hasty defensive preparations required once the objective is secured.

Combat Service Support

CSS assets normally do not accompany infiltrating units. However, CSS assets must be prepared to follow attacking forces which link up with the infiltrating force to support resupply and medical evacuation. Infiltrating forces carry the minimum essential equipment and supplies during the movement. Depending on the situation, limited aerial resupply and medical evacuation may be provided to the force during the infiltration. However, since medical evacuation will be difficult and could compromise the infiltration, corpsmen and battalion-level medical support are critical.

Tactical Considerations

Successful infiltrations are characterized by boldness and initiative. Individual and small-unit resourcefulness and ingenuity are required to prevent enemy detection. Proficiency in tactical movement is a requirement for infiltration. It provides the ability to find routes which permit the force to bypass enemy positions, locate gaps, and avoid enemy surveillance capabilities.

Infiltrations should take advantage of periods and conditions of reduced visibility. If the enemy has electronic detection devices, countermeasures must be incorporated into the plan to neutralize them. Patrols can provide security during the infiltration and

may prevent enemy reconnaissance from determining the size of the infiltration and its objectives. Supporting artillery fires can be used to target known enemy locations and to mask the movement of infiltrating forces.

Planning

Infiltration requires a detailed plan based on mission analysis and estimates of the situation. Infiltration has the best chance for success when the enemy defense is overextended. The commander and staff select objectives and routes based on terrain analysis, enemy dispositions, and need to avoid contact before reaching attack positions. Best results may be achieved when infiltrating forces attack simultaneously with or soon after other attacking forces.

The size of the infiltrating force is METT-T dependent. Initial infiltration groups are normally of platoon or company size. Once gaps are located and pinpointed, larger infiltration groups may be passed through them. In some instances the infiltration force may include light vehicles and some armored vehicles. When possible, the inclusion of transportation can enhance combat power by providing additional direct fires, long-range communications, and increased ammunition support.

Helicopterborne Operations

A helicopterborne operation is a tactical operation normally in support of the ground tactical plan whereby helicopters are employed to move troops, supplies, and/or equipment. Helicopterborne operations allow the commander to maneuver rapidly to achieve tactical surprise and to mass his forces, regardless of terrain obstacles and without depending on ground lines of communication. The unique versatility and strength of the helicopter — speed, agility, and firepower — provides the division an ability to rapidly maneuver against the enemy.

A helicopterborne force provides commanders with truly unique capabilities. Helicopters help extend the battlefield, move forces, and rapidly concentrate combat power. Helicopterborne operations are deliberate, precisely planned, and vigorously executed combat operations designed to allow friendly forces to strike over extended distances and terrain barriers to attack the enemy when and where he is most vulnerable. These same attributes allow the formation of helicopterborne task forces containing aviation units task-organized with division units to create combined arms teams.

Capabilities

Ground and helicopter units can be fully integrated with other members of the combined arms team to form flexible helicopterborne forces. Specifically, helicopterborne task forces can —

- Attack enemy positions from any direction.
- Overfly or bypass barriers and obstacles and strike objectives in otherwise inaccessible areas.
- Conduct operations beyond the FLOT or point of contact, using helicopters to insert and extract forces.
- Rapidly concentrate, disperse, or redeploy to extend the area of influence.
- Provide a responsive reserve allowing the commander to commit a larger portion of the force to action.
- Rapidly place forces at tactically decisive points in the objective area.
- Provide surveillance or security over a wide area.
- Rapidly secure and defend key terrain such as crossing sites, road junctions, or bridges.
- Bypass enemy positions; achieve surprise.

Limitations and Vulnerabilities

A helicopterborne force will be relatively light and mobile but reliant on helicopter support throughout the operation. In addition, they may be limited by —

- Severe weather, extreme heat and cold, and other environmental conditions such as blowing snow and sand that limit flight operations or helicopter lifting capability.
- Dependence on air lines of communication.
- Enemy aircraft, air defense, and electronic warfare action.
- Reduced ground mobility and vehicle-mounted antitank systems once inserted.
- Availability of suitable HLZs.

- Battlefield obscuration that limits helicopter flight.
- High fuel and ammunition consumption rates.

Initial elements are often separated from weapon systems, equipment, and materiel that provide protection and survivability on the battlefield. Thus, a helicopterborne task force is particularly vulnerable to —

- Attack by enemy air defense weapon systems during the movement phase.
- Attack by NBC systems, because of limited NBC protection and decontamination assets.
- Ground attacks by infantry, artillery, and armor. Helicopterborne forces are particularly vulnerable during embarkation and debarkation phases.
- Electronic warfare (jamming).

Planning

Successful helicopterborne operations require a careful analysis of METT-T and detailed reverse planning. Five separate but integrated plans are required to conduct a helicopterborne operation. See figure 6-6. They are the ground tactical plan, landing plan, air movement plan, loading plan, and the staging plan. The ground tactical plan is developed first and dictates the content of all others. These plans are developed in reverse order. Sample formats for each plan are provided in Appendix J, FMFM 6-21, *Tactical Fundamentals of Helicopterborne Operations*.

Ground Tactical Plan

The foundation for a successful helicopterborne operation is the commander's ground tactical plan. All planning evolves around this plan. The ground tactical plan specifies actions in the objective area which ultimately accomplish the mission. The plan may also include subsequent operations. The ground tactical plan for the helicopterborne operation contains essentially the same elements as any other operation but differs in that it is prepared to capitalize on speed and mobility in order to achieve surprise. Infantry units are placed on or near the objective and organized to enable immediate attack. In some situations, the helicopterborne force must land away from the objective and conduct a foot and/or vehicle movement to the objective. The scheme of maneuver may assume a variety of possibilities depending on the commander's evaluation of METT-T. Of particular importance is the availability of HLZs in the area.

Mission. The most obvious portion of the helicopterborne mission is the requirement to conduct a helicopter movement. The following concerns should be examined:

- Missions of all units and methods for employment.
- Special tasks required to accomplish the mission.
- Means to accomplish the mission, e.g., organic personnel, aviation, communications, and medical.
- Number of personnel to be lifted.
- Total weight to be lifted.
- Internal and external lift requirements.
- Distance of the air movement.

Concept of Operations. The ground concept is formulated in five parts:

- Ground movement to the pick-up zone.
- Securing and organizing the pick-up zone.
- Actions at the HLZ.
- Ground movement from the HLZ to the objective or actions on the objective.
- Operations subsequent to securing the objective.

Task Organization. Ground combat, ground combat support, and helicopter/aviation units are task-organized for a specific mission. Multiple objectives and landings require detailed, flexible plans. The ground commander must have the opportunity to adjust his organization and conduct briefs prior to being landed in subsequent zones.

Other Ground Tactical Plan Considerations. These considerations include the following:

- Determine forecasted weather.
- Determine available LZs.
- Establish H-hour.
- Determine fire support considerations such as CAS, artillery, NSFS, SEAD, and coordinating measures.



Figure 6-6. Planning Diagram.

- Determine enemy situation, in particular air defense capabilities and reaction forces located near the objective or HLZ(s).
- Determine intelligence support available.

Landing Plan

The landing plan must support the ground tactical plan. The plan sequences units into the area of operations so that they arrive at locations and times prepared to execute the ground tactical plan. Considerations in developing the landing plan include —

- The availability, location, size, and enemy proximity to potential HLZs.
- The vulnerability of the helicopterborne force during landing.
- The tactical integrity of units when landing.
- The disorientation of Marines if the briefed landing direction changes and they are not kept informed.
- The combat readiness of the helicopterborne forces to fight in any direction when it lands.
- Supporting fires.
- The provisions for emergency extract, resupply, and medical evacuation by air.

Selection of LZs. The ground tactical commander makes the selection of LZs based on the recommendation of the air mission commander. LZs are selected using the following criteria:

- The ground force commander's concept of operations.
- LZs can be located on, near, or away from the objective, depending of the factors of METT-T.
- The size of the LZ will determine the sequence for landing. It is desirable to land the entire force simultaneously to minimize exposure to the threat. The size of available zones may also require the use of more than one zone, more than one wave, or increased separation between waves.
- An alternate LZ should be planned for each primary LZ selected to ensure flexibility.
- Enemy troop concentrations, air defenses, and the enemy's capability to react to a helicopterborne landing are considered when selecting LZs.
- LZs are selected which deny enemy observation and acquisition of friendly ground and aviation elements while they are in route to/from and in the LZ.
- LZs should be readily identifiable from the air.
- Requirements for logistic support.
- Requirements for fire support.
- Routes to and from LZs.
- Weather, reduced visibility, or strong winds may preclude or limit the use of marginal LZs.

LZ Characteristics. In addition to deciding where to land in relation to the objective, a decision is made on whether to use single or multiple LZs.

Advantages of single LZ:

- Allows concentration of combat power in one location.
- Facilitates control and orientation.
- Facilitates supporting arms coordination.
- Enhances security for subsequent lifts.
- Reduces the route planning requirements.
- Centralizes required resupply operations.
- Requires less planning and rehearsal time.

Advantages of multiple HLZs:

- Creates force dispersion to avoid creating a lucrative target for enemy mortars, artillery, and CAS.
- Allows rapid employment of elements required to accomplish tasks in geographically separated areas.
- Reduces enemy ability to determine main effort and react to the initial lift if the force is detected.
- Eliminates aircraft congestion.
- Makes it difficult for the enemy to determine the size of the helicopterborne force and the exact location of supporting weapons.

Fires to Support the Landing. It is desirable to land without preparatory fires to achieve tactical surprise. However, fires are planned to support a landing in each LZ in the event they are needed. When developing fire support plans, the commander gives consideration to —

- Deception. False preparations are fired into areas other than the objective or LZ.
- Loss of surprise.
- Availability and type of fire support.
- Significant targets. A known or suspected enemy force regardless of size, warrants targeting.
- Obstacles to landing and maneuver. Some ordnance used in preparation (artillery, bombs, napalm) can cause craters, tree blowdown, fires, and LZ obscuration and therefore may not be desirable.
- Scheduled fires.
- Positive control measures. Control measures must be established for lifting or shifting fires. Airspace coordination areas (ACA) may be necessary to protect approach and retirement lanes.

Air Movement Plan

The air movement plan is based on the ground tactical and landing plans. The plan provides the air movement schedule and instructions for the air movement of troops, equipment, and supplies. It also provides coordinating instructions pertaining to approach and retirement routes, air control points, aircraft speeds, altitudes, and formations. The use of attack helicopters should be included in this plan.

Examination of METT-T, with strong emphasis on threat analysis, determines approach and retirement route selection. Route and altitude are interdependent in the selection and shall be considered concurrently to determine the optimum movement. Avoidance of enemy detection and fires is the primary consideration. In addition to METT-T factors, the commander considers the following general principles when route selection planning.

- Terrain is used to the best tactical advantage.
- Primary and alternate approach and retirement routes are identified.
- Routes should be easily identified and navigated.
- Communications will not be easily impaired.
- Routes can be flown under adverse weather conditions.
- Unique or complicated support requirements are minimized.
- Supporting arms capabilities are maximized and limitations are minimized.

It is important for ground commanders to know the dimensions of approach and retirement routes for fire support planning. Leaders must maintain situational awareness to include navigation during flight as helicopters may be forced to land unexpectedly.

Planned fires in support of the operation may be executed during flight. These fires are planned as they would be to support any helicopterborne operation. The commander's fire support planning incorporates the following considerations:

- Fires along the flight route are planned to suppress known or suspected enemy positions. These fires should be of short duration. Multiple target engagement techniques should be utilized.
- Fire plans must be complete and flexible. Fire support plans include suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) systems and smoke to protect formations from enemy detection from pick-up zones (PZs), along approach and retirement lanes, and the LZ.
- On-call fires are planned along the flight route to ensure rapid adjustment of targets of opportunity.
- The use of illumination requires detailed planning.

Loading Plan

Correct helicopter loading is essential in maintaining proper employment and orientation upon debarkation. In turn, proper debarkation enhances mobility and reduces the time required to organize for movement from the LZ to the objective. The key is to load and land helicopters in the manner and sequence which allows immediate assumption of the mission upon landing.

The loading plan is based on the air movement plan. It identifies the personnel, equipment, and supplies to be loaded on each aircraft. A bump sequence is

designated to ensure essential personnel and equipment are loaded ahead of less critical loads in case of aircraft breakdown or other problems. Each helicopter load is prioritized to establish the force bump plan. Likewise, each individual heliteam establishes an internal prioritization should conditions preclude the loading of the entire team. Planning must cover the organization and operation of the pick-up zone including load positions, day and night markings, and communications. The loading plan becomes more complicated when mixing internal and external loads and/or when mixing helicopter types. External loads and helicopter support teams (HSTs) should be planned and coordinated to facilitate the rapid handling of cargo.

Written Plans. The requirement for detailed, written plans can be reduced by having adequate unit SOPs covering pick-up zone tasks and loading plans.

Load Planning. During preparation of the loading tables, unit leaders at all levels attempt to maintain or ensure the following:

- Tactical integrity of units. When planning loads for helicopterborne operations, units are loaded intact on the same aircraft and in the same wave. The goal is to load to ensure unit integrity is maintained at every level.
- Every towed item is accompanied by its prime mover.
- Crews are loaded with their vehicle or weapon.
- Each weapon is accompanied by the appropriate ammunition.
- Sufficient personnel are on board to unload cargo.
- Communication between flights is maintained.
- Tactical spread. Loads should be planned so that leaders, special equipment, crew-served weapons, or a capability are not lost with the loss or destruction of one aircraft.

Staging Plan

The staging plan is based on the loading plan and prescribes the arrival time of ground units (troops, equipment, and supplies) at the PZ in the proper order for movement. Loads must be ready before aircraft arrive. The staging plan also provides for the organization of the zone, defines flight routes to the zone, and provides instructions for linkup of all aviation elements. Air-to-air linkup of aviation units should be avoided, especially at night when night vision goggles are being used.

Mission Brief. The responsibility for operational briefings is a function of command and rests with the commander tasked with executing the helicopterborne operation. The mission brief is the final phase of the planning effort and should include all key personnel. This brief will set forth the concept of operations, scheme of maneuver, and specific details concerning mission coordination and execution. Information shall be provided which enables each participant to understand the overall operation and his specific role and responsibilities regarding mission execution. Joint briefings with representatives from each participating unit should be conducted.

River Crossings

The division may be required to conduct river crossing operations during both offensive and defensive operations. River crossing operations facilitate moving division units across the water obstacle so that there is minimum impact on the division's ability to maneuver. Wide, unfordable rivers impose restrictions on maneuver as they are obstacles to attack and they form natural lines of resistance for the defense. However, a division in the defense also must contend with these obstacles for defensive maneuver and counterattacks. River crossings may be considered either hasty or deliberate. See FMFM 7-26, *River Crossing Operations* for further information.

Hasty Crossing

A hasty crossing is a crossing of a river or stream using crossing means on hand or readily available without pausing to make elaborate preparations. Preferably, a hasty crossing is conducted by seizing crossing sites intact.

Deliberate Crossing

A deliberate crossing is a crossing of a river that requires extensive planning and detailed preparations. Normally, deliberate crossings are conducted against rivers incorporated into an integrated defense or when the river is particularly wide or hazardous. A

deliberate river crossing has four phases — *Phase I: Advance to the river; Phase II: Assault across the river; Phase III: Advance from the far bank; and Phase IV: Secure the bridgehead line.* They are distinct in planning, but there is no pause between them in execution.

Crossing Considerations

The focus of offensive river crossing operations may be to destroy the enemy's defense in-depth along with securing a bridgehead. When bridgeheads are established, they must be large enough to accommodate the force and to facilitate continuation of the operation. Projecting combat power across the river is critical. Crossings should be conducted on as wide a front as possible, using as many crossing sites as possible. Crossing at night, during reduced visibility, using obscurants, and developing a deception plan are all means to reduce the vulnerabilities inherent in river crossing operations.

Throughout a river crossing operation, the crossing force must be capable of defeating or blocking anticipating enemy reaction, including counterattacks, on the far bank. Plans must provide for a rate of crossing and buildup of combat power on the far bank that exceeds the rate at which the enemy can concentrate against the force. The crossing force secures sufficient space on the far bank to provide adequate maneuver room and a depth sufficient to successfully conclude the river crossing operation.

The MEF should be thoroughly familiar with the division's river crossing operation as the MEF provides some of the assets to carry out the operation. Although the actual operation is conducted primarily by the division, all bridging assets are provided by the CSSE. The ACE also provides necessary means to carry out the crossing.

Provision should be made for flank security of the bridgehead by tying the bridgehead line into the river itself. Flanks should include good defensible terrain. METT-T will determine the task organization for the crossing. Under extremely favorable circumstances, it may be possible to cross a river and to secure the entire objective area in a single sustained attack. This type of crossing and securing of the area in one phase may be feasible when the enemy is incapable of significantly delaying the advance of forces making the initial assault crossings or disrupting subsequent operations.

Fire support available to river crossing operations may include artillery, CAS, and NSFS. Fire support is assigned missions that —

- Neutralize enemy direct and indirect fire.
- Isolate the crossing sites and objectives comprising the bridgehead.
- Provide interdiction fires, particularly against enemy reserves.
- Provide smoke.
- Suppress and destroy air defense and C^2 facilities.
- Deliver scatterable mines to protect the flanks, support the defense of the bridgehead, and restrict enemy activity in the vicinity of the obstacle.

A movement control plan is developed that speeds movement across the river and maintains momentum of the attack. To accomplish this, maintenance and refueling sites should be established on the friendly side of the river. The plan requires detailed coordination between movement control agencies and maneuver forces, to include in-place forces and the MEF when applicable.

Crossing sites are normally selected by the regimental commander. The division may specify crossing sites when a certain location is critical to the commander's concept. METT-T determines the number of crossing sites. Depending on available resources, it is desirable that each battalion making the initial crossings should have at least one good assault crossing site in its zone. Control of the crossing sites generally reverts to the CSSE when the division's essential combat support and CSS assets have crossed the obstacle.

Deception operations include feints, demonstrations, ruses, and displays. The objectives of the division deception effort are normally part of a MEF deception plan. Deception measures must be plausible to the enemy. A feasible course of action discarded in the planning may provide a good basis for a deception plan. Deception considerations include —

- Concealing the location and strength of force buildup.
- Concealing the location of the proposed crossings and the main effort.
- Causing the enemy to reveal his defensive fires.
- Causing the enemy the shift his fires from the main effort.
- Causing the enemy to commit reserves improperly against the bridgehead or to delay commitment of reserves.

Retrograde River Crossings

A retrograde river crossing is usually conducted when enemy advances threaten to overwhelm the division. The commander responds to the situation by directing the execution of some form of retrograde operation. While executing a retrograde operation, the division may be subjected to possible enemy pursuit. In such a situation, the retrograde river crossing may be conducted to accomplish one of two objectives:

- To establish a new defense on the exit bank of the river.
- To continue the retrograde to new defensive positions designated beyond the obstacle.

Retrograde river crossings are not merely offensive river crossings conducted in reverse. Retrograde river crossings are characterized by the following:

- Detailed planning and centralized control.
- Enemy control of maneuver initiative.
- Use of delaying forces to impede the enemy's advance and to trade space for time at the crossing sites.
- Forces on the exit bank providing defensive and overwatching fires.

Planning

The retrograde river crossing should be conducted with the same amount of detailed planning that is associated with a deliberate offensive crossing. Since the enemy has the maneuver initiative, it is essential to employ deception operations as an integral part of the plan. Deception should be planned and executed to deceive the enemy regarding the retrograde. The deception story should seek to conceal the location and extent of crossing operations. For planning purposes, the crossing operation is divided into three distinct actions — *delay, defense*, and *crossing*. They normally take place concurrently on the battlefield.

Delay

The delay trades space for time. The time gained allows the main body of the division to cross the river. MEF and division units not engaged in the delay execute a planned retirement or withdrawal and cross the river as quickly as possible. These units are assigned appropriate missions within the crossing area or in the defense which is established on the exit bank. The commander will direct delay operations to continue until delay forces reach the battle handover line. At this time, the units occupying assigned defensive positions on the exit bank assume responsibility for the battle. The delay force then disengages and begins its rearward crossing.

Defense and Crossing

The establishment of a strong exit bank defense in each division sector is undertaken concurrently with the execution of delay operations. The defense of the exit bank must be strong as possible with the available troops. The primary mission of the defense is to overwatch the crossing of the forces remaining on the far side of the river. Once defense forces are directed by the commander to assume responsibility for the battle, they are expected to defeat, or at least contain, the enemy in a specified area. This is essential for the successful completion of the crossing. As units engaged in delay operations negotiate the crossing, they are incorporated into the defense or are directed to prepare to assume the delay mission if further retrograde operations are warranted.

Because friendly forces control both banks of the river for some period of time prior to the operation, existing bridges and crossing sites should be continually improved and repaired. All available bridging and rafting within the MEF should be installed or prepositioned to the rear to supplement existing crossing means. The activity begins with the actual crossings of CSS units. These units evacuate all nonessential supplies and engage in prestocking the delay and defense forces. The crossing sites within the rear area should be fully operational early in the

retrograde to allow elements not involved in the delay to cross the river at the earliest possible time consistent with the tactical situation. Operations within the retrograde crossing area are characterized by —

- Rapid and controlled flow of traffic across the river.
- Maximum use of concealment and dispersal.
- Coordinated crossing of equipment and supplies.
- Coordination between the defense and delay forces for use of crossing sites by the latter.
- Preparation of existing bridges with demolitions for destruction while both banks are controlled. Specific criteria should be issued by the division commander concerning actual bridge destruction.

Mechanized Operations

A mechanized operation is a tactical operation designed to maximize the ground mobility, protection, shock action and firepower of the division through the use of armor-protected vehicles to concentrate combat power against the enemy. Combat power is generated by the massed employment of tanks and by enhancing the mobility of other forces through the use of assault amphibians and light-armored vehicles.

Capabilities

The task organization and employment of mechanized forces are based on METT-T. Mechanized forces may be organized to provide the division commander a mobile striking or counterattack force. They can also be used as security forces over extended distances or designated the division main effort during exploitations and pursuits. In addition, they are capable in varying degrees of —

- Seizing terrain and penetrating or enveloping enemy defenses or strongpoints.
- Conducting defensive operations by dispersing over great distances and by concentrating rapidly.
- Rapidly exploiting success in the offense or defense.

Limitations

Use of mechanized forces may also be limited. Limitations include —

- Mechanized forces rely on radio communications. This makes them vulnerable to enemy counter C^2 efforts and reconnaissance. Understanding of commander's intent, doctrine, battle drills, and control measures helps the mechanized force overcome jamming and inoperable systems.
- Mechanized forces are vulnerable to antiarmor weapons and mines. Proper integration of dismounted infantry and use of artillery, terrain driving, and extensive reconnaissance to locate and target enemy antiarmor positions, minefields and other obstacles, reduce this vulnerability.
- Mechanized forces have a high consumption rate of supply items, especially classes III, V, and IX. Anticipation of these supply needs, push-logistics at optimum times, and use of mobile CSSDs can reduce this vulnerability.

Planning Considerations

The effective employment of the division with foot, motorized, or helicopterborne infantry and a mechanized force requires detailed planning. Coordinated planning, development of orders, rehearsals, and coordination between the respective commanders and staffs must take place. Critical areas in the planning process include lateral communications and coordination, combat support and CSS, and use of terrain.

Intelligence

Intelligence requirements for each type unit must be understood and integrated into the IPB. Mechanized forces orient on unit concentrations, tank and antiarmor locations, counterattack routes, armor obstacles, and engagement areas. Both infantry and mechanized infantry priority information requirements must be combined. The reconnaissance and surveillance plans of both type forces should be developed concurrently and thoroughly coordinated.

Maneuver

The commander develops his scheme of maneuver to maximize the capabilities of his task-organized subordinate units.

Both mechanized and nonmechanized forces can fix the enemy while the other force attacks. In either case, the mechanized force requires adequate terrain to maneuver. Mechanized forces are best suited to open and mixed terrain. Mobility and organic firepower make it easier for mechanized forces to disperse and rapidly concentrate at the decisive point on the battlefield. The direct fires of infantry and mechanized forces should be mutually supporting. The mechanized unit can use its long-range direct fires to provide suppression and overwatch fires for the infantry unit.

To ensure actions of the mechanized force and infantry force are fully coordinated, the commander must coordinate movement of the mechanized force with the other maneuver units of the division. He must provide sufficient maneuver space for the mechanized force. If the mechanized force is to be committed subsequent to infantry attacks, the division commander must decide —

- The amount of separation to accept prior to the commitment of the mechanized force.
- The amount of mechanized assets (if any) to support the infantry attack.
- What obstacles or fortifications along the mechanized force's route are required to be cleared by infantry to expedite movement.

Fire Support

Planners must integrate available fire support for each force into the fire plan. Planners must be familiar with the organization, capabilities, and limitations of all forces involved. During planning and preparation phases, liaison teams should be exchanged to facilitate the integration and coordination of fire support.

Mobility

The division G-3, FSC, division engineer, and the commanders of the tank battalion, assault amphibian battalion, and combat engineer battalion must develop an integrated breaching plan to overcome obstacles. Breaching assets mounted on tanks and AAVs must be considered as well as assets organic to the combat engineer battalion. When foot mobile units are required to clear choke points and obstacles for a mechanized force, breaches must be large enough to accommodate the largest vehicles of the force. Planners must also consider weapon disparities in range, their impact on preparing obstacles, and the use of terrain during battle handover to the mechanized force.

Combat Service Support

Combat service support requires an understanding of the current, ongoing, and forecasted needs of both mechanized and nonmechanized forces. Commanders must be able to distribute combat service support to support overall support requirements and be prepared to receive CSS augmentation from the FSSG. Infantry unit commanders must understand the mechanized unit's maintenance requirements and plan operations accordingly.

Employment

Mechanized forces can be employed as the main effort in any operation to include movement to contacts, attacks, and raids. They can also be committed to support these operations by conducting tasks such as the reserve, overwatch, counterattacks, attacks by fire, covering force operations, and deception operations. Mechanized force tasks in the defense include conducting counterattack, reserve, covering or other security force missions; providing overwatch and reinforcement, or providing the detachment left in contact during retrogrades.

Mechanized forces are often employed in combination with helicopterborne forces, with the helicopterborne force seizing and holding key locations until the arrival of the mechanized force. In a linkup with a helicopterborne force, the mechanized force is normally the moving force and the helicopterborne force is the stationary force. As the helicopterborne force lacks mobility, firepower, and sustainability once on the ground, the mechanized force should be organized with additional elements to provide support as needed.

Military Operations in Urban Terrain

The division commander and staff must understand the problems and complexities of MOUT. Doctrine applicable to the open battlefield is equally applicable to the urban battlefield. The decisionmaking methodology used to develop courses of action remains the same. Only the factors of METT-T change. Commanders and staffs must know and understand the unique challenges of the urban battlefield. The urban battlefield is characterized by isolation. Because of this isolation, the urban battle requires psychologically strong leaders. However, the MOUT battle is the type of fighting at which properly trained and supported infantry units excel. The division can expect to conduct both offensive and defensive operations in urban areas.

Offense

The division may conduct offensive operations in urban terrain to —

- Seize a tactical advantage. Cities control key routes of commerce and provide a tactical advantage to the commander who controls them. Control of features such as bridges, railways, and road networks can have a significant outcome on future operations.
- Seize a political advantage. The political importance of a built-up area may justify the use of time and resources to liberate them. Capturing the city could destroy the seat of government, local or national. If not, it could deal the enemy a decisive psychological blow and/or lift the morale of the people within the city.
- Seize an economical advantage. The destruction or capture of key industrial and commercial cities with the resulting denial of production and distribution of equipment and supplies strikes at the enemy's future ability to wage war. Capture of such cities may prove extremely beneficial to the attackers who can, in turn, use these resources to their advantage. The requirement for a logistic base, especially a port or airfield, may play a pivotal role during an operation.

Offensive Planning

A detailed study of an urban area and enemy dispositions in and around it forms the basis for planning the attack. Normally, the division commander organizes the force into an assault force and an enveloping force.

The enveloping force —

- Prevents enemy escape.
- Prevents reinforcements from entering the city.
- Provides direct fires for the assault force.
- Protects the assault force from counterattack.

The assault force clears the city of enemy resistance and links up with the enveloping force. The attacker has the advantage of maneuver to isolate an urban area. Then, he can either press the attack or contain the defender and perhaps force him to capitulate without a direct attack. The attacker selects his best point of entry and can attack from any direction. He can choose to bypass strongly defended buildings and contain or isolate the defenders. The following are proven techniques and guidelines for conducting offensive MOUT operations:

- Attack a built-up area only as the last resort and only when a major advantage accrues through its seizure or control.
- Know the characteristics of urbanized terrain and advantages and disadvantages it offers to either attacker or defender.
- Attack where the enemy is weak and hit his flanks and rear simultaneously.
- Require detailed planning by subordinate commanders to enhance decentralized execution and minimize C^2 problems during an attack.
- Employ combined arms to maximize capabilities and minimize vulnerabilities.
- Dissipate an enemy's strength by causing him to react to demonstrations, feints, or ruses.
- Maneuver over approaches to a built-up area with smoke protection and overwatching fires.
- Reduce strongpoints with fires where possible, then keep moving, and secure them with follow-on forces.

- Cut lines of communications and defeat the enemy through isolation.
- Attack at night to gain surprise and maximize our night technology advantage.
- Attack continuously to maintain momentum.

Offensive Phases

Attacks in MOUT normally have three phases — *Phase I. Isolation of the Built-up Area; Phase II. Advance and Gain a Foothold;* and *Phase III. Clear the Built-up Area.*

Phase I. The division isolates the built-up area and seizes terrain features that dominate approaches. The division secures positions outside the built-up area from which to support entrance into the city itself. The tactics and techniques for this phase of the operation are similar to those of attacks against other well-organized enemy positions. See figure 6-7.

Phase II. The division advances to the edge of the built-up area and gains a foothold, while eliminating the defender's observation and direct fires on approaches into the area. From the foothold area, the attacking unit penetrates on a narrow front with tanks and infantry leading where possible. Supporting fires on the entry point focus on this frontage and on preventing attacks on the flanks. Assaulting units can expect to encounter barricades, antitank obstacles, mines, boobytraps, and antiarmor fires. The probability of success increases if the assault is launched from an unexpected direction during periods of limited visibility or under cover of smoke. See figure 6-8.



Figure 6-7. MOUT Phase I.



Figure 6-8. MOUT Phase II.

Phase III. Phase III begins without pause after completion of Phase II. The division clears or seizes urban terrain based on METT-T. It varies from a systematic, block-by-block, house-to-house reduction of the built-up area to a rapid advance with clearance of only critical areas and buildings. When the built-up area is large and heavily fortified and the mission requires a methodical house-to-house clearance operation, the division should divide the area into regimental zones of action. Each regiment must then clear its zone completely. See figure 6-9.

Defense

The division may conduct a defense in urban terrain to —

- Deny important strategic/political objectives. Capitals and cultural centers can be defended for strictly psychological or national morale purposes even if they do not offer a tactical advantage to the defender. Because of the sprawl of such areas, significant combat power is required for their defense.
- Retain key economic, industrial, or transportation centers. In many countries, the entire economic strength of the nation may be tied to one or possibly two urban areas. A decrease in the country's primary industrial or transportation base could result in the overthrow of the current government or deny that government the ability to adequately support combat operations against enemy regular or insurgent forces.
- Control avenues of approach. Urban sprawl has made it impossible for forces to avoid cities and towns. Most avenues of advance are straddled by small towns every few kilometers and must be controlled by defending forces. If an attacker attempts to bypass a built-up area, he may encounter an array of tank-killing weapons. To clear such an area, the attacker must sacrifice speed and expend resources. In this



Figure 6-9. MOUT Phase III.

way, defense of a city or town can easily become a major obstacle to the enemy and an integral part of our own defensive plan.

- Use economy of force. Due to the tactical advantages to the defender, a well-trained force defending a built-up area can inflict major losses on a numerically superior attacker. The defender can anchor his defense in urban terrain and conserve the bulk of his combat power so that it is available for use in open terrain. The defenders remaining in built-up areas perform an economy of force role.
- Conceal forces. Forces can be well-concealed in built-up areas. It is difficult to detect forces deployed in cities despite aerial photography and imagery and sensory devices. Headquarters echelons, reserves, CSS complexes, and combat forces well emplaced in built-up areas are hard to detect and therefore hard to target or attack.

The division commander may decide not to defend an urban area for the following reasons:

- The built-up area is unnecessary to the defensive plan.
- Nearby terrain allows the enemy to bypass the urban area on covered or concealed routes.
- Light construction or flammable structures offer little protection to the defender.
- The urban area is dominated by adjacent terrain.
- Available fields of fire are inadequate.
- The urban area has been declared an open city.

Built-up areas present obstacles to an attacking force while providing the defender an advantage and some protection. A small, well-prepared force in an urban defense can defeat or hold off a much larger attacking force. Strongly constructed cities give the defender a decided advantage. Each building or group

of buildings is a potential strongpoint. With additional construction and the use of barricades, mines, and boobytraps, an urban area can become a veritable fortress. Under some conditions, elements of the division may hold built-up areas while the remainder of the division defends from adjacent restrictive terrain. The following are techniques and guidelines for defensive MOUT operations:

- Establish defenses in-depth in built-up areas. The defense must start far forward and include approaches to the urban area.
- Integrate adjacent terrain into the defense.
- Use security forces in depth to counter enemy ground reconnaissance and infiltration.
- Use restrictive missions and detailed control measures to facilitate decentralized execution.
- Employ combined arms teams to maximize individual unit capabilities.
- Maintain a strong, mobile reserve to counterattack and block penetrations.

Chapter 7

Battlefield Tasks

Overview

Battlefield tasks are conducted continuously during all division operations. The division conducts these tasks to enhance overall operations and contribute to combat effectiveness. These tasks enhance the division commander's decisionmaking capabilities, promote security of the force, and permit the effective use of maneuver and fires by subordinate units. All of these tasks are integrated into the commander's concept of operations and are reflected in his guidance and orders to subordinate commanders. Battlefield tasks are required to generate combat power at the decisive time and place.

Reconnaissance Operations

Reconnaissance is an essential and continuous operation that the division conducts to collect information and to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. Reconnaissance of some type should always precede a commitment of forces. Failure to conduct a thorough reconnaissance may cause the loss of initiative or failure to exploit fleeting opportunities. Lack of reconnaissance can result in the enemy's achieving surprise, inflicting unacceptable losses on friendly forces, and causing the failure of the mission.

Objective

The objective of reconnaissance operations is to satisfy the commander's PIRs concerning the enemy and the battlespace. The reconnaissance effort is integrated with the concept of operations and is focused on obtaining critical information required to enable rapid decisionmaking in the execution of combat operations. Key reconnaissance tasks include —

- Obtaining location and description of enemy forces.
- Identifying enemy strengths.
- Discovering gaps in enemy dispositions.
- Confirming trafficability and other terrain characteristics.
- Detecting high value targets such as command posts, communications centers, logistic facilities, troop concentrations, firing positions for nuclear-capable systems and other supporting arms.
- Confirming or denying the adoption of a particular course of action by the enemy.
- Confirming and expanding information collected by other sources.

Types of Reconnaissance

There are four types of reconnaissance — *route, area, zone,* and *force-oriented.* Route reconnaissance provides detailed information about a specific route and the surrounding terrain which could be used to influence movement along that route. Area reconnaissance provides information about a specific point target and its immediate surrounding area such as a town, assembly area, or key facility. Zone reconnaissance is employed to provide a detailed, thorough reconnaissance of all important terrain features within specified boundaries. Force-oriented provides information on the location, disposition, and activities of a specific enemy force.

Reconnaissance Methods

There are a variety of methods which can be employed to conduct reconnaissance. Reconnaissance may be aerial, ground-based, or a combination of both.

Patrols

In ground reconnaissance operations, a patrol is the principal reconnaissance method employed. A reconnaissance patrol usually gains information about the enemy without his knowledge, employing stealth to avoid detection by the enemy's counter-reconnaissance and security elements.

Armed Reconnaissance

In certain circumstances, a patrol may conduct an armed reconnaissance mission, in which it is authorized to attack targets of opportunity in its prescribed patrol area.

Reconnaissance by Fire

Fire support or maneuver units may conduct reconnaissance by fire. Known or suspected enemy positions are fired upon in an effort to force the enemy to disclose his position by movement or return fire.

Fundamentals of Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance operations are conducted according to the following fundamentals.

Orient on the Enemy

The reconnoitering unit must orient itself on the enemy to be reconnoitered. The reconnoitering unit must seek the best location or locations from which it can obtain the information it seeks, without reference to the location of friendly forces. As long as the unit mission is purely reconnaissance, the unit should not make any special effort to maintain itself between its parent unit and the enemy. Measures must be taken to ensure the freedom of action of reconnaissance units in spite of boundaries or other control measures that might otherwise restrict their operations.

Gain and Maintain Contact

Because reconnaissance is a time-consuming operation and the commander requires information as early as possible to help formulate his plan, observation of the enemy must be gained as soon as possible. Without being detected, reconnaissance elements actively seek contact with the enemy. Because accurate knowledge of the enemy's location, disposition, and movement is a potentially decisive advantage, contact is not broken off without permission. Contact may be maintained by ground or air observation.

Confirm Information Quickly

When contact is made or when a key object is encountered, the enemy's strength, composition, and disposition, or the nature of the object must be determined quickly. Special efforts will be made to determine the flanks, gaps, unit boundaries, headquarters, and supporting arms units. If authorized, fires may be directed into known, suspected, and likely positions to induce the enemy to reveal its disposition and strength.

Report All Information Rapidly and Accurately

Unless reconnaissance information reaches the commander in time to aid in his decisions, the information is useless. Inaccurate information may often be more damaging than no information at all. By its nature, the chain of command imposes friction on the rapid reporting of information. Therefore, the commander must establish special measures to ensure that vital information is transmitted immediately to the echelon most affected by or in need of the information. Essential information must be sent by the most rapid means available to all interested parties, without regard for usual military channels. Information that appears unimportant taken alone should be reported, as it may be of vital significance to the higher commander when considered with other available information.

Use Stealth

A reconnaissance mission should not be jeopardized by engagements with the enemy if the information can be obtained without fighting. A reconnaissance unit should obtain its information by the employment of stealth wherever possible. It should engage in combat only to prevent the destruction of the unit or to force the enemy to disclose his positions by fire when this information cannot be obtained by stealth. Information gained by stealth tends to be much more valuable than the same information obtained with the enemy's knowledge. There will be times, however, in which reconnoitering units will have to fight to gain information. Even in these cases, reconnoitering units must not become decisively engaged as they must retain their freedom to maneuver.

Responsibility

The G-2 has staff responsibility for reconnaissance. In conjunction with the G-3, he develops the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan, which allocates resources and assigns specific reconnaissance missions to subordinate elements.

The LAR battalion and division reconnaissance company have the primary responsibility for conduct of R&S missions in support of the division. Regiments and other subordinate units of the division may be tasked to conduct specific reconnaissance missions in support of the overall division operation.

All subordinate units conduct reconnaissance in support of their own intelligence efforts through the use of reconnaissance and combat patrols. All Marines have an inherent responsibility to report information on the enemy and the environment up and down the chain of command and to adjacent units.

Planning

The objective of the R&S plan is to integrate the reconnaissance effort with the concept of operations. This integration develops the intelligence required to enable rapid decisionmaking during the execution of the operation. The G-2 develops the R&S plan as part of his overall collection plan. He uses the commander's intent and PIRs to prioritize the reconnaissance effort. The G-2 uses the results of the IPB process and the concept of operations to focus the R&S plan.

In developing the R&S plan, the G-2 must consider when the information is required and when assets must be in position to collect and report that information. He must allow sufficient time for mission planning, insertion, and movement to the objective area. The G-2 must also ensure that available reconnaissance units are not overcommitted and must attempt to retain a reserve capability to respond to unforeseen requirements. Factors which influence the development of the R&S plan include —

- Time available.
- Reconnaissance assets available.
- Knowledge of the enemy situation.
- Available information from other sources.
- Enemy counter-reconnaissance capabilities.

Based on the PIR, anticipated enemy activity, overall collection plan, and the concept of operations, the G-2 develops specific reconnaissance tasks. Each task includes a listing of where to look, what to look for, what information should be reported, and what time the information is required. The G-2, in coordination with the G-3, then resources the reconnaissance effort.

Deep reconnaissance operations will normally be conducted by the LAR battalion or the division reconnaissance company. Reconnaissance tasks in support of the close battle will normally be conducted by security forces and committed forces in the main battle area. Such missions are usually done as collateral tasks concurrently with their primary mission, although the G-3 may assign a primary mission of reconnaissance in force, reconnaissance by fire, or armed reconnaissance to any of these units. In the reserve or rear areas, reserve units, MPs, engineers or other combat support and CSS units may be assigned reconnaissance tasks. Such tasks might include route reconnaissance of counterattack routes or MSRs, LZ reconnaissance, or identification of reconstitution sites.

The R&S plan should incorporate the specialized reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities such as engineer reconnaissance, NBC reconnaissance, counterbattery radars, as well as any attached or direct support R&S assets provided by the MEF.

Execution

Individual units carry out assigned reconnaissance tasks in accordance with the approved R&S plan. The G-2 establishes a surveillance and reconnaissance center (SARC) to supervise the execution of the R&S plan and to coordinate the division's reconnaissance effort. Detailed information on the SARC is contained in FMFM 3-21, *MAGTF Intelligence Operations*.

Rapid processing and utilization of reconnaissance information is critical to the success of division operations. The G-2 works with the reconnaissance unit commanders to establish reporting thresholds and a rapid, flexible, and responsive reporting system. The G-2 develops procedures within his intelligence section to ensure reconnaissance reports are processed, analyzed, and integrated into mission specific intelligence products. The perishable nature of most reconnaissance information demands that the intelligence section maintain situational awareness and rapidly disseminate time-sensitive reports to the appropriate operational agency.

The results of reconnaissance operations should be utilized to shape the battlespace. In offensive operations, the commander should base his plan for maneuver on the concept of reconnaissance-pull. Reconnaissance determines which routes are suitable for maneuver, where the enemy is strong and weak, and where gaps exist. Thus, reconnaissance should pull the main force towards and along the path of least resistance. This facilitates the division's initiative and agility. Reconnaissance-pull is also valid in defensive operations.

Security Operations

The division conducts security operations to provide maneuver space and reaction time, and to protect the main body. It incorporates security in the planning of all offensive or defensive operations. The G-3 develops and recommends the concept of operations. This includes assigning security responsibilities and missions to subordinate commanders, who train then plan, prepare, and execute security operations. Every unit has a continuous security role.

Security operations include *cover, guard, screen,* and *counter-reconnaissance* operations. Cover includes the functions of screen and guard operations but also develops the situation. Cover deceives, disorganizes, and destroys enemy forces. Guard missions include the functions of screen and protect the main body from ground observation and direct fire. Screens maintain surveillance, conduct counter-reconnaissance, provide early warning to the main body, and harass and impede the enemy through indirect fires. Counter-reconnaissance is inherent in all combat operations. It prevents the enemy from obtaining information about the division through visual observation or other detection means.

Cover Operations

Covering missions differ depending on the type of operation the division is conducting. In the offense, a covering force is normally expected to penetrate the enemy's security forces and main defensive positions sufficiently to facilitate division main body units attacking the enemy's main defenses in depth; to identify the location and deployment of enemy forces in the main defensive positions; and to limit the ability of the enemy security forces to collect intelligence and disrupt the deployment and commitment of forces from the main body. In the defense, a covering force conducts operations to either defend against or delay an attacking enemy force. A defensive covering force may be tasked to force the enemy to prematurely deploy and commence his attack; to identify the enemy effort; and to reduce the enemy's strength by destroying specific maneuver units and stripping away essential assets such as artillery. A division covering force may be organized around a tactically self-contained, regimental-sized task force, but any covering force employed must have mobility equal to or greater than that of the enemy.

The covering force orients on objectives established by the G-3 and division commander. These objectives may be in the enemy's security zone with a counter-reconnaissance orientation to strip the enemy's ability to determine in what force and where the division is attacking. This action requires the covering force to use a two-team method — one team locates the enemy reconnaissance in the security zone and another team destroys it.

Locating enemy reconnaissance normally requires a mix of ground, air, and electronic reconnaissance. Ground forces may include LAR, regimental reconnaissance, and battalion scout-sniper platoons. The mission of these units is to locate enemy forces so that other maneuver and fire support assets may attack them. Another objective of a covering force may be to determine routes through enemy defensive belts. The covering force uncovers enemy strengths, weaknesses, gaps, locations, and dispositions and serves as a reconnaissance-pull for the main body. It may conduct limited objective attacks or probes across a wide front.

If the covering force conducts a movement to contact against a moving enemy, it may operate as a reconnaissance in force. As a reconnaissance in force, it conducts a series of limited objective attacks, and it uses objectives to orient its movement. The battalions of the covering force seize each objective and continue until contact is established. Reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance continue to be

paramount. Once it establishes contact, the covering force conducts a hasty attack or hasty defense to maintain contact and/or establish conditions that will permit the uninterrupted passage of the main body against the enemy force.

The G-2 must consider intelligence support for the offensive covering force. He must provide a full complement of intelligence resources to the covering force, normally be task-organized into an intelligence team. Ground-based systems must be able to rapidly displace and should operate to allow continuous coverage. The G-2 coordinates the employment of MEF and ACE intelligence resources that provide long-range coverage over wide areas forward and to the flanks of the covering force. The CE and ACE may also cue other joint assets to confirm or deny information provided by other agencies and to provide coverage when division assets displace.

Fire support planning must include both supporting and deceptive fires. If sufficient artillery is available, each battalion in the covering force should have artillery in direct support. Counterbattery radars should be part of the covering force's artillery task organization. The covering force should establish critical friendly radar zones around the main effort to expedite reactive counterfire.

Fire support coordinating measures should be permissive and on order. These measures should be used in conjunction with phase lines and well ahead of the covering force. Fire plans should be simple, but as detailed as possible. The FSC should plan groups and series of targets to support rapid-moving maneuver forces and plan FASCAM on flank avenues of approach.

The FSC should consider the use of electronic warfare, especially against the enemy's reconnaissance and fire support nets in the fire support plan. CAS should be integrated into the fire support plan and, when possible, preplanned against the enemy. Even when the enemy is moving, the G-2, G-3, and FSC can project when they expect to make contact with the enemy. Wargaming this event may provide an approximate location and time for preplanning CAS.

The G-3 task-organizes air defense assets, based on recommendations from the ACE commander, to the covering force. Shoulder-launched systems are positioned on dominant terrain and along likely air avenues. Because of their short range and need to match the momentum of the covering force, air defense assets should be part of the subordinate units of the covering force. The air defense unit commander must have the capability to monitor the MEF early warning net.

Engineers with the covering force identify routes for forward movement and lateral routes to provide the commander flexibility as he develops the situation. In coordination with the FSC, the engineer plans FASCAM on avenues of approach into the flanks of the covering force. The engineers should be prepared for earth moving, rapid obstacle breaching, and assault bridging.

In the defense, the covering force may be controlled by the MEF, ACE, or the division. When the covering force is employed in a multidivision MEF or joint operation, MEF control of the covering force battle permits the MEF to shape the battle, allows the division to concentrate on the decisive close or main battle area battle, and eliminates the need for each division to fight independent covering force battles.

The division's covering force operates well forward of the main body to develop the situation and to deceive, disorganize, and destroy enemy forces. The defensive covering force mission may be to delay forward of a given phase line, time, or event. The division must plan for the rearward passage of the covering force by establishing passage points with the main battle area regiments and the battle handover line. A phase line depicts the area the covering force is to delay in front. It should be forward of the battle handover line. Being forward of the battle handover line gives the covering force commander the depth to complete the delay and yet retain enough maneuver space to conduct an orderly passage. This also aids in the covering force's staggered withdrawal. Maneuver forces in the covering force should execute detailed counter-reconnaissance plans.

Intelligence assets supporting the defensive covering force are much the same as in the offensive covering force. In the defense, intelligence assets are moved in echelon to the rear, withdrawing in a way that facilitates their use in the main battle area. Fire support assets are organized and function in much the same manner. Fire plans are more detailed and an integral part of the scheme of maneuver. Artillery and other fire support assets are planned to mass at critical times and places. Observers watch obstacles and plan fires to cover them. Fire support coordinating measures are permissive and employed close enough to the covering force to facilitate engaging the enemy.

CAS is planned for engagement areas. Surveillance is conducted by reconnaissance teams to observe and monitor decision points for initiation of these attacks. Engineers with the covering force conduct countermobility and survivability tasks as their first priority. Air defense assets provide coverage on likely air avenues of approach. This is critical as the covering force tends to mass during the withdrawal. Coverage of passage points and lanes into the main battle area must be coordinated with air defense units within the main battle area.

Guard Operations

Guard Forces

Guard forces and the offensive covering force differ in their orientation during movement and in their zone of action. The covering force focuses on the enemy, maneuvers toward him, and covers the entire division zone. Guard forces orient on the movement of the main body. They provide security along specific routes of movement of the main body.

Advance Guard. The advance guard operates within supporting range of the main body and protects it from ground observation and direct fire. The division may provide and control the advance guard or assign a maneuver unit this responsibility. The G-3 in the tactical echelon monitors the advance guard's operations if it is controlled by the division. The G-3 monitors its advance and operations as with any other committed force. He integrates the actions of the advance guard with those of the covering force and the main body.

The advance guard conducts route reconnaissance in front of the main body. The tactical echelon coordinates its movement with the main body to ensure that it remains within supporting range. Generally, reconnaissance elements of the advance guard should remain within range of supporting artillery. Artillery moves to provide support to the advance, flank, and rear guards and to rapidly occupy positions when the main body must deploy. Priority of fires is normally given to the advance guard during movement. This facilitates conduct of a hasty attack or hasty defense. The FSC at the tactical echelon coordinates this for the advance guard FSC when the advance guard is under division control.

The advance guard FSC plans fire support much like the covering force's, emphasizing simple fire plans with as much detail as possible. Groups, series, and smoke missions are planned to support the maneuver commander's scheme of maneuver. The FSC coordinates these through the tactical echelon FSC. The tactical echelon coordinates C^2W support for the advance guard. The G-2 at the tactical echelon disseminates combat information and intelligence from the covering force and main echelon to the advance guard.

The G-3 at the tactical echelon coordinates engineer and air defense support for the advance guard. He coordinates with the MEF, ACE, and CSSE to provide required support. Engineer elements in the main body respond to the advance guard requirements. Because of their short range, shoulder-launched air defense assets move with the advance guard. When the lead regiment provides the advance guard, the regiment coordinates, integrates, and supports the advance guard.

Flank Guard. The maneuver units of the main body normally provide and control flank guards. This mission entails the conduct of defensive operations to the flanks to prevent ground observation and direct fire against the main body.

The flank guard establishes defensive positions to the flanks for stationary or moving forces. To secure the moving force, the flank guard leapfrogs forces to successive positions along the flank of the main body. LAR or regimental units may conduct screens

to flanks which require close integration with flank guard units.

The regimental S-2 closely coordinates intelligence support for the flank guard. The flank guard must plan reconnaissance and surveillance in detail to include provisions for early warning, monitoring the threat, and economy of force. Counter-reconnaissance actions assist in providing security to the flank guard and ultimately the main body. They may also provide the first indication a threat is developing to the flank.

The maneuver unit controlling the flank guard should plan for its reinforcement or withdrawal. To reinforce the flank guard, the flank guard becomes the fixing force while other maneuver units engage the enemy with fire and maneuver. To withdraw the guard, the main body maneuver unit establishes a hasty defense and passage points for the flank guard to move into the main body positions.

Rear Guard. The rear guard protects the main body from the rear during retrograde operations or from bypassed units during exploitation and pursuit. The rear guard must orient on the movement of the main body to prevent gaps from developing and being cut off. Main body forces must position supporting elements toward the rear of the main body to support the rear guard. This is particularly true of artillery. During retrograde operations, the first priority of CAS should be to the rear guard.

The rear guard commander prepares to conduct a series of delays from subsequent battle positions. He must not decisively engage the enemy unless the controlling commander approves. The main body may not be in a position to reinforce the rear guard. During offensive or retrograde operations, the rear guard occupies battle positions. It moves to new positions by echelon toward the main body. The rear guard elements closest to the enemy should not be outside supporting range of the main body. This requires close coordination between the rear guard and its controlling headquarters. The rear guard commander must closely monitor his subordinate units to allow displacing forces to occupy new positions before in-place units vacate theirs.

During the exploitation and pursuit, the rear maneuver unit controls the rear guard. During retrograde operations, the tactical echelon controls the rear guard. Main body forces should identify and assist in preparing battle positions for the rear guard force. Engineers should prepare survivability positions. They also conduct countermobility operations to delay, disorganize, and limit the enemy force. In retrograde operations, they coordinate obstacle free zones and lanes through obstacle belts with the rear guard. Artillery and air delivered mines can rapidly close these lanes and reinforce breached obstacles. In exploitation and pursuit, FASCAM should assist the rear guard to delay the enemy and to block approaches from the rear. Fires should be planned to assist the rear guard to disengage and move to subsequent positions.

Screen Operations

Screen Forces

Screens provide early warning and harass and impede the enemy with indirect fires. The division may use screens as an economy of force security mission. When sufficient maneuver space exists, the division should position the screen far enough away from the main body to allow sufficient time to identify and counter the threat. This distance will probably be outside the range of supporting artillery, placing increased emphasis on the availability of CAS to support the screen.

The screen commander combines reconnaissance, surveillance, and counter-reconnaissance techniques to identify threats to the main body. He uses the IPB to identify enemy avenues of approach and to establish named areas of interest (NAIs) for his forces to observe. As he identifies a threat, the screen commander reports to the tactical echelon and attempts to impede the enemy within his capability. Concurrently, he uses fire support assets against the threat. This may require the screen to leave stay-behind forces to direct the attack. Reconnaissance units may also support directing the attack. As the screen withdraws into range, it employs main body artillery.

Screening a Stationary Force. A security element screens a stationary force by establishing a series of observation posts along a designated screen line. The observation posts are located to provide overlapping observation. Areas that cannot be observed from observation posts are patrolled. Observation posts immediately report any sightings of enemy activity and engage enemy forces with indirect fires at maximum range. Maintaining contact, the screen falls back along previously reconnoitered routes to subsequent observation posts.

Screening a Moving Force. Advance or rear screens must screen the entire width of the main body's frontage; flank screens must screen the entire depth of the main body's flank. Screening elements move on an axis generally parallel to the movement of the main body. Upon making contact with the enemy, screening elements engage at maximum range with indirect fires, or direct fire if necessary, and report the contact. The screening force has several options, based on the situation:

- Continue to advance if resistance is minimal or the enemy tries to withdraw.
- Report the enemy location and bypass if the position is not a threat.
- While avoiding decisive engagement and within capabilities, develop the situation until reinforcements from the main body arrive.
- Maintaining contact, fall back and hand the battle over to elements of the main body.

Counter-reconnaissance Operations

Counter-reconnaissance is the sum of action taken by the division to counter enemy reconnaissance efforts throughout the division's area of operation. A detailed analysis of the enemy's reconnaissance capabilities during the IPB is crucial to understanding the nature, composition, and timing of the enemy's reconnaissance elements. This analysis, combined with the division commander's concept and estimate, will provide indications of enemy reconnaissance objectives. Typical enemy reconnaissance objectives are to —

- Identify possible sites for communications installations.
- Identify, locate, and report on friendly headquarters, troop locations, communications centers, and unit movement.
- Determine the disposition of friendly defenses, locate friendly boundaries and artillery positions, provide terrain information on the approaches to friendly defensive positions, and report friendly emplacement of demolitions, minefields, and other obstacles.
- Determine obstacle crossing sites and provide hydrographic information on water obstacles.
- Monitor areas of suspected NBC contamination.
- Identify routes for advance, withdrawal, and lateral communications.

The G-2 develops likely courses of action for enemy reconnaissance and main body elements during the IPB process. He identifies likely avenues of approach and develops NAIs to focus the collection and monitoring assets of the division. The G-3 uses this information to determine required counter-reconnaissance actions and to task units to execute them. The G-3 fixes responsibilities and provides resources to units to locate, fix, and destroy enemy reconnaissance forces. Counter-reconnaissance requires a two-team approach — one to conduct surveillance and acquire enemy reconnaissance elements and the other to close with and destroy them.

Counter-reconnaissance consists of active and passive measures. Active measures detect, fix, and destroy enemy reconnaissance elements. Passive measures conceal friendly units and capabilities and deceive and confuse the enemy. The G-3 integrates both types into the division's counter-reconnaissance plan.

All subordinate units develop and coordinate their counter-reconnaissance action. They fix responsibility for patrols, ambush requirements, specific observation post (OP) locations, and observation of NAIs. The G-3 reviews subordinate unit counter-reconnaissance actions and issues additional taskings to fill any gaps.

Countering the enemy's reconnaissance effort presents a two-part problem. First is how to acquire the reconnaissance elements. Second is how to counter

them, once acquired. In most cases, destruction of enemy reconnaissance units is the logical course of action. However, there may be significant disadvantages to attacking the lead elements of an enemy advance such as revealing the location and dispositions of your defenses or compromising your own intelligence effort. In certain circumstances, a more prudent course might be to maintain the enemy reconnaissance units under surveillance or subject them to deception operations. As part of the counter-reconnaissance planning effort, the G-2, G-3, and FSC consider potential reactions to the detection of enemy reconnaissance forces. The commander and staff should —

- Develop NAIs and assign responsibilities for observation.
- Provide for continuous surveillance (overcommitment of the counter-reconnaissance force weakens security).
- Use aviation assets to detect infiltration.
- Assign specific responsibilities for obstacle security.
- Plan to recover forward security elements.

Planning Considerations

As the G-3 and other staff incorporate security requirements into the planning of division operations, they should consider the following:

Adequate Support to Security Forces

The covering force, especially in offensive operations, operates well forward of the division main body. The G-3 allocates resources to the covering force so that it functions as a tactically self-sufficient force. Guard forces operate within supporting range of the main body. However, the G-3 and other staff elements must consider relationships between the main body and the guard force.

Ranges and Capabilities of C^2W Assets, Fire Support, and Communications Systems

The staff must consider the range and capabilities of combat and combat support weapons and systems as it assigns security responsibilities and missions to subordinate commanders. Terrain, weather, and enemy electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) actions may significantly impact on effective ranges for weapons and C^2W systems.

Time-Distance Relationships

The staff considers time-distance relationships when using screens or guards. Screens provide early warning to the main body. During the planning process, the planner must consider the time required for the main body to counter a threat and to compute the distance the enemy could move during that time. This aids in determining location of the screen. If sufficient maneuver space is not available to accommodate this time-distance relationship, then the staff should consider employing a guard rather than a screen.

Economy of Force Factors

Planners should consider economy of force in assigning security responsibilities and missions. Fewer forces are required to screen a force than to guard it. Where possible, the plans element should consider employing screens as opposed to guards. The considerations of adequate support, time-distance, and the threat will affect this decision.

Passage of Lines

Planners should consider the requirements for passage of lines by security forces. An offensive covering force may be required to conduct a forward passage of lines as it begins a movement to contact or leads the division in an exploitation or pursuit. Similarly, a defensive covering force may execute a rearward passage into the main battle area. Screens or guards may conduct a passage with main body forces. This consideration may assist the G-3 in determining which headquarters provides and controls the security force.

Formation of the Main Body

The staff must also consider the division formation. Each formation has its own strengths, weaknesses, and planning considerations for security.

Deception

Deception is an important combat multiplier. It enhances the conditions which allow the commander to effectively mass forces at the decisive time and place. It is considered for every division operation. The ultimate goal of division-level deception operations is to manipulate enemy behavior and to create opportunities for exploitation. Battlefield deception

enables the commander to conduct economy of force operations, to mass at a decisive point, and to conserve and protect the force. Well-planned and executed deceptions achieve surprise.

Planning

Deception operations cannot be planned independent of tactical operations. The primary consideration in any deception is the MEF mission and deception plan. Deception operations, whenever possible, are centralized with the highest commander of the area. Failure to present an integrated deception operation wastes resources and may cause portions of the plan to contradict each other. The MEF and adjacent headquarters should be aware of division deception operations. Failure to coordinate can damage other unit's operations or deceptions.

A deception must be plausible. The enemy must believe that the division's actions are in accordance with its doctrine and that the division can do what the deception indicates. Enemy intelligence collection channels must be fed information in a coordinated, redundant effort. The division may have to pass the same information repeatedly through multiple channels to ensure the enemy collects the deception. The enemy must see a picture consistent with our capabilities and his beliefs.

Deceptions should be adaptable and flexible. As the plan changes, the deception may also be forced to change. The division must portray the deception for as long as it is feasible and beneficial. For this to happen, the overall plan, including the deception, must have built-in flexibility.

Integration is vital to successful deceptions. A deception must not only be part of the overall plan, it must extend into every facet of the plan; that is, aside from being part of maneuver, it must be part of the logistics, fire support, air defense, command and control, and engineer effort as well.

The division can expect the enemy to know its norms. The enemy will seek to find where the division places it supplies. He will look for medical facilities and fire support units. These signatures provide him a basis for true intent. Without full integration into all plans, the deception will quickly lose credibility.

The target of any deception is the enemy decisionmaker. He has the authority to react to the deception. An elaborate deception should not be designed if the enemy is incapable of either collecting, analyzing, or reacting to the information or if the deception is contrary to normal operating procedures.

Feedback is important in any deception as the means to verify the deception must be established. The division's normal intelligence infrastructure of specially established means can normally accomplish this. It may not always be possible to verify the deception, and for this reason all plans must be flexible, including deception plans.

Finally, the division must consider cost of a deception in terms of resource expenditure. For a deception to appear real, the division must dedicate adequate resources. The cost depends on the type of deception (demonstration, display, feint, or ruse) and its objective. The division must also measure costs in risk and flexibility. For example, it may be very risky for the success of the division's main effort to rely solely on the success of a planned demonstration. Should the demonstration not produce the expected enemy reaction, it could cause the main effort to fail. Flexibility is built into the plan by using branches, sequels, or executable deceptions.

Objective

The objective of any deception is to cause the enemy to act contrary to his interests and beneficial to the division's. The division's goals are to —

- Condition the target's beliefs.
- Influence the target's action by misleading him and persuading him to adopt a specific course of action.
- Benefit from his actions through surprise, superior combat power, and improved survivability.

The five components of battlefield deception are the objective, target, story, plan, and event. The objective is what the division wants the enemy to do. The target is the enemy decisionmaker. The story is what the division portrays to the enemy. The plan is the concept of how the story is portrayed. Events are specific actions performed as part of the plan. Since deception is inherent in planning and

concurrent with current operations, the division G-3 has overall responsibility for deception.

If the intent is to induce the enemy to do something the division can exploit, the commander and staff must address deception early in the planning process. Deception designed after the division has developed, wargamed, and decided on a course of action is wasted. It becomes an afterthought, ill planned because of lack of time, and ill resourced because all division assets have been allocated in the wargame of the chosen course of action. In providing his deception guidance, the division commander should consider —

- What he wants the enemy to do.
- How the division can best make the enemy do it.
- What forces and material will be dedicated to the effort.
- What enemy behavior is expected.
- How the division can benefit from that behavior.

The staff uses this guidance to develop a deception plan or course of action in the same manner as it develops and analyzes other courses of action. The G-2 provides input, identifying enemy weakness and vulnerabilities, and enemy collection assets that can detect the deception. Done properly, a deception should be part of a course of action. Like any course of action, deception development must involve the entire staff with operations security measures developed and implemented.

One method of planning and preparing deception plans concurrently with the commander's operations plan is to prepare two or more related courses of action rather than optimizing one. This builds flexibility into the plan. The division selects one course of action for execution and another related course of action for portrayal to the enemy. Both courses (one hidden and one displayed) seek to obtain a specific reaction. Thus, if the enemy reacts to the visible course of action, the concealed course of action will be able to exploit him. Conversely, if the enemy rejects the visible course of action, reacting instead to the concealed course or yet another, the division may still be able to exploit him by executing the displayed course of action. The key to this type of deception is that no matter what the enemy does, the commander still has an executable course of action.

The deception process relies greatly on signature management. Signature management is the use of —

- Deception assets to augment or mask signatures.
- OPSEC assets and techniques to diminish signatures.
- Real assets and techniques to augment or diminish course of action signatures.

The division uses signature management to reduce the visibility of key activities associated with the course of action it intends to execute. It does this through the judicious use of OPSEC techniques and assets and the manner in which it conducts its real operations. For instance, a reserve force for the intended course of action may go to radio silence or coordinate a passage of lines face to face. This may hide the existence and intent of the unit. An engineer unit might lay a deliberate minefield at night. Logistic supply points might be hidden in a built-up area. These techniques reduce signatures and avoid detection.

Simultaneously, key signatures associated with the deceptive courses of action are highlighted through more visible activities. For example, the reserve force could support the deception course of action. It could coordinate a passage of lines along a major avenue of approach via radio. Logistic supply points could be poorly camouflaged or even left out in the open. Dummy logistic assets, such as mockups and empty containers, can augment the signature.

Execution

All staff sections must carefully control and monitor execution of deception operations. Resource availability within the division, or the lack thereof, may require the division to request resources to provide people and assets to replicate C^2 signatures.

To properly evaluate deception activities, the division must determine their impact on the enemy. This requires reliable feedback. Without feedback, the division cannot be confident the enemy decision-maker is intentionally reacting to the deception in ways contrary to his interest. The division obtains

feedback in one of three ways. It can use the established intelligence-gathering infrastructure, or it can establish a special means with which to collect information about the deception, or it can use a combination of the aforementioned. This involves using many of the same assets used routinely to collect intelligence, an intelligence support force specifically task organized to support the deception or a combination of the two.

The division may require only a reasonable assurance that intended signals reached the decisionmaker and had their intended effect. This will not always be possible to confirm. The division must rely on information available and knowledge of the enemy to determine his reaction to the deception.

The termination of a deception can be as critical as its execution. The concept of playing out the deception should present a dilemma for the enemy. The division should continue the deception for as long as possible with the intent of never allowing the enemy to know he has been deceived, or to phase out the deception in such a manner that the enemy views it as a perfectly plausible activity. If the enemy discovers the deception for what it is, he may become the exploiter instead of the exploited. The enemy may also review the signals he received throughout the operation and view them skeptically, reducing the division's ability to deceive him in future operations.

Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability

To succeed on the fluid battlefield, the commander must ensure that his own forces are free to maneuver and must take measures to deny the enemy the same. Few factors can enhance friendly mobility and reduce the enemy's mobility as much as the intelligent and aggressive use of combat engineers. The division and subordinate commanders must understand and emphasize combat engineer support if they are to realize the full effectiveness of combined arms. Combat engineer support has three primary functions — *mobility*, *countermobility*, and *survivability*. Each function contains several tasks.

Mobility

Engineers assist in enhancing the mobility of friendly forces. Mobility operations reduce the effects of existing or reinforcing obstacles to improve the movement of forces and critical supplies. Support may vary from simply filling a crater on an important route to breaching a complex barrier. Mobility operations are part of both offensive and defensive operations. Tasks involved include engineer reconnaissance, repair of roads and bridges, gap crossing, and minefield and obstacle breaching and clearance.

Engineer Reconnaissance

Engineer reconnaissance is the primary method of obtaining engineer intelligence. It does not have to be conducted by engineers. Reconnaissance or infantry units may conduct engineer reconnaissance. They may satisfy engineer intelligence requirements in the course of other reconnaissance missions if given the proper guidance. Ordinarily, the best solution is to include qualified engineer personnel to accompany one of these units on a reconnaissance mission to gather and interpret technical data.

Repair of Roads and Bridges

Combat engineers with heavy equipment are capable of providing temporary repair of main supply routes and bridges. When reinforced with personnel and equipment from the engineer support battalion, FSSG, or the naval mobile construction battalion, combat engineers can provide more permanent repair to main supply routes and repair or replace damaged/destroyed spans of bridges.

Gap Crossing

In addition to construction of nonstandard bridges for crossing rivers or streams, engineers can also assist in crossing dry gaps such as tank ditches or dry river beds by filling or leveling the banks when augmented with required equipment.

Minefields and Obstacles Breaching and Clearance

Engineers should be used for those breaching and clearing tasks beyond the capability of the supported combat troops. Engineers with forward combat units should be equipped to breach minefields and

obstacles. Complete removal will be assigned to follow-on engineers and other support forces.

Countermobility

Countermobility involves those actions that impede movement of the opposing forces with minimal impairment to the movement and activities of the division. Countermobility tasks include emplacement of or improvement of obstacles and barriers, and the use of demolitions.

Emplacement or Improvements in Obstacles and Barriers

Obstacles are any natural or man-made obstructions, including mines, that canalize, delay, restrict or divert movement of a force. Barriers are coordinated series of obstacles. Both should be covered by fire to achieve the greatest effect. Obstacles and barriers alone cannot stop an advancing enemy altogether. However, they can enhance the effectiveness of friendly fires and can cause the enemy losses in personnel, equipment, and time.

Employment of Obstacles and Barriers

When employing obstacles and barriers in defensive operations, commanders must be prepared to deal with the same obstacles when a transition is made to offensive operations. The method used depends on METT-T. In all cases, the need for coordination with all subordinate, senior, and adjacent commands is seldom more urgent than in obstacle and barrier employment. Some solutions are —

- Planning to bypass the barriers when the transition is made.
- Leaving lanes in minefields and barriers for the specific use of friendly forces.
- Planning for removal or destruction of the obstacle before offensive operations begin.

When using demolitions, caution must be exercised in authorizing the blocking of roads or the destruction of bridges. The commander must weigh the immediate need to delay the enemy with demolitions against the possible loss of maneuver options if the same roads or bridges are required by friendly forces when they transition from defense to offense is made.

Survivability

Survivability operations are characterized by the employment of protective measures that decrease the lethality of the enemy's firepower while units fight and maneuver. Survivability measures include the use of countersurveillance measures, deception, smoke, and the construction of protective positions. The majority of survivability tasks are actually accomplished by the units of the division. Engineers enhance their effectiveness by providing guidance, technical assistance, some special materials, and equipment support. Hardening of artillery positions, using engineer support when available, is often preferable to survivability moves because there is no need to interrupt fire support.

Engineer survivability tasks include *development of protective positions* and *terrain reinforcement.* Development of protective positions may be dug-in, have overhead protection, and incorporate reinforcing materials. Terrain reinforcement includes such techniques as increasing natural defilade by building beams or by integrating existing terrain features into the needs of the friendly forces.

Sources of Engineer Support

Engineer support for the division is provided by the following units:

Combat Engineer Battalion. Within the division, the primary source of engineer support is the combat engineer battalion. Close combat engineer support for the division, especially in the functions of mobility enhancement and countermobility, is normally accomplished by attaching or assigning direct support missions to combat engineer companies or platoons. However, some centralization of combat engineers by the division will nearly always be required to ensure that the full range of engineer requirements can be satisfied. Engineer support to the rear of forward elements, such as maintaining supply routes in the division's area of responsibility, will generally be performed under the centralized control of the combat engineer battalion. The combat engineer battalion has no organic bridging assets.

Engineer Support Battalion. Although the primary mission of the engineer support battalion of the FSSG is general engineering support, the battalion is

the main source of assets for gap crossing, a combat engineer function. The bridge company provides this capability. The current capability ranges from pontoon floats to medium girder bridges. These assets are considered assault bridging assets and require the seizure of the far side of the crossing site and free from direct or observed indirect fires. There are two methods by which the bridge company supports a division unit — a detachment of the bridge company may be attached to the combat engineer unit in support of the division maneuver unit or the bridge company may simply provide the bridging equipment and some supervisory personnel to the combat engineer unit.

Nonengineer Units of the Division. The bulk of engineer work is done by Marines of the supported units, supervised by engineers. The main responsibility of the combat engineer battalion and its subordinate units is to provide advice, technical assistance, and supervision for engineer tasks. Even in those cases where direct supervision by engineers is not possible, most division units have some capability to accomplish many of these functions. Infantrymen, for example, are trained in preparing hasty field fortifications. Artillery units have organic earthmoving equipment. The assault amphibian battalion has the mobility/countermobility platoon with the three-shot line charge for clearing minefields. The tank battalion has the mine rake and mineplow for proofing minefields and the armored vehicle-launched bridge and towed assault bridge for gap crossing.

Planning

Engineer planning must be coordinated at all levels and must encompass both combat support and CSS engineer requirements of the supported forces. The unit engineer officer must ensure that the general or executive staff and subordinate commanders keep him fully informed during planning. Engineer planning is based on the concept of operations of the supported force, the engineer mission assigned, the priority of tasks, and the engineer assets available. Primary considerations that the engineer officer and the support commander must take into account when estimating the situation and developing their plans are as follows:

- Topography and terrain of the area of operations.
- Personnel, supplies, and equipment needed for the engineer tasks and the sequence in which they should be phased into the area of operations.
- Status of training of engineer units to accomplish any special tasks required by the supported commander.
- Anticipated rate of consumption of engineer supplies.
- Enemy engineer capability.
- Friendly task organization, with special attention to quantities of wheeled and tracked vehicles.

Chapter 8

Fire Support

Firepower

Firepower is the amount of fire that may be delivered by a unit, position, or weapon system. It provides destructive force and is essential in defeating the enemy's ability and will to fight. Firepower contributes significantly to combat power and is an integral component of maneuver. Firepower is exploited through autonomous fires, deep supporting fires, and close supporting fires. Autonomous fires are those delivered by direct fire weapons in self-defense or as part of self-supporting offensive actions. Close supporting fires are those delivered by armed aircraft, cannons, rockets, missiles, naval guns, mortars, and electronic attack systems against enemy troops, weapons, or positions which, because of their proximity, present the most immediate and serious threat to the supported unit. Close supporting fires require detailed integration and coordination with the movement and autonomous fires of the supported force. Deep supporting fires are those delivered by armed aircraft, cannons, rockets, missiles, naval guns, and electronic attack systems against enemy forces or objectives not in the immediate vicinity of our forces to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy enemy potential before it can be employed. Collectively, deep and close supporting fires against land targets are commonly referred to as *fire support.* Fire support can be delivered by indirect-fire weapons and aircraft or direct-fire weapons.

Fire support consists of four inextricably linked actions — *fire support planning, fire support coordination, the delivery of fires,* and *assessment.* Fire support at the division level focuses primarily on targeting, target acquisition, and coordinating the employment of the indirect fire component of firepower throughout the division. Targeting methodology is an integral part of tactical decisionmaking throughout the planning process. It is a commander responsibility and a commander-driven process that combines intelligence, planning, leadership, tactical decisionmaking, weaponeering, operational execution, and combat assessment. Targeting methodology contains four functions — *decide, detect, deliver,* and *assess.* These functions occur both simultaneously and sequentially throughout fire support planning and attack of enemy targets. Target acquisition assets are arrayed in depth based on the IPB and the commander's estimate to provide sufficient coverage, early warning, and identification of targets. The division G-3 and FSC coordinate the employment of fire support through the dissemination of the division's task organization, assignment of subordinate unit tasks, establishment of fire support priorities, and overall supervision that ensures unity of effort.

For it to be effective, fire support requires the integration of three systems — *command and control, target acquisition,* and *weapons.* The C^2 assets of the division enhance information connectivity between sensors, decisionmakers, and weapon systems to ensure the effectiveness of attacks against enemy forces and capabilities. Target acquisition assets, properly located based on METT-T, enhance early and accurate target identification which permits decisionmakers to formulate the most decisive response and to permit weapons to orient to the intended target. Weapons maintain situational awareness through division command and control and are located in depth to enhance responsiveness and survivability. The fires of indirect and direct fire weapons are integrated with each other, with other assets and capabilities (electronic warfare), and with maneuver to generate combat power.

Fire Support Planning

Fire support planning is the continuous process of analyzing, prioritizing, allocating, and scheduling fire support. It determines how fire support will be employed, what types of targets will be attacked, when they will be attacked, and with what means.

The division commander maximizes the effectiveness and efficiency of his available fire support through fire support planning. Fire support planning starts as soon as the mission is identified and must be fully integrated into all steps of the planning process. Division fire support planning includes several key actions. The degree to which each of these actions is conducted is dependent on METT-T. These key actions, which are discussed in detail in chapter 5 of FMFM 6-18, include —

- Obtain information and guidance from the MEF, ACE, and CSSE as part of mission analysis.
- Establish and disseminate commander's planning guidance for fire support.
- Consider fire support in developing courses of action.
- Prepare estimates of supportability.
- Allocate fire support assets and resources.
- Conduct targeting.
- Effect coordination with subordinate units and with other elements of the MEF.
- Prepare the fire support plan.
- Disseminate the fire support plan.
- Adjust the fire support plan as required.

Decide Function

The decide function of targeting process is the most important function and is encompassed throughout the planning process. As the first step in the targeting process, the decide function provides the overall focus and helps prioritize intelligence collection and attack planning. IPB provides much of the information for the decide function and is the foundation on which the rest of the targeting process is built. IPB is a continuous, systematic approach to analyzing the terrain, weather, enemy doctrine, and current enemy actions to arrive at enemy courses of action. IPB helps identify any critical enemy activities or named areas of interest (NAI) in which specific enemy activities or events will help confirm the enemy's intent. Designating NAIs allows for observation of all the enemy's viable options without wasting coverage on areas of little importance.

In addition to IPB and the intelligence estimate, a key staff product that supports the decide function is target value analysis (TVA). TVA is normally performed by the target information officer in conjunction with the target intelligence officer. Given a selected friendly course of action and the input generated during the IPB process, TVA is conducted to identify potential high value target (HVT) sets associated with critical enemy functions that could interfere with the friendly course of action or that are key to enemy success. HVTs are those assets the enemy commander requires for successful completion of his mission. HVTs are briefed during the mission analysis brief, first as target sets and then as specific unit types or echelons and/or specific systems. Target sets include maneuver; fire support; engineer; reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition; air defense; command and control; nuclear/chemical; radio electronic; and CSS (lines of communication, lift, maintenance, ammunition, and POL). The ultimate products of TVA and the identification of HVT are *target selection standards, the sensor/attack systems matrix, high-payoff targets (HPTs), the high-payoff target list (HPTL)*, and *the attack guidance matrix (AGM)*.

Target Selection Standards

Target selection standards are criteria, applied to enemy activity used in deciding whether that activity is a target. See figure 8-1. Target selection standards break nominations into two categories — targets and suspected targets. Targets must meet accuracy timeliness require- ments for attack, while suspected targets must be confirmed before any attack. Target selection standards are established based on enemy activity and available attack systems and are expressed by one or more of the following standards: target location error inherent in the acquisition system, size of the enemy activity (point or area), status of the activity (moving or stationary), and timeliness of the information. HPTs that meet all the criteria should be tracked until they are attacked in accordance with the AGM; targets that do not meet target selection standards should be confirmed before they are attacked.

EXAMPLE TARGET SELECTION STANDARDS MATRIX

HPTL	ATTACK SYSTEM	TLE / ACQ TIME
MRL	GS ARTY BN	<1KM / 10 MIN
BDE CP	MLRS	100M / 2 HRS
2S5 BTRY	MLRS/ACE	200M / 20 MIN
SA-11	GS ARTY BN	200M / 20 MIN
ARMORED RESERVES	ACE	1KM / 2 HRS

LEGEND:

TLE — TARGET LOCATION ERROR. Attack system target location accuracy requirements.

ACQ TIME — ACQUISITION TIME. The length of time from acquisition to attack that the target information is valid. Based on estimated dwell time of the target.

Figure 8-1. Target Selection Standards Matrix.

Sensor/Attack Systems Matrix

A targeting tool that may be used to determine whether the HVTs critical to friendly success can be acquired and attacked is the Sensor/Attack Systems Matrix. This matrix allows wargamers to record their assessment of the ability of sensor-systems to acquire and attack-systems to engage specified HVTs for each critical event or phase of the battle. Marginal information at the top has blanks for the battlefield event being assessed and the associated HVTs. Blank spaces on the left are for entering available sensor systems; blank spaces on the right are for entering attack systems. Using this matrix, the wargamers annotate systems selected for use to acquire and attack a target by marking the appropriate block with an S for sensor and A for attack. As the wargame progresses from one phase to the next, the ability of sensor and attack systems to perform desired tasks is determined. If sensors and attack systems cannot support the mission, they must be moved or an alternate system selected. If no system is available within the command, support must be requested from higher headquarters. An example of how the Sensor/Attack Systems Matrix may be used is shown in figure 8-2. Note that there is no horizontal linear relationship between the sensor systems and the attack systems.

High-Payoff Targets (HPTs)

TVA continues during course of action development, particularly in wargaming. During the wargaming process, as critical events are identified, HPTs are developed and prioritized on a HPTL. HPTs are HVTs that must be acquired and successfully attacked for the success of the friendly commander's mission. They are normally identified for specific points or phases in the battle, in order of importance, on the HPTL. The best places to attack HPTs in relation to the friendly course of action are identified and expressed as target areas of interest (TAI). TAI are engagement points or areas, usually along an avenue of approach or mobility corridor, where the interdiction of an enemy force by fire, maneuver, or jamming will reduce or deprive that force of a particular capability. Unlike a NAI, which is designated for observing enemy activity to confirm or deny his course of action, the TAI is an area in which the enemy activity is interdicted to cause the enemy to abandon a particular course of action. Examples of TAIs are bridges, road junctions, chokepoints, drop

EXAMPLE SENSOR/ATTACK MATRIX

EVENT: ATTACK THROUGH SECURITY ZONE

HVT	ARTY OP'S	MRL	2S5	SA-11	BDE CP	LOG SITES	MECH BN'S		HVT
SENSOR									ATK SYSTEM
ITT	A				S	S	SA		MVR UNITS
CIT	A		A	A	S	SA	A		CANNON ARTY
RECON	S	A	A		S		SA		MLRS
RADIO RECON		A		S	SA	A	S		NSFS-NGF
FO/FAC/SPOTTER	S				A		S		NSFS-TLAM
TPQ-36		S	S				A		ACE-CAS
TPQ-37		SA	SA						ACE-DAS
UAV			S	S		A	SA		AC-130
ACE			SA			S	S		CVBG-OAS
JSTARS	A		S	S	A				EA: RADIO RECON
					A				EW: EA-6B
							A		PSYOPS
					A				DECEPTION

S: SENSOR A: ATTACK

Figure 8-2. Sensor/Attack Matrix.

zones and landing zones, known fording sites, and forward and rear refueling and rearming points. TAIs can also indicate where HPTs might be most vulnerable to attack.

High-Payoff Target Lists (HPTLs)

The HPTL, an example of which is depicted in figure 8-3, identifies the HPTs for a specific point in the battle in the order of their priority. The target category of the HPT is shown on the list either by name or by number. The number of target priorities should not be excessive so as to dilute intelligence collection, acquisition, and attack efforts. The approved list is used as a planning tool to determine attack guidance and to refine the collection plan.

Attack Guidance Matrix (AGM)

The commander must express his guidance on whether specific HPTs should be disrupted, delayed, limited, damaged, or destroyed. Based on the commander's attack guidance, the FSC recommends how each target should be engaged in terms of effects and attack options.

Effects can range from harassment, suppression, neutralization, to destruction. The attack guidance must be approved by the commander. This guidance should detail a prioritized list of HPTs; when, how, and the desired effects of attack; any special instructions; and HPTs that require battle damage assessment (BDA). Attack guidance is visually condensed in the AGM as shown in figure 8-4.

The division has only a finite capability to detect HPTs and deliver attacks against HPTs while conducting tactical operations. The division must balance its capability to detect HPTs with its capability to engage them. The division must also consider the effect on subordinate commanders and their plans. Although it is the division commander's responsibility to shape the division battlespace, detection and

EXAMPLE HIGH-PAYOFF TARGET LIST

EVENT OR PHASE: ATTACK THROUGH SECURITY ZONE

PRIORITY	CATEGORY	TARGET
1	FIRE SPT WEAPONS	MRL
2	C3	BDE CP
3	ADA	SA-11
4	FIRE SPT WEAPONS	2S5
5	POL/AMMO	LOG SITES
6	RSTA	OP'S
7	MANEUVER	MECH BN'S

Figure 8-3. High-Payoff Target List.

EXAMPLE ATTACK GUIDANCE MATRIX

EVENT OR PHASE: ATTACK THROUGH SECURITY ZONE

HPTL	WHEN	HOW	EFFECT	REMARKS
MRL	A	MLRS	N	
BDE CP	P	TLAM		PLAN IN
SA-11	A	GS ARTY	N/S	SUPPRESS
2S5	P	ACE	N	PLAN IN
LOG SITES	P	NGF	D	PLAN IN
OP'S	P	GS ARTY	S	PLAN IN
MECH BN'S	P	ACE/MLRS	N	INTENT TO

Figure 8-4. Attack Guidance Matrix.

delivery assets may not be able to adequately support the targeting requirements of subordinate units if these assets are totally committed to the detection and attack of division targets.

Fire Plans

The derivative of fire support planning is the fire support plan, a tactical plan containing the information necessary for the employment of fire support in the operation. The fire support plan is an umbrella document prepared by the division FSC and his staff to both expound upon and execute the division commander's guidance. The division FSC and his staff must focus the division commander's attention on the information and intelligence products required to create the division fire support plan.

Each supporting arm agency and its representatives conduct fire planning. Fire planning consists of those activities necessary for implementation of fire support. Targeting, scheduling of fires, provisions for attacking targets of opportunity, positioning, communications, combat service support, and computation of firing data are some of the aspects involved in fire planning. Information resulting from fire planning, which is needed by the supported unit for employment of a specific supporting arm, is contained in applicable tabs to the fire support plan; e.g., air fire plan, artillery fire plan, NGF plan. Detailed procedures, instructions, and information of use by the supporting arms agency is recorded in applicable orders.

Air Fire Planning

Aviation assets are made available through an apportionment process. Apportionment is the determination and assignment of the total expected effort devoted to the various air operations and/or geographic areas for a given period of time based on the MEF and ACE mission. The MEF commander may receive taskings from higher commanders in the apportionment process.

Following apportionment, the MEF and ACE commanders determine the allocation of aviation effort within the MEF. The division air officer (AO) works closely with the ACE in air fire planning to focus those facets of air operations which may impact on ground operations. Air control measures (e.g., control points) are established to allow aircraft maneuverability while minimizing interference with indirect fires. AOs in the division identify and anticipate aviation requirements and pass tactical air requests up the chain of command. At each echelon, these requests are reviewed for approval or disapproval, prioritized, additions made as required, and required coordination initiated, and then the request is forwarded to the next echelon. Once all requirements have been identified and received at the tactical air command center (TACC), air tasking orders are prepared.

The AO prepares the air fire plan to provide air support procedural information to the supported unit. The air fire plan is made in coordination with the supporting ACE and the development of the air operations annex which addresses aviation specific procedures and information. The air fire plan provides information on the delivery of air support which is known in advance. Examples include aircraft alert status, coordination measures and procedures incident to air safety, air target list annotated with necessary attack instructions, air delivery procedures (e.g., target marking, SEAD, etc.), codes, and air request procedures. It includes a graphic illustration of the preplanned air strikes. When possible, reference is made to other publications and parts of the order; e.g., SOPs, air operations annex.

The DASC (see chapter 2) receives the air tasking order (ATO) from the TACC and coordinates preplanned direct air support. The link between the DASC and the division FSCC is vital for coordination and integration of direct air support missions with the employment of other supporting arms, and for the expeditious processing of immediate tactical air requests and assault support requests. An air support liaison team may be employed to make this coordination and integration more efficient. The division FSC is the final arbitrator of all supporting arms integration conflicts and will decide all cases of conflicting requests for fire support assets. The FSCC continuously provides the DASC with updates on the unit boundaries and fire support coordination measures, friendly and enemy unit positions, pertinent intelligence data, and other prearranged data items as they are received at the FSCC. The FSCC provides the DASC with information on gun positions, gun-target lines, and gun trajectories in the

vicinity of aircraft flight routes. The DASC is responsible to the FSCC to provide timely information on —

- Predicted flight paths for aircraft under the DASC's control.
- BDAs.
- Status of outstanding requests.
- Pertinent intelligence.
- Delays or cancellations to the ATO.
- Other prearranged data items.

Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP)

TACPs establish and maintain facilities for liaison and communications between division units and the DASC, inform and advise the ground commander on the employment of supporting aircraft, and request and control air support means. The division TACP consists of one forward air controller (FAC) qualified naval aviator/naval flight officer, one air support control officer, and ten radio operators. The air support control officer is a contingency billet. The division TACP assists the division AO by monitoring all immediate air support requests from subordinate units, supervising the operation of aviation nets in the FSCC, and keeping the FSC advised of the general air situation. The division TACP coordinates and consolidates all preplanned air support requests from the division level and subordinate TACPs with the division FSC. TACPs are tasked to —

- Provide liaison and communications between the commander of the ground unit to which assigned and the appropriate air control agency.
- Provide the commander of the ground unit with current information on the employment and availability of aircraft assigned to the support of his unit.
- Advise the ground unit commander and his staff on matters concerning the employment of aviation assets. Prepare and forward requests for air support in accordance with instructions specified in the MEF's air employment plan.
- Prioritize and resolve duplication and conflicts of air support requests.
- Advise the commander of the AAW situation.
- Coordinate with air defense units.
- Exercise control of aircraft during the terminal phase of CAS to ensure accuracy of weapons delivery and to minimize the danger to friendly troops.
- Recommend fire support coordination measures as they relate to air support.
- Keep the target intelligence officer or G-2 advised of all target information received through air support channels.

The more liaison between the supported unit and the ACE, the quicker the plan can be developed and the better the plan will work. For example, the ACE commander or his designated representatives may come to the supported unit for a brief/update of the tactical situation and exchange of information. Then, concurrent coordinated planning by the two units can occur. During planning, the two units keep each other informed of changes that may affect the operation.

Artillery Fire Planning

The artillery regimental S-3, in coordination with the FSC and G-3, prepares the artillery fire plan for the division's fire support plan. The artillery fire plan incorporates the requirements of subordinate artillery units and fire support requirements of the division. The plans of the battalions assigned DS missions are reviewed, duplication eliminated, additions and changes made as required, and all are integrated into the division artillery fire plan. The execution of the portion of the fire support plan pertaining to general support (GS)/general support-reinforcing (GS-R) artillery battalions is planned by the artillery regiment. These fires are employed on targets requested by the battalions in direct support, on targets identified by the artillery regiment, and on targets designated by the division commander. The artillery regiment plans counterfires and fires involved with special ammunition. Coordination with subordinate units is affected if fires are planned within the unit's zone of action short of the CFL or if the unit's operations will be affected. Targets, which are out of artillery range or are unsuited for artillery attack, are forwarded to the division FSCC for possible attack by other fire support means.

The focal point of artillery fire planning at the infantry regiment or separate battalion is the FSC. He develops a concept of fires to support the commander's intent. The DS artillery battalion S-3 develops a plan to support the concept of fires. He receives information regarding targeting and fire support requirements from the S-2 of the infantry regiment as well as from the subordinate liaison officer at each battalion.

The battalion S-3 conducts top down fire planning which is passed to each respective liaison section for bottom up refinement. Once the refinement is received from the battalion liaison officer located with the supported commander, the S-3 takes the information and completes fire planning. When completed, the fire plan is distributed to the firing batteries, reinforcing artillery, and the artillery regiment.

Artillery liaison officers receive the plan and ensure that all forward observers are notified of the fires planned in their sectors. The artillery unit continues its planning to ensure that the required support can be rendered, e.g., positioning, ammunition availability, firing restrictions. For additional discussion on artillery fire planning, see FMFM 6-9, *Marine Artillery Support*.

Naval Gunfire Planning

During planning, NGF requirements are prepared by the MEF commander and submitted to the appropriate naval commander. The naval commander examines overall naval and MEF requirements and subsequently allocates NGF assets to support the MEF. In amphibious operations, the CATF publishes an ATF NGF plan. A LF NGF plan is prepared by the LF naval gunfire liaison officer. The LF naval gunfire officer (NGFO) coordinates closely with the ATF NGFO in planning NGF. He provides information concerning the LF concept of operations that allows the ATF NGFO to plan NGF employment to meet LF requirements, e.g., positioning of fire support areas and stations. The use of NGF depends to a large degree on the number and type of NGF support ships available and on the priorities and guidance set forth by the commander.

The LF NGF plan contains pertinent information and instructions pertaining to naval gunfire support extracted from the ATF NGF plan. Subordinate echelons may refer to higher echelon plans and not issue their own NGF plan. NGF plans normally include specific instructions on the tactical use of NGF. NGF plans prescribe operations and procedures for the LF NGF organizations, e.g., shore fire control parties (SFCPs) and the regimental NGF liaison teams.

The NGF plan contains a NGF operations overlay, a schedule of fires, and instructions on communications, radar beacon employment, and reports. When possible, reference is made to SOPs. Upon deployment, much of the planning between the supported unit and the supporting ship may occur via radio or teletype.

Other Plans

The fire support plan may also include other plans such as countermechanized and SEAD fire plans, fire support coordination, fire support communications plans, and the target list. The fire support plan is prepared in close coordination with the development of other plans to ensure compatibility betweenplans, supportability of the fire support plan, and integration with other assets to achieve combined arms.

Communications

Communications are focused on the fire support coordination nets at the various levels from division to battalion. All coordination essential to the use of available supporting arms can be done on these nets. There are other nets for both air and ground forces through which fire support can be requested, planned, executed, and coordinated. These other fire support nets are used primarily for the purpose for which they were designed, but depending on the tactical situation, any fire support net, or any other radio net, may be used to accomplish the mission. This does not imply the routine use of other radio nets for fire support coordination.

Communications Security

Use of secure fire support coordination nets is determined by METT-T. If the threat demands increased communications security (COMSEC), then every net should be covered. Additionally, reducing COMSEC does not necessarily improve communications. The use of COMSEC procedures on an uncovered net should have a minimal effect on communications if operators are well trained.

Fire Support Communications Architecture

FMFM 6-18 and FMFM 3-30 describe radio nets used for fire support and fire support coordination. Figure 8-5 lists nets and stations required to control or guard each one. "As required" nets are activated only when a particular fire support element is available. Automated fire support coordination is conducted on the Marine Corps Fire Support System (MCFSS). FMFM 6-18-1, *MCFSS Techniques and Procedures*, provides guidance on the employment and procedures for MCFSS.

LEGEND:
C-Net Control
X-Guard
R-As Required

	LF ARTY COMMAND/FD (1)	DIV FS COORD	DIV FS COORD (DIGITAL)	REGT FS COORD	ARTY REGT COMMAND	ARTY REGT FIRE DIRECTION	ARTY REGT TAC	DIV/GCE ARTY AIR SPOT	ARTY BN FIRE DIRECTION	ARTY BN COMMAND	D/S ARTY COF (2)	TAR (1)	TAD (1)	TACP LOCAL	DIV/GCE NGF SUPPORT	NGF AIR SPOT	DIV/ GCE RADAR BEACON	NGF CONTROL	NGF GROUND SPOT	SFCP LOCAL	NGF CONTROL OVERLOAD	BN MORTAR	MAGTF/LF NGF SUPPORT	MAGTF/LF FF COORD (4)
SACC/FFCC	C															C		C			C		C	C
TACC/TADC												X	X			R								
DIV FSCC	R	C	C		R		R	R				X			C	C	C	R			R		R	X
DASC (ASHORE)												C	C										C	
INF REGT FSCC	R	X	X	C				R	X	R	R	X	X		X	R							R	R
INF BN FSCC	R			X				R	R		X	X	X	C		R			C	C		X	R	R
ARTY REGT	R	X	X		C	C	C	C																X
D/S ARTY BN	R			X	X	X	X	R	C	C	C													R
D/S ARTY BTRY	R							R	X	X	X													R
RADAR BEACON TEAM																	X							
ARTY FO								R			X													
FAC												X	X	X										
MORTAR FO																						X		
NGF SPOT TEAM																			X	X				
LAAD MISSILE TM (3)																								
AIR OBSERVER								X								X								
FIRE SUPPORT SHIP(S)															X	R		X	X		R		X	
MORTAR PLATOON																						C		

(1) Net control located in SAAC until displaced ashore.
(2) Net control at Battalion (centralized FO) of Battery (decentralized FO).
(3) LAAD nets established as required.
(4) May be voice of digital.

Figure 8-5. Fire Support Communications Architecture.

Fire Support Coordination

Fire support coordination is a continuous process of evaluating fire support needs or missions, analyzing the situation, and planning and orchestrating the implementation of the fire support plan while in a continually changing environment. The process enables the commander to use his available firepower to influence the action while ensuring the safety of his troops. Target acquisition and intelligence are key to maintaining responsive fire support coordination. Target acquisition is the detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of weapons. The detect function of the targeting process promotes responsive target acquisition.

Detect Function

The detect function of the targeting process includes allocating resources, developing the collection plan, assigning intelligence acquisition tasks, processing information into target intelligence, and disseminating target intelligence to attack systems. In the decide function, the more specific the HPTs, the more likely the G-2 can identify, locate, and accurately target them.

The detect function of targeting has a relationship to the attack system. The fire support means are evaluated in terms of accuracy, responsiveness, and availability (including on-station time for aircraft). The G-2 identifies, locates, tracks, and targets HPTs in his recommendation for intelligence task organization and the division collection plan. Because of limited range of division intelligence assets, the G-2 must coordinate with the MEF collection manager to request intelligence for deep HPTs.

The heart of the detection function is the IPB process. The IPB is continually updated to confirm or deny enemy courses of action and projected events, using information provided by organic, supporting, higher, adjacent, and subordinate assets.

Reconnaissance reports support targeting in close operations. Intelligence acquisition tasks in the collection plan or specific reconnaissance missions assigned to units by the G-3 provide this information. Counterfire radars provide accurate locations of artillery firing locations. These targets may have already been engaged, depending on their priority and division's attack guidance. However, their locations may assist the intelligence section to locate other HPTs. The artillery regiment, through its targeting processing center, must routinely pass radar acquisitions to the G-2.

Terrain analysis helps detect HPTs for rear operations. The rear echelon identifies likely LZs and assigns surveillance responsibilities. This is integrated with the air defense planning of the MEF and ACE.

The G-2 coordinates HPT detection in deep, close, and rear operations. Committed forces detect HPTs in close operations. These include ground maneuver units, division C^2W assets, artillery radars, and aviation units. These forces detect division HPTs as a result of intelligence acquisition tasks in the collection plan and through the reporting of combat information to the tactical echelon.

The division commander and subordinate commanders may have different HPTs. The G-2 section at the main echelon coordinates the collection effort with subordinate commander's S-2s, integrating it into the division collection plan. Likewise, the G-3 section coordinates the attack plan with the subordinate commander's S-3s and integrates it with the division's attack.

The G-2 section at the tactical echelon coordinates HPT detection in close operations using the HPTL, combat information from committed forces, and intelligence received from the main echelon. He coordinates with S-2s of committed forces and the G-2 section at the main echelon to ensure collection assets focus on HPTs. As HPTs are detected, he informs the FSC and G-3 for commitment of attack resources or attacks per the attack guidance matrix.

The G-2 section in the rear echelon coordinates detection of HPTs in rear operations with the G-2 in the main echelon and commanders in the rear area. His primary means of detecting HPTs are reconnaissance and surveillance efforts of units in the rear area. He integrates and coordinates the reconnaissance and surveillance effort into one plan. This plan incorporates reports from military police, information from MEF counterintelligence, and interrogation of detainees.

Detection of HPTs in an enemy force requiring a level II or III response to a rear area threat depends on contingency planning between the rear and main echelons G-2 sections. Intelligence and C^2W assets may be required to detect HPTs quickly and accurately to engage them with the TCF, supporting artillery, and CAS. The G-2 section at the main echelon coordinates and integrates reallocation of assets.

Fire Support Coordination Procedures

The division FSCC plans and coordinates fires on targets of interest to the division. The division FSCC assists the regimental FSCCs in fire support coordination. If the division generates a target to be fired, the fire support coordinator may use any of the fire support means available to the division. Coordination with adjacent or higher fire support coordination facilities must be effected to fire on targets outside the division boundary. Some typical fire support coordination tasks include —

- Advising the commander on the employment of fire support.
- Responding to intelligence reports by requesting supporting arms to attack high-payoff targets.
- Selecting the best supporting arm to attack a target.
- Clearing requests for fire support.
- Integrating fires with maneuver.
- Coordinating the execution of fires.
- Requesting additional fire support when needed.
- Establishing fire support coordination measures to aid the rapid engagement of targets and provide safeguards for friendly forces/installations.
- Resolving fire support conflicts.
- Disseminating pertinent information within the FSCC and to other sections of the COC and to other units.

The fire support coordination procedures described below can be used in most situations. The general procedures portray the quick, effective fire support used in all types of division operations. Offensive and defensive procedures are fire support coordination actions taken after an attack has started and in response to an enemy attack, respectively. These last two procedures deal with coordination of planned and immediate fire support.

General Procedures

The following procedures are used both in offensive and defensive operations for the coordination of planned and immediate fire support.

- Track all fire missions originating in, impacting in, or crossing through the unit's zone of action on a map.
- Maintain overlays.
- Maintain a HPTL.
- Integrate fire support, as required through employment of MCFSS. Monitor the progress of friendly aircraft through the division airspace (DASC). The AO makes recommendations to the FSC concerning any airspace coordination which may be required. Included are the use of ACAs and the use of suppression fires on any known or suspected air defense weapons.
- Keep supporting arms advised of the situation, particularly when periods of intense activity are anticipated. This allows them to make the necessary preparations.
- Ensure a method for timing the delivery of fires is well-understood by all units/agencies involved in fire support.

Offensive Procedures

To effectively coordinate fire support for an attack, the fire support plan and SOPs must be established and understood by all personnel concerned with fire support. The plan must be flexible; remember, that it is usually easier to modify a plan than to develop a new one.

All personnel concerned with fire support must keep abreast of the developing friendly and enemy situations including dispositions, capabilities and weaknesses, and their tactics. Supporting arms commanders and their representatives must know, understand, and anticipate the supported commander's actions and requirements. Once the attack has started, the offensive procedures for coordinating fire support are to —

- Keep track of the targets fired on, the damage assessments received, and the targets not fired on in scheduled fires, if conducted. Also, know which supporting arms assets will be shifted from scheduled fires if an important target is reported unexpectedly.

- Keep track of execution of fires planned in support of the attack. These will usually be neutralization or suppression missions and will usually by fired when the assault elements reach a certain point or request the fires.
- Use aviation only against targets which other supporting arms cannot effectively attack. Bunkers and fortifications, for example, normally require heavy ordnance which only aircraft can deliver. If they cannot be bypassed, an air strike is the logical choice of supporting arm to attack them.
- Make use of priority targets. Shift priority targets with the maneuver units movement.
- Key clearance of artillery movement to crossing of phase lines by the supported maneuver unit. Report this movement to the artillery unit immediately.
- Know if fires are to be shifted when the lead element crosses any control measure and ensure that communications are maintained with whoever directs those fires.

All staff sections must keep abreast of the location of the lead elements. This facilitates rapid clearance of fire missions. The FSC and G-3 working in proximity to each other allow the lead unit's reports to be used for fire support coordination purposes and to eliminate the need for separate reporting by the supporting arms representatives to the FSCC.

Position location reporting system (PLRS) provides a position and navigation service to users and makes position location information available to designated C^2 systems. Observers can fix their own location which enhances their ability to locate targets accurately and rapidly. PLRS can also provide a digital data communications capability which allows users to send and receive formatted as well as free text messages.

Global positioning system (GPS) is a space-based radio navigation system which provides position, velocity, and time both globally and continuously. GPS will be used for different purposes, including navigation for space, air, sea, and land vehicles, precise positioning, time transfer, attitude reference, surveying, etc..

Defensive Procedures

Prompt and effective measures by FSCCs can be critical to defeating an enemy attack. Although the enemy seeks surprise in the attack, there are usually some warnings. When these indicators appear, the G-2 should rapidly notify the FSCC watch officer who should —

- Have the principals (FSC, artillery liaison officer (LNO), AO) recalled.
- Alert the supporting artillery, NGF ships, DASC, and the MEF.
- Ensure NGF ships are within range and have desired ordnance available.
- Correlate the G-2's track of the enemy's advance with critical targets/engagement areas in the fire support plan. Modify planned fires as required to ensure fires are on the probable locations of the enemy's forward units, his command and control, his reserves, the combat service support for his maneuver units, and routes over which he will move reserves. Use weapons with large dispersions on the deep targets and use the weapons with small dispersions on the forward units.
- Pass target data to supporting arms.

During the attack, the FSC should monitor the overall operation and allow his subordinates to attend to the details. There will be more targets than can be handled immediately. One of the keys to success is to use the supporting arms where they most influence the entire action.

Procedures for Coordinating Scheduled Fires

Scheduled attacks are often the most effective way to provide fire support. The FSC must verify that the situation has not changed sufficiently to warrant a change in the scheduled attack. Actions to be taken are to —

- Verify target with requesting unit and controlling agency.
- Verify target location. Since fire mission or air strike was scheduled, the target may have moved, been overrun, or destroyed by other supporting arm.

- Consider nature of the target. Priorities may have changed since the air strike or fire mission was scheduled.
- Ensure that the delivery of fires does not pose unnecessary danger to friendly units and, in the case of air strikes, that the planned route of aircraft does not cause unnecessary interference with friendly operations.
- Verify that the scheduled ammunition or ordnance is still the right choice for the target.
- Discuss situation and supporting arms mission with representatives of other sections of the combat operations center, with senior and subordinate FSCs, and within the FSCC, as required. This identifies and resolves conflicts.
- Cancel mission if no longer required or if previously granted clearance has been canceled.
- Determine if any temporary fire support coordination measures are needed.
- Monitor the mission. At the completion of the mission, record and pass damage assessment data to the G-2, higher headquarters, and adjacent units, as appropriate.
- Cancel fire support coordination measures implemented for that mission.

Procedures for Coordinating Immediate Fires

The procedures for coordinating call for fire missions and/or immediate air strikes do not significantly differ from those for planned fire support. Many of the actions are the same. The difference is they must be executed much more quickly. Another key difference is that the FSC is normally the first person in the FSCC to know of the requirement for a planned mission. The FSC then discusses it with the supporting arms representatives before selecting the supporting arm. In call for fire missions, it is usually the supporting arms representative in the FSCC who monitors/receives the request on a conduct of fire or tactical air request net and then effects final coordination with the FSC. The actions are to —

- Identify requesting unit.
- Check the target location.
- Consider the target's nature and quickly verify that the right supporting arm is being requested. Even if another supporting arm would be more effective, interceding to recommend a change causes delay. It may be better to let the mission proceed as requested and then use a more appropriate arm for reattacks.
- Identify what unit is to fire and its location, and verify that trajectories from surface fires do not create an airspace conflict.
- Identify what ordnance is being used. Some munitions require clearance with adjacent or senior units.
- Quickly clear the request with the FSC, other supporting arms representatives, and the supported S-3 or his representative.
- Clear the request with that unit if the fires impact in or pass through another unit's zone. Coordinate directly with the affected unit, when possible.
- Approve or disapprove the fire support mission. This consists of two separate considerations: the use of the supporting arm and clearance to engage the target.
- Implement fire support coordination measures, if needed.
- Monitor the mission.
- Record and pass data to G-2, higher headquarters, and adjacent units, as appropriate.
- Cancel fire support coordination measures implemented for that mission.

Fire Support Coordinating Measures

Fire support coordinating measures are used to facilitate timely and safe use of fire support. When properly used, fire support coordinating measures enhance the accomplishment of the mission. For example, a properly placed coordinated fire line makes counterfire easier, which allows the supported unit to maneuver freely and use its direct support from its supporting unit effectively. The application of fire support coordinating measures varies with the operation and target density.

Coordinated Fire Line

The coordinated fire line (CFL) is a line beyond which conventional surface fire support means may fire at any time within the zone of the establishing headquarters without additional coordination. It expedites the attack of targets beyond the CFL without coordination with the ground commander in whose zone of action targets are located. It also provides the ground commander with an area within his zone

where his forces can operate in safety from friendly surface delivered indirect fires.

Fire Support Coordination Line

The fire support coordination line (FSCL) is a line established by appropriate land force commanders to ensure coordination of fires not under their control but which may affect current tactical operations. The FSCL is used to coordinate fires of air, ground, or sea weapon systems using any type of ammunition against surface targets. The FSCL should follow well-defined terrain features, if possible. The establishment of the FSCL must be coordinated with the appropriate air commanders and other supporting elements. Supporting elements may attack targets forward of the FSCL provided the attack will not produce adverse surface effects on, or to the rear of, the line. Both the land force and joint special operations commanders should be informed of attacks beyond the FSCL. Attacks against ground targets behind this line must be coordinated with the appropriate land force commander to reduce the possibility of friendly casualties. If a land force desires to shoot or maneuver beyond its lateral boundaries, it must first coordinate with the appropriate commander.

The FSCL allows the land force and supporting forces to attack expeditiously targets of opportunity beyond the FSCL. Forces attacking targets beyond the FSCL must inform all other affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid friendly casualties. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to do so will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL; however, failure to coordinate this type of attack increases the risk of friendly casualties and could waste limited resources through duplicative attack.

The FSCL is normally positioned closer to the forward line of own troops in the defense rather than in the offense; however, the exact positioning is situation dependent. The decision on where to place or even whether to use an FSCL requires careful consideration. All those involved in the decision must understand that the FSCL is a permissive measure used to expedite fires. Its greatest utility is in facilitating the attack of time-sensitive targets of opportunity while reducing the possibility of friendly casualties.

Free Fire Area (FFA). A FFA is a specifically designated area into which any weapons system may be fired without any additional coordination with the establishing headquarters. Its purpose to expedite fire and to allow jettisoning of CAS munitions if an aircraft is unable to drop on a target.

Restrictive Fire Line (RFL). A RFL is a line established between converging friendly forces that prohibits fires, or effects from fires, across the line without coordination with the affected force. The purpose of a RFL is to prevent interference between converging friendly forces.

No Fire Area (NFA). A NFA is an area into which no fires or effects of fire are allowed. The purpose of the NFA is to prohibit fires or their effects in the area, normally to protect civilians. There are two exceptions. The establishing headquarters may approve fires temporarily within the NFA on a mission-by-mission basis. Also, if an enemy force within the NFA engages a friendly force and the engaged unit leader determines there is no time for coordination, he may order fires in the NFA.

Restrictive Fire Area (RFA). A RFA is an area in which specific firing restrictions are imposed and into which fires that exceed those restrictions will not be delivered without coordination with the establishing headquarters. The purpose of the RFA is to regulate fires into an area according to the stated restrictions. This means that fires or certain types of ordnance can be controlled in an area where friendly forces are or will be located.

Airspace Coordination Area (ACA). An ACA is a three-dimensional block of airspace in which friendly aircraft are reasonably safe from friendly surface fires. The purpose of an ACA is to act as a safety measure for friendly aircraft while allowing the other supporting arms to continue fire in support of the ground force. ACAs are normally referred to as either formal or informal. Formal ACAs require detailed planning. When time for coordination is limited, an informal ACA is used. Informal ACAs are temporary and are not as widely disseminated as formal ACAs. ACAs can vary from physically defined areas or locations to various methods of separation or deconfliction. Physical areas can include routes or areas. Methods of separation or

deconfliction include lateral separation, altitude separation, timed separation, or a combination of these.

Other Control Measures

Even though they are not fire support coordination measures, some control measures play a role in fire support planning and coordination.

Boundaries. Boundaries designate the geographical limits of the zone of action or sector of a unit. Within his own boundaries, unless otherwise restricted, a commander enjoys complete freedom of fire and maneuver. Normally, units do not fire across boundaries unless the fires are coordinated with the adjacent unit or the fires are beyond a permissive fire support coordination measure such as the CFL. This does not preclude a commander from deciding that his subordinate units may fire across boundaries at positively identified enemy units without coordination.

Zone of Fire. A zone of fire is an area within which a designated ground unit or naval gunfire ship delivers, or is prepared to deliver, fire support. Fire may or may not be observed. It is not used as a control or coordinating measure as much as it is used to tell supporting arms organizations what their responsibilities are. It is used to designate a specific area which the supporting unit must be able to cover with its fires. The zone should be so selected that the firing unit can best support the actions of the supported unit. Normally zones of fire correspond with zones of action, sectors of defense, or tactical areas of responsibility (TAOR) of the supported unit.

Amphibious Objective Area (AOA). The AOA is a geographical area, delineated in the initiating directive, for purposes of command and control within which is located the objectives to be secured by the ATF. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the ATF's mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations.

Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR). The TAOR is a defined area of land for which responsibility is specifically assigned to the commander of the area as a measure for control of assigned forces and coordination of support. Commonly referred to as TAOR.

Delivery of Fires

Delivery of fires is the execution of fire plans and necessary coordination in operations. The deliver portion of the targeting process enhances the delivery of the appropriate ordnance to achieve the desired effect on the target. Fires are delivered to produce a variety of effects which are *destruction, neutralization, harassment, interdiction, suppression, screening,* and *illumination.*

- **Destruction Fire.** Destruction fire is fire delivered for the sole purpose of destroying material objects. To achieve destructive effects on a target, it is not necessary to completely demolish the target. A target may be considered destroyed if it cannot perform its primary mission.

- **Neutralization Fire.** Neutralization fires are delivered to render the target ineffective or unusable. The fires are used to temporarily hamper the movement and/or the firing of the weapon.

- **Harassing Fire.** Harassing fire is fire designed to disturb the rest of enemy troops, to curtail movement and, by threat of losses, to lower morale. These fires are delivered occasionally, usually at night or during periods of reduced visibility.

- **Interdiction Fire.** Interdiction fire is fire placed on an area or point to prevent the enemy from using the area or point. Roads, railways, routes, and other lines of communications may be interdicted to prevent, reduce, or disrupt the enemy forces, supplies, and communications.

- **Suppressive Fire.** Suppressive fires are fires on or about a weapon system to degrade its performance below the level needed to fulfill its mission objectives, during the conduct of the fire mission. The effects are only temporary.

- **Screening Fire.** Screening fires are fires using smoke projectiles to obscure the enemy's observation of friendly forces and their movement.

- **Illumination Fires.** Illumination fire may be used to observe enemy operations and movements, to adjust observed fire during hours of darkness, and to provide assistance to friendly night operations.

Deliver Function

The deliver function is the execution of the attack against the target. The prioritized HPTL, target intelligence from the G-2, target selection standards, and attack guidance guide the attack. Where tactical decisions on the time of attack, desired effect or degree of damage, and attack system to be used are largely the result of actions taken during the decide function, several technical decisions must be completed in the deliver function. The G-3/FSC confirms HPTs and directs their attack by maneuver forces or fire support assets once they meet attack guidance. Based on guidance from the decide function and results of the detect phase, planners must determine the number and type of munitions, the unit to conduct the attack, and the response time of the attacking unit.

Attack of HPTs in deep operations normally involves employment of aviation. The range of division attack assets may not reach uncommitted enemy forces. Deep maneuver, though an attack option, is a high risk action. The FSC and G-3 section in the main echelon coordinate and integrate attack of HPTs by aviation. The FSC directs previously allotted sorties against the target or requests additional aviation support from the MEF. The division FSC submits periodic updates on the location and status of targets to the MEF force fires coordinator. The G-2 section provides information for these updates. The division FSC informs the G-3 of the impending attack. The G-3 section either confirms the attack or requests diversion to a different target.

Committed forces attack HPTs in close operations. Committed forces' headquarters echelons and the division tactical and main echelons coordinate and integrate the attacks. Attack assets include maneuver, fire support, and engineers. Maneuver forces may attack enemy reconnaissance as part of counter-reconnaissance efforts. They may conduct limited objective attacks to disrupt enemy air defense during aviation operations. Smoke may be used to disrupt enemy reconnaissance and target acquisition. Fires may be employed to attack a range of targets including enemy mortars, artillery, air defense, reconnaissance, and command and control. Engineers may place mines or demolitions to limit the enemy's avenues of approach or delay his arrival.

Attack of HPTs in support or rear operations may actually be conducted as part of the deep or close operations. These may include engaging air transported forces and support assets and long-range fire support. In the rear area, attack of HPTs may support counter-reconnaissance, surveillance, and security against special forces, or a level II or III response to a rear area threat.

The rear echelon coordinates and integrates rear area security plans to attack HPTs in the rear. It coordinates with the main echelon to change priorities of fire support to engage HPTs. It directs level II and III responses to rear area threats. The main echelon coordinates and integrates these actions with deep and close operations. For example, it may have to divert CAS to support rear operations or change the priorities of CAS to integrate with those of the close operation. The use of attack helicopters to support the rear echelon may also impact on deep operations.

The main echelon commands and controls the division targeting effort by executing branches to deep operations and integrating and coordinating actions to support branches implemented by the tactical or rear echelons. The tactical echelon may direct execution of branches of the close operations plan and coordinate them with the main echelon. This ensures that the attack of HPTs in the deep operation is coordinated with the close operations branch. As a result, the tactical echelon may direct a new or revised HPTL and place attack guidance in effect. This may require changes to collection plans and priority to detect the HPTs.

Counterfire

The division commander must realize that counterfire is not solely the responsibility of the division's artillery regiment. Counterfire requires integration of intelligence, fire support, and maneuver. It is a concurrent operation the division commander and staff must coordinate with the MEF and ACE during both offensive and defensive operations.

Counterfire assists the division by protecting forces, thus allowing freedom of movement and agility. The enemy's entire fire support system is targeted in order to deny him the ability to disrupt friendly forces. A fully integrated counterfire plan allows targets to be engaged, upon acquisition, by either ground-based or airborne assets by linking the detect asset to the delivery means. These fires can affect both friendly and enemy movements throughout the battlefield.

Counterfire may be *proactive* or *reactive*. Proactive counterfire is the detection and attack of enemy nonfiring and firing systems before they engage friendly forces. It is linked with the targeting effort. Reactive counterfire is a response to the enemy's engagement of the division.

Proactive Counterfire

Proactive counterfire requires the intelligence system to identify, locate, and accurately target elements of the enemy fire support system. The MEF usually conducts the proactive portion of counterfire. It has the intelligence and attack systems to identify, locate, and attack targets before their commitment, arrival, and employment against the division. The division may conduct proactive counterfire against enemy fire support systems within range of organic and supporting intelligence and fire support systems.

Reactive Counterfire

Reactive counterfire requires integration of intelligence, target acquisition, fire support, maneuver, and command and control. The intelligence system must use the IPB to predict likely locations of enemy fire support systems. Using this prediction, the division positions and tasks intelligence sensors and target acquisitions assets to confirm the IPB and provide target information. Fire support assets engage enemy fire support systems on the basis of this information. Maneuver elements provide information from reconnaissance and surveillance. They may also engage enemy target acquisition assets located on or near the FLOT. The C^2 system provides the reporting network for counterfire and identifies priorities for protection of the force.

Responsibilities

The division commander is responsible for counterfire throughout the division area of responsibility. His counterfire responsibilities include —

- Developing, planning, and describing his vision, concept, and intent for counterfire within the total division operation.
- Portioning the battlefield through maneuver boundaries or assignment of area of responsibilities (AORs). This delineates responsibilities for counterfire within the division zone.
- Prioritizing the counterfire effort within the division zone.
- Allocating resources within the context of the overall division operation.
- Coordinating and integrating the division counterfire effort.

Within the division, key staff members for counterfire are the G-2, G-3, and FSC. The G-2 develops and updates the IPB, tasks resources to acquire target information, and disseminates information to the G-3 and FSC. The G-3 integrates and prioritizes counterfire into the concept of operations. He allocates resources in the context of the overall mission. The FSC integrates counterfire into the division's fire support plan.

The artillery regiment commander advises the division commander on enemy fire support capabilities; makes recommendations on counterfire means, priorities, surveillance and defensive measures, and attack guidance; assists in the preparation of the division counterfire plan; and ensures the artillery is organized for combat and positioned to support the counterfire effort.

The G-4 and combat engineer battalion commander are also involved in the counterfire process. The engineer may be required to provide survivability support to the artillery. The G-4 orchestrates class V support for the fire support systems.

Planning Considerations

Division planning considerations for counterfire include —

- The MEF counterfire plan.
- C^2 capabilities

- Capabilities of friendly and enemy fire support.
- Capabilities of friendly and enemy target acquisition.

The division must understand its role within the MEF counterfire plan. The MEF counterfire plan is defined through the MEF commander's concept and intent. MEF fire support plans further define MEF and division roles.

Within the division, the first counterfire consideration is the enemy's capabilities. The G-2 provides this information as part of the IPB and targeting process. These considerations include the enemy's mission and whether the division is facing the enemy main effort. Both impact on the division's counterfire requirements. His considerations are not only enemy mortars and artillery, but also enemy electronic warfare and fixed- and rotary wing assets. He includes ranges, echelon, and types of artillery in the estimate. Less counterfire is required against towed artillery than self-propelled artillery. Range and echelon affect not only the enemy's capability to engage the division in depth, but also where the enemy positions his artillery on the battlefield. Munitions capabilities of enemy fire support are also a consideration in the counterfire planning. Weapons that fire improved conventional munitions are a greater threat than those capable of firing only standard high explosive munitions. The G-3 and FSC must consider these same types of capabilities of friendly weapons systems.

Enemy target acquisition capabilities also impact the division's counterfire planning. The division must plan to attack and destroy enemy artillery reconnaissance elements and observation posts through an aggressive counter-reconnaissance effort. The division must strictly employ and enforce C^2W efforts to negate or limit enemy direction-finding capabilities. If the enemy artillery target acquisition threat is great, friendly artillery must move frequently to survive. The division must locate and destroy enemy counterfire radars to enhance survivability of mortars and artillery.

The commander and staff must consider the division's target acquisition capabilities. These capabilities include C^2W systems, radars, UAVs, forward observers, and FACs employed with maneuver units. Each of these resources provide a different degree of accuracy and speed of targeting data. The division must also consider threats to each of these.

The C^2 organization of division artillery is also a consideration. The division must decide whether to centralize or decentralize execution of counterfire by the artillery. Centralization facilitates massing of artillery and precludes duplication of effort. It also enhances the use of counterfire radars. However, centralization places a heavy burden on the headquarters responsible for executing artillery counterfire. If the division has reinforcing indirect fire assets (such as Army MLRS), it may be assigned to execute counterfire. This allows the FSC to focus and employ a dedicated fire support asset to counterfire while the artillery regiment focuses on artillery support to committed forces.

Activities

Counterfire activities are conducted using the decide-detect-deliver-assess methodology. The MEF should delineate counterfire responsibilities between the MEF, division, and ACE. This allows each to focus on a specific area of the battlefield and prevents duplication of effort. Counterfire begins with the targeting process during course of action development and wargaming. The targeting team identifies high-value targets and refines them into high-payoff targets for the division. It recommends what targets to attack, how to detect and engage them, and how to determine the results. The targeting team does this as part of the total targeting process and not as a separate action.

The division commander prioritizes counterfire targets within the division zone. Normally, enemy fire support facing the division's main effort will receive priority for counterfire. However, when the division employs a unit in an economy of force role, it may receive priority for counterfire.

The use of counterfire radars requires several decisions. First, the division examines the threat to decide if radars will operate in a continuous or command-cued manner. If threat of acquiring the radars is low, then the commander may direct continuous cueing. If the threat is high, the division normally employs command cueing. Command cueing requires cueing agents to direct the radar to

radiate. These agents are normally battalion or regiment FSCs, but may include individual forward observers (FOs) and forward air controllers (FACs).

Once the commander decides what to attack with counterfire, his staff can plan how targets will be detected. The IPB process is the first step. Using the IPB, the G-2 and FSC orient and position collection resources on likely positions of enemy fire support. The counterfire radars identify and provide locations of mortars, artillery, and rocket units as they are firing. Call for fire zones (CFFZ) should be established in the counterfire radars around likely enemy firing positions. CFFZ are used to generate an immediate fire mission when incoming rounds are received from a specific area. The counter-battery radar is programmed with a zone of search which ranges templated enemy indirect fire positions. Ground surveillance radars may provide combat information on enemy firing units occupying likely firing positions. They also may provide a degree of battle damage assessment indicating units are displacing after a likely firing position has been engaged. They also may cue other target acquisition assets.

Electronic direction finding assets may locate key fire support headquarters for lethal attack or jamming. Assets may also be used to identify and locate artillery reconnaissance elements or command OPs as part of the division counter-reconnaissance effort.

The division uses a variety of techniques to execute counterfire. The counterfire program is a counterfire technique used when there is little movement of enemy fire support assets and sufficient time available to identify, locate, and target them. It is used to disrupt enemy fire support systems at critical times, such as during a counterattack or a penetration. Reactive counterfire is a counterfire technique which involves attacking enemy fire support assets during or immediately following enemy engagement of friendly forces. A cueing agent normally initiates this technique. He directs the counterfire radar to radiate, acquire the target, and transmit a fire mission to its reporting headquarters.

Another technique is to have all radars report to the artillery regiment. This allows the regiment to centrally command and control radars and artillery counterfire. It also allows the artillery regiment to maintain continuous coverage of the division sector by coordinating the movement of counterfire radars and firing units.

The division may employ maneuver forces against enemy fire support systems. This may include use of small maneuver units to engage reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition elements. The division may request the employment of aviation against artillery groups. The division may employ a mix of these techniques.

Assessment

Assessment is the determination of overall effectiveness of force employment during division operations. It informs the division commander of strike effects against specific targets and target sets. Based on this information, the enemy's operational capabilities are continuously estimated. During this review, munitions effectiveness is evaluated and reattack recommendations are proposed or executed.

Assess Function

The principle tool for the division commander during the assess function is battle damage assessment (BDA). BDA is the timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or nonlethal, against a target. BDA within the targeting process pertains to the results of attacks on targets designated by the division commander. Producing BDA is primarily an intelligence responsibility, but requires extensive coordination with operational elements to be effective. BDA requirements must be translated into priority information requirements. BDA accomplishes the following purposes:

- It provides the division commander an estimate of the enemy's combat effectiveness, capabilities, and intentions.
- It helps to determine if a reattack is necessary.
- It is used to determine allocation or redirection of attack systems to make the best use of available resources and combat power.

The requirement for BDA for specific HPTs is determined during the decide function in the targeting process. BDA requirements should be recorded on

the AGM and the intelligence collection plan. The commander and the staff must be aware that resources required for BDA are the same resources used for target development and acquisition. Therefore, the commander's decision must be made with the realization that an asset used for BDA may not be available for target development and acquisition. BDA information is received and processed to analyze the results of target attack in terms of desired effects. The results are disseminated to the targeting team. The targeting team must keep the following in mind:

- BDA must measure that which is important to the commander, not what is easily measured.
- BDA must be objective.
- The degree of reliability and credibility of the assessment relies largely upon collection resources. The quantity and quality of collection assets reporting on the target significantly influence whether the assessment is highly reliable or has low reliability. The best BDA uses more than one collection asset to verify each conclusion.

Battle Damage Assessment Subcomponents

BDA may take different forms besides the determination of the number of casualties or the amount of equipment destroyed. Other information of use to the targeting team include the following:

- Whether the targets are moving or hardening in response to the attack.
- Changes in deception efforts and techniques.
- Increased communications efforts as the result of jamming.
- Whether the damage achieved is affecting the enemy's combat effectiveness as expected.

Each BDA has three subcomponents. They are as follows:

Physical Damage Assessment

These estimates provide a quantitative assessment on the extent of physical damage occurring through munitions blast, fragmentation, and/or fire damage effects to a target. This assessment is based on observed or interpreted damage.

Functional Damage Assessment

These estimates provide the effect of force applied on the functional or operational capability of the target to perform its intended mission compared to the operational objective established against the target. This assessment is inferred based upon all-source intelligence and includes an estimate of the time required for reconstitution or replacement of the target function. A functional damage assessment is a temporary assessment used for specific missions.

Target System Assessment

This is a broad assessment of the overall impact and effectiveness of the full spectrum of military operations against an entire target system's capability, for example, enemy air defense systems. It may also be applied against enemy unit combat effectiveness. A target system assessment may also address significant subdivisions of the system compared to the commander's stated operational objectives. A target system assessment is a relatively permanent assessment (compared to a functional damage assessment) that will be used for more than one mission.

Chapter 9

Operations Other Than War

Overview

Operations other than war (OOTW) encompass a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale combat operations usually associated with war. Although these operations are often conducted outside the United States, they also include military support to U.S. civil authorities. They may be regional in nature, may develop quickly, and may or may not be long term. A division employed in response to a crisis serves to contain or limit its immediate effects and strives to achieve the peaceful resolution of the issues that created it. There are two broad categories of OOTW based on the general goal — *operations to deter war and resolve conflict* and *operations to promote peace*.

The forward-deployed MAGTF integrated with the NEF is uniquely capable of conducting OOTW. Though trained and equipped primarily for combat, the division can be task-organized to meet the mission requirements of the contingency at hand from direct combat against a capable enemy force to the civil assistance necessary to maintain the basic essentials of life for a disaster-stricken populace.

OOTW are often conducted in a politically sensitive environment. Marines must consider every individual action as it may have significant political or operational impact. This places increased importance on small unit discipline, decentralized execution of lawful orders, cultural training, and proper use of individual language capabilities within the force. For example, one act of civil disturbance or intolerant treatment of civilians can turn a supportive populace against the force and be exploited by a potential adversary. This same act may become a lighting rod in turning domestic public opinion against a continued effort.

The commander must consider his activities in relation to similar activities carried out by agencies of the U.S. government, allies, and host nation, as well as nongovernment and private volunteer organizations. Additional considerations include —

- Media scrutiny will by extensive.
- Rules of engagement will be more restrictive.
- Identification of hostile parties may be more difficult.
- Military assets may be routinely used to support noncombat functions.
- Interaction with civilian noncombatants will be routine at every level of command.

Principles

Planning and conduct of OOTW should encompass consideration of the following five principles.

Objective

A clearly defined and attainable objective, with a precise definition of success, is critical. Multinational forces must come to a unanimous agreement as to what the objective is, recognizing that individual nations may desire to achieve it by vastly different means. Leaders of disparate organizations, military and otherwise, must understand the strategic aims, set appropriate objectives, and ensure that they contribute to overall unity of effort.

Unity of Effort

This principle is similar to unity of command associated with combat operations. In OOTW, unity of effort may be more difficult to attain because ad hoc alliances, coalitions, and the introduction of nonmilitary agencies will pose unique problems of coordination and cooperation. Organizations such as the United Nations, NATO, the State Department, the

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other regional alliances establish the political, economic, military, and psychological atmosphere of the operation. The MEF and division will normally support the efforts of these organizations and the host nation. Multinational command relationships may be loosely defined. This will require senior military and political decisionmakers to be on the scene as early as possible and commanders to emphasize cooperation and coordination rather than command authority to achieve objectives.

In multinational coalitions, even if unity of command is established, unity of effort may still be elusive. The division commander must understand that participating forces will be compelled to take direction from their own national authorities and respond to their own national interests. Likewise, most participating forces receive logistical support through their own sustainment system.

Security

Security deals primarily with force protection and protection of civilian noncombatants. The presence of military forces may generate opposition by various elements that adhere to different social, political, or military objectives. These factions might attack the force to gain legitimacy, weaken U.S. or international resolve, or undermine the authority of the host government. U.S. forces are a particularly lucrative target as they represent the world's sole superpower, and may have difficulty appearing as impartial under a scrutinizing media. Protected parties may be perceived as supporting or supported by the U.S. government. This perception could place that organization at greater risk. Division units must maintain constant vigilance regardless of their apparent acceptance by the population. They must be ready to exercise their inherent right to self-defense by rapid transition from peaceful activities to a combat posture.

Restraint

Rules of engagement (ROE) are established by the commander in chief (CINC) and based on National Command Authorities' (NCA) guidance, mission, threat, law of war, and host nation restraints on force deployment. These rules are communicated to the division through the chain of command. ROE must be thoroughly briefed, understood, and enforced by all Marines. The use of force is characterized by the judicious and prudent selection, deployment, and employment of forces most suitable to the situation. This never precludes units from exercising their inherent right to self-defense or the application of appropriate combat power to demonstrate U.S. resolve. Changes to ROE are made by requesting supplemental guidance through the chain of command. Meanwhile, the division commander should publish his own unclassified *"Commander's Guidance on the Use of Force"* to ensure every individual understands the restrictions. Intelligence plays an important part in developing ROE as required by the changing situation. Anticipation of unforeseen conditions and timeliness of getting changes approved is critical. For OOTW, the division commander develops his guidance with the following in mind:

- Explain the mission and commander's intent.
- Assess the threat accurately.
- State guidance clearly.
- Recognize that use of force is justified in self-defense.
- Anticipate that guidance is subject to change.

Legitimacy

Legitimacy of the operation and host government must be maintained. During operations where a legally constituted government does not exist, extreme caution must be applied when dealing with indigenous individuals and organizations. The appearance of formal U.S. recognition when such U.S. support does not exist must be avoided. The division commander should incorporate psychological operations/public affairs programs in his planning to influence both foreign and domestic perceptions. Activities that attempt to solve immediate problems yet undermine the authority or legitimacy of the host government may undermine our ultimate aim.

Agencies Routinely Involved in OOTW

The division can expect to work in cooperation with a variety of agencies and private organizations not normally encountered during combat operations when conducting OOTW. Though most coordination and liaison with these organizations is conducted

by the MEF, the division commander and staff can expect these organizations to be participants in the operation and to provide significant expertise and resources to the overall effort.

Department of State

The Department of State (DOS) is responsible for the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy. In a given country, DOS authority is delegated to one of several principal staff assistants.

Regional Liaison

Regional liaison groups are established as necessary to ensure coordination of planning in the field and provide advice and guidance in operations planning and execution.

Emergency Action Committee

The Emergency Action Committee (EAC) is the point of contact for DOS/DOD evacuation site interface. Its mission is to brief, coordinate, and plan for the evacuation or protection of U.S. noncombatants and certain designated aliens in case of emergency. It normally consists of DOS representatives, local U.S. government representatives/country, third country nationals, and host nation personnel.

Country Team

The country team consists of the ranking representatives of embassy sections and other U.S. government agencies operating within a country. Chaired by the ambassador or the deputy chief of mission, the country team meets regularly to advise the ambassador on U.S. matters and to review current developments in the country.

U.S. Agency for International Development

USAID is an agency under the policy direction of DOS that coordinates U.S. foreign assistance efforts. In peace support operations, the armed forces will work closely with USAID staff. Foreign economic assistance provided by USAID includes grants, loans, funding for infrastructure, and food administered in cooperation with the Department of Agriculture. USAID efforts are focused on four areas:

- **Use of market forces.** Stimulation of market economies and investment by U.S. companies in developing nations.
- **Institution building.** Improvement of schools, colleges, training organizations, supportive government ministries, and other institutions to support economic growth.
- **Policy dialog.** Emphasis on policy reform to advance development.
- **Technology transfer.** Transfer of technology to help countries produce their own resources.

U.S. Aid Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

The U.S. Aid Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (AOFDA) is the federal agency responsible for providing prompt nonmilitary assistance to alleviate loss of life and suffering of foreign disaster victims. AOFDA may request DOD assistance during humanitarian assistance operations.

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) coordinates federal, state, and local resources on issues of national security emergency preparedness, civil defense, continuity of mobilization preparedness, and continuity of government and technological disasters within the U.S., territories and possessions.

American Red Cross

The American Red Cross operates under Congressional charter and fulfills peace support operations obligations primarily in the U.S. However, it does operate internationally. International support that may involve the Red Cross includes assistance to disaster victims, blood programs and education, and support to other Red Cross societies during crises.

World Health Organization

The main focus of the World Health Organization is health program development. World Health Organization representatives work directly with any existing health organization concerning health program development. During emergencies, they may be able to provide advice and guidance, mobilize specialists, and provide urgently needed medications

and supplies. For normal operational matters in a country, they depend on the regional director, while during emergencies they may deal directly with both their regional offices and the World Health Organization headquarters.

United Nation's Children's Fund

United Nation's Children's Fund (UNICEF) provides health services, emergency food relief, and education programs.

InterAction

InterAction is an association of 154 U.S.-based, private, humanitarian organizations working throughout the world. The central focus of its members is to alleviate human suffering and to promote sustainable development. Members of this association include agencies such as CARE, International Aid, Inc., and Food for the Hungry.

Civil Military Operations Center

The civil military operations center (CMOC) is an agency that coordinates execution of military and U.S. assistance (as appropriate) for relief operations. It can serve as the primary interface between all humanitarian organizations and military forces. A CMOC is normally established at the JTF level. Key members of the CMOC should include selected JTF and Service component staff members and DOS, AOFDA, and disaster assistance response team (DART) representatives. To ensure continuous coordination and cooperation among all the players in the region, members of the CMOC, as well as U.N. agencies representatives, military liaison personnel from participating countries, representatives from nongovernmental and private volunteer organizations, and representatives from other governmental agencies should meet frequently to discuss problems and coordinate actions. This will facilitate better communications among all participants in the operation. A sample CMOC organization is depicted in figure 9-1.

Types Of Operations Other Than War

OOTW can be characterized as *operations to deter war and resolve conflict* and *operations to promote peace.*

Operations to Deter War and Resolve Conflict

In spite of internal or external efforts to promote peace, factions within a country or region may resort to armed conflict. A deteriorating situation may require military force to demonstrate U.S. resolve and capability, support the other instruments of national power, or terminate the situation on favorable terms. The general goals of U.S. military operations during periods of conflict are to support national objectives, deter war, and return to a state of peace. These operations involve a greater risk as they may escalate into large-scale combat operations. Operations to deter war and resolve conflict include the following:

Support to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

The U.S. may support insurgencies that share U.S. values and counterinsurgencies of friendly governments against insurgents that proclaim support of ideology incompatible with U.S. national interests. Fundamental to supporting insurgencies or counterinsurgencies is the recognition of the political, economic, and/or ideological motivation of the insurgent movement. Leaders must understand the culture of the population and the geographical nature of the country or countries involved. This understanding is critical to the decision to commit U.S. forces, the extent of the military operation, and the threat the insurgency poses to our national interests.

Support to Insurgency

Since most insurgencies are covert, MEF support may be limited to supporting the efforts of special operations forces. Division support to insurgencies will principally involve training and advising insurgent forces in unconventional warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures. Insurgency support is classified as a special activity and is subject to approval by the U.S. Congress.

Support to Counterinsurgency

The division may be tasked to provide support across the full range of conventional capabilities to the supported government against a hostile insurgent force. The division may be employed to support counterinsurgencies by assisting with foreign internal defense, training of military and law enforcement personnel, and the conduct of strikes, raids, and limited ground



Figure 9-1. Sample Composition of a CMOC.

combat. Though the division may participate in combat operations in support of a friendly country's counterinsurgency effort, in many instances, this active role may detract from the political legitimacy and effectiveness of the host government. Therefore, the employment of the division and its contribution to the host nation must be continually assessed based on the changing situation. The spectrum of support provided by the division includes —

- Advisory and training assistance.
- Intelligence support.
- Logistic support.
- Civil-military operations.
- C^2 support.
- Combat operations.

Combating Terrorism

Terrorism is designed to influence public support for a stated policy or program by successful attacks against citizens and property. Terrorist attacks may reduce the credibility of the U.S. or diminish the Nation's ability to influence international events. The lead agency for combating terrorism overseas is the DOS, within the U.S. is the Department of Justice. The DOD is responsible for providing technical assistance and/or forces when directed or requested by one of these lead agencies. Since terrorism can be international in scope and, in some instances, aided and abetted by state sponsors, the threat posed to U.S. citizens and security interests abroad may require a U.S. military response. The two levels of response are categorized as counterterrorism and antiterrorism.

Counterterrorism

Counterterrorism is the offensive portion of combating terrorism and involves the employment of forces to directly address terrorist situations including preemptive, retaliatory, and rescue operations. The extent of division participation depends upon location, type of incident, the degree of force required, and the impact of legal and political constraints. National assets are normally used to conduct

counterterrorism operations. A forward-deployed MEF or division unit in striking distance of a terrorist action may be tasked to support an in-extremis effort.

Antiterrorism

Antiterrorism is the deterrence of terrorism through active and passive measures. The basics of such a program begin with a well-trained division, continuing actions, and security procedures. It also includes the collection and dissemination of timely threat information, the conduct of information awareness programs, personal training, and coordinated security plans. Protective plans and procedures are based on the threat and should strike a reasonable balance between protection, mission requirements, the criticality of assets and facilities, and available manpower and resources. The division may provide antiterrorism assistance to foreign countries as part of the overall U.S. military foreign internal defense and development programs. This support may include training in bomb detection and disposal, physical security, and the detection, deterrence, and prevention of acts of terrorism.

Show of Force

Show of force lends credibility to U.S. policies and commitments, increases its regional influence, and demonstrates resolve. In shows of force, the division plans for combined and joint training exercises and the transition to combat operations. As with other contingency operations, the division plan must support regional campaign and operation plans. The division plans training that supports its requirements and facilitates transition to combat operations. This requires —

- Coordinating in detail with other Services and the host nation.
- Developing a training plan.
- Selecting ranges and training areas located in or near the terrain where combat operations may occur.
- Maintaining and positioning the basic load of ammunition.
- Planning deception.
- Conducting rehearsals.
- Planning fire support.
- Establishing reconnaissance and surveillance locations.
- Establishing security.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) remove threatened civilian noncombatants from locations in a foreign nation. The methods and timing for the evacuation will be significantly influenced by diplomatic considerations. NEO may entail the evacuation of U.S. citizens and/or citizens of nonbelligerent countries and the host nation. Ideally, there is no opposition to an evacuation and it will be supported by the host country. However, the division commander must be prepared to participate in NEO in a hostile environment that requires the use of force. NEO resembles a raid in that it involves the swift introduction of forces, evacuation of the noncombatants, and a planned withdrawal. Detailed coordination is required between the MEF and the representatives of the DOS responsible for U.S. interests in the region. The U.S. Ambassador, or Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, is responsible for the preparation and update of the regional Emergency Action Plan that covers the military evacuation of U.S. citizens and other designated foreign nationals. Execution of the military portion of the Emergency Action Plan is the sole responsibility of the supporting military commander.

Recovery

Recovery operations are sophisticated activities requiring detailed planning and precise execution, especially when conducted in hostile areas. When conducted by the military, recovery operations may be clandestine or overt. They may include the recovery of U.S. or friendly foreign nationals or sensitive equipment critical to U.S. national security. Recovery operations may be conducted by specially trained units or conventional forces organized into raid forces.

Attacks and Raids

Attacks and raids may be conducted by the division to create situations which permit seizing and maintaining the political initiative. Successful attacks and raids place considerable pressure on governments and groups supporting terrorism. The decision to execute an attack or raid must include precise

identification of the target to ensure that its neutralization will produce the desired political effect.

Maritime Interception Operations

Maritime interception operations (MIO) consist of port denial and vessel intercept. Port denial is the act of prohibiting access to specific ports to prevent the import/export of contraband. Vessel interceptions are based on international law associated with maritime visit and search. Boarding parties exercising the right of visit and search may be placed on merchant ships to examine ship's documents, bills of lading, and cargo, searching for evidence of contraband. The division may be tasked to provide forces to conduct boarding operations or support to naval special warfare units conducting the intercept.

Peace Operations

There are three distinct types of peace operations — *peacemaking, peace enforcement,* and *peacekeeping.* **Peacemaking** is primarily a diplomatic process beyond the purview of military personnel. The division may conduct the following missions in support of peace operations.

Peace Enforcement

Peace enforcement includes appropriate forceful military actions to separate belligerents involved in a conflict, with or without their consent. Forces employed in peace enforcement conduct all doctrinal military operations to force a cessation of hostilities.

Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping operations support diplomatic efforts to maintain peace in areas of potential conflict. They stabilize a conflict between belligerent nations or factions and require the consent of all parties involved in the dispute. It may be more appropriately referred to as truce-keeping since a negotiated truce is maintained. The most important requirements for a peacekeeping operation are a negotiated truce and consent to the operation by all the parties in a dispute. Peacekeeping often involves ambiguous situations requiring the peacekeeping force to deal with extreme tension and violence without becoming a participant. The essential elements that must be present at the time a peacekeeping force is established, as well as throughout its operation, include the following:

- The consent, cooperation, and support of the authorities of all the parties in the conflict.
- Political recognition of the peacekeeping operation by most, if not the entire, international community.
- A clear, restricted, and realistic mandate or mission with specified and easily understood rules of engagement (ROE).
- Sufficient freedom of movement for the force and observers to carry out their responsibilities.
- An effective C^2 system.
- Well-trained and impartial forces.
- An effective and responsive all-source intelligence gathering and dissemination capability.
- Coordinated logistic support of the force.

Preventive Deployment. Preventive deployment is the deployment of a multinational force where a conflict threatens to occur. It requires neither a truce nor a peace plan between the potential belligerents. The force deploys at the request of any of the parties involved, without agreement between belligerents except to the specific tasks. The division's tasks may include —

- Interposing itself in order to forestall violence.
- Protecting the delivery of humanitarian relief.
- Assisting local authorities to protect and offer security to threatened minorities.

Internal Conflict Resolution Measures. Internal conflict resolution measures are the actions taken by a multinational force to restore and maintain an acceptable level of peace and security. They are appropriate to conditions where there is a dispute in which the parties may be less easy to identify than in conventional conflict, and the presence of a multinational force may not enjoy local consent. Although the level of violence may be low and sporadic, the danger to multinational personnel is greater than in a conventional peacekeeping operation because the potential threat is difficult to identify.

Assistance to (Interim) Civil Authority. The task of the multinational force will be to supervise the provisions of the peace agreement and ensure that any transfer of power or the holding of elections will be

carried out fairly. The role of the military contingents is to maintain a level of security which allows the civil administration to function effectively.

Protection of Humanitarian Assistance Operations. These operations entail the employment of a military force to ensure the safe and uncontested delivery of relief supplies and resources. A joint, multinational task force organized for relief protection will need to focus on three main tasks — establishing a mounting base; ensuring delivery of resources; and providing security for the victim population at the delivery site. A multinational relief protection operation may have several of the following characteristics:

- The in-country delivery of relief must be mounted through a secured forward base and not directly from donor nation to victim community.
- Some element of local armed opposition may be encountered but it is unlikely that it will be of such strength to require intensive combat operations.
- Protection of delivery should be planned with the cooperation of regional neighboring states.
- The response agencies, both nongovernmental organizations and the military force, should be coordinated. This can be done by an organization designed to coordinate the needs of relief agencies with the capabilities of military units.

Operations to Promote Peace

Use of military forces in peacetime helps keep tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict and maintains U.S. influence in foreign lands. Such operations are typically joint in nature and may involve the MEF, forward-deployed MAGTFs, CONUS-based forces, or a combination of both.

Nation Assistance

The U.S. may accelerate security assistance when a friendly or allied nation faces an immediate military threat. Initial support is frequently focused on providing additional combat systems or supplies. Division support to security assistance surges may include the full range of training and logistic support.

Support to Counterdrug Operations

Illicit drug trafficking organizations undermine and corrupt regional stability. Because our national security directly depends on regional stability throughout the world, drugs have become a major concern of U.S. foreign policy. The Secretary of Defense's guidance directs an attack on the drug problem in three phases: at the source, in-transit, and in the U.S.

At the Source. The division may be tasked to assist the counterdrug efforts of cooperating foreign governments, agencies, and forces. This assistance is provided through training and operational support to host country forces, technical assistance, intelligence support, and collaboration with host nation law enforcement agencies to prevent the export of illegal drugs.

In-transit. The U.S. military is the lead agent for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime drug smuggling in-transit to the U.S., both outside the continental U.S. and at the borders and ports of entry of the Nation. The division can provide ground patrol and surveillance of the border areas and C^2 assets in support of these activities.

In the United States. Division units may provide support to Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies to include training in planning techniques and procedures, loan of military equipment, logistic support, use of aviation assets, assistance to community antidrug programs, and providing use of facilities.

Other Civil Support Operations

These operations encompass worldwide humanitarian assistance, military support to civil authorities, and military assistance for civil disturbances. The division, as part of a larger military operation, may assist in disaster relief, which includes support to displaced persons as well as humanitarian and civic assistance. Units can also augment domestic governments of the U.S. Such operations can include support to medical facilities, emergency response, and assistance to law enforcement agencies.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations use military personnel, equipment, and supplies to support emergency relief to victims of natural or man-made disasters in the U.S. and overseas. The division can provide or support logistic efforts to move supplies to remote areas; extract or evacuate victims; provide emergency communications, medical support, maintenance, maintenance of law and order; and civil engineering support. Historically, forward-deployed naval forces have been quick to respond to an emergency or disaster and the inherent flexibility and logistic capabilities of the NEF make it well suited to provide support to these operations.

Planning

Although combat actions differ significantly from peacetime activities, the process for tactical decision making is similar. While peacetime activities vary, division-level planning consists of four basic components — *mission analysis; task organization; logistic support;* and *command and control and communications*.

Mission Analysis

The mission analysis determines facts, assumptions, an analysis of the MEF mission and intent, and the commander's guidance.

Facts

The division staff provides the division commander pertinent facts.

G-1. The G-1 estimate includes —

- Division strength and statistics of low-density MOSs that may be critical to this particular mission.
- Preparation for overseas movement status of the division.
- Language-specific requirements and numbers of language-qualified personnel.

G-2. The G-2 prepares a detailed IPB for the AO that includes —

- Terrain analysis.
- Infrastructure assessment. A detailed analysis of transportation networks, airfields, port facilities, communications systems, power grids, urban areas with emphasis on capacity, system operations, and location of critical nodes.
- Weather. Climatic and environmental conditions for a region can affect the mission. For example, hot, humid areas may require the acclimation of personnel.
- Political, social, economic factors. Peacetime operations have high political visibility. The end state of peacetime military activities cannot exclude the receptiveness of the host nation population to U.S. forces, sources of political instability, ongoing insurgencies, cultural sensitivities, and standard of living.
- Threat. The G-2 identifies known threat capabilities which could affect operations and summarizes recent and present threat activities that may indicate future actions. In many cases, the threat may not be conventional forces but consist of police forces, paramilitary units, insurgent groups, or terrorist organizations.

G-3. The G-3 coordinates with the MEF and Marine force component, and U.S. government agencies to determine the scope of the operation and C^2 relationships. The G-3 plans and coordinates airlift, sealift, ground transport, and specialized training which may be required with other agencies. The G-3 uses current unit status reports and training readiness to determine units capable of conducting the operation.

G-4. The G-4 provides logistic status. The G-4 compiles detailed estimates for all classes of supply and equipment. He determines what combat-prescribed load lists are critical and increases quantities. The G-4 estimates the amount of support needed from the MEF and Marine component to support the operation. The G-4 also plans for redundancy of critical equipment to offset decreased repair and supply capability.

G-5. The G-5 reviews regional studies of AOs and, through the MEF staff, coordinates civil affairs and psychological warfare units. The G-5 also examines needs assessments conducted for the AO to see what actually must be done. The G-5 identifies the host nation agency responsible for the operation, the level of host nation participation, and points of contact within the host nation government.

Assumptions

Having identified the facts available, the division staff develops assumptions needed to replace necessary but missing facts and facilitate planning. Assumptions developed during the initial planning may include —

- Availability and type of transportation assets.
- Force protection requirements.
- Training requirements.
- Joint conventional and special operations participation.
- Security assistance organization role.
- Use of reserve forces.
- Other U.S. agency and private organization roles.
- Host nation requirements and expectations.
- Special equipment requirements.

Analysis of Mission and Intent

Once tasked to support peacetime military operations, the division staff analyzes the theater strategy, campaign plans, and concept plans of the gaining combatant command. The theater strategy articulates the CINC's vision for his theater. In most cases, it provides guidance, direction, and opportunities for peacetime operations in general terms. Campaign plans and concept plans identify theater objectives, sustainment concept, needed resources, and specified and implied tasks. Supporting plans developed by the Marine Service component command provide more definitive guidance on essential tasks.

Commander's Guidance

Commander's guidance can be the most critical element of the mission analysis during time of crisis and short notice warning, such as disaster relief and post-conflict operations. The commander issues guidance on task organization, logistic support, and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C^4I) arrangements.

Task Organization

Mission, available lift, in-theater support, and political factors drive task organization. The division task-organizes forces to be as self-contained as possible. It is critical to define command relationships for each subordinate unit.

Logistic Support

Logistic support may involve providing on-hand and contracted material and supplies to both U.S. and host nation forces and agencies. It can also involve developing logistic systems and infrastructures and procedures for host nation logistic personnel. The G-4 begins to plan for logistic support packages. He develops a concept for support and uses experienced logistic staff officers to ensure that the logistic system works smoothly.

Mission Requirements

The mission dictates the level and type of support needed. Logistic planners consider essential tasks to be accomplished by the division, terrain, and degree of interagency and host nation support.

Available Theater Support

Maximum reliance on theater support is critical to long-term sustainment of forces. Early coordination identifies all classes of supply, services, and direct support maintenance available. During disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations, the G-4 coordinates with the MEF on availability and movement of DOS- or FEMA-stockpiled relief supplies.

Force Protection

The division commander may determine that infantry forces are needed to provide sufficient force protection. He takes appropriate steps to ensure security of his units. Force protection focuses on two areas: conserving our ability to generate combat power and denying the enemy the ability to generate combat power. The commander implements protection of the division through his force protection plan. This plan addresses all components of protection including survivability, deception, and countermobility operations. This plan addresses both active and passive measures.

The political environment may cause a rapid transition from a relatively peacetime environment to conflict. Detailed ROE contain graduated responses to a changing environment. Some considerations include the use of riot control agents, use of snipers, stockpiling of basic loads, and augmentation by combat forces.

Legal Considerations

Generally, legal considerations for commanders conducting peacetime operations concern the use of proper funding authorizations for the type of mission being conducted. The staff judge advocate (SJA) is responsible for monitoring expenditures of Foreign Assistance Act funds and operations and maintenance funds.

Command and Control and Communications

Well-defined and effective C^2 structure and communications are essential to successful peacetime actions. Normally, the U.S. ambassador assumes responsibility for U.S. noncombat operations outside the U.S. He heads a country team that interfaces with civilian and military agencies. They are charged with ensuring that U.S. actions to accomplish regional and international objectives within a country are efficiently and economically administered. The regional command representative on the country team is the chief of the security assistance office (SAO). The defense attaché officer may also act as the chief of the SAO. The SAO or defense attaché can provide information on —

- U.S. ambassador's goals for the host nation.
- Current threat.
- Involvement of other agencies and points of contact.
- Current political situation.
- Usable supply routes.
- Airfields.
- Movement restrictions.
- Customs procedures.
- Host nation expectations.
- Other ongoing peacetime activities within the host nation.
- Terrain management.
- Airspace restrictions.
- Weapons restrictions.
- Extent of host nation role and support.

If time permits, on-site surveys are conducted and an advance party precedes deployment of the main body. At a minimum, the division headquarters advance party should consist of representatives of the G-2, G-3, G-4, G-5, G-6 sections and the SJA. Initial coordination is made with the MEF and the Marine component. In some cases, the division may be relieving another force. The advance party of the relieving unit then coordinates the following areas with the relieved unit:

- Transfer of property and supplies.
- Force protection plans.
- Contracting procedures.
- Completion status of projects.
- Engineering data.
- Environmental factors.
- Use of air and sealift for backhaul of relieved unit.
- Host nation support.

Peacetime military operations may often need special communications requirements due to the type of operation and the different agencies involved in the operation. Communications are planned to support communications with the JTF, combatant command, host nation, and other U.S. government agencies that may not have compatible equipment.

Negotiation and Mediation

The division commander or one of his subordinates may find himself in the role of negotiator, mediator, and even arbitrator at the point of a confrontation. If possible, negotiations on matters affecting both parties should be carried out jointly with the two sides and should be conducted by specially organized negotiation teams that appear neutral to the belligerents. A negotiator must be firm, tactful, and fair if he is to retain the trust of both parties. He must be careful not to pass the confidences of one side to the other.

Negotiations are not always successful. Agreements of all parties may or may not occur. The negotiator must remain neutral and avoid being used by either side. He must expect some of the belligerents to negotiate in bad faith. They may attempt to twist issues to their advantage to prolong negotiations while they continue to violate agreements. For further guidance on conducting negotiations, see figure 9-2.

Become familiar with the problem.

Collect all available evidence.

Determine if the issue has been raised before.

Determine what agreements or understandings have a bearing on the problem.

Be certain regarding the MEF commander's or peacekeeping force's policies on the issue.

Prepare for negotiation.

Select and prepare a meeting place acceptable to both parties.

Obtain adequate interpreters and communications assets.

Secure the meeting area and delegates from attack.

Ensure a common map edition and scale is used by both sides and the peacekeeping force.

Keep the MEF informed.

Conduct negotiations.

Remember the customary salutations and exchanges of courtesies.

Introduce yourself and any advisors. All delegates are introduced by name.

Use some introduction to make delegates feel at ease and to assess their mood.

Allow each side to state his case without interruption and premature judgments or concessions.

Make a record of issues presented by each side.

If one side makes a statement which is known to be incorrect, be prepared to produce evidence or proof to establish the facts.

If the peacekeeping force has a preferred solution, present it and encourage both sides to accept it.

Close the meeting by explaining to both sides exactly what has been agreed to and what action they are expected to take. Be prepared to present this in writing for signatures if necessary.

Figure 9-2. Guidelines for Conducting Negotiations.

Public Affairs and the Media

The news media will normally have a significant presence during OOTW, particularly those operations that are of relatively long duration. Since much of the public's understanding of the operation will be gained from reports generated by the media, it is critical that the commander establishes a coherent media policy and a working relationship with those media personnel within the theater. Whenever possible, public affairs assets are deployed with the force to ensure the media does not become a hindrance to operations, that important events receive media attention (when desired), and that details of the operation are accurately presented.

Public affairs officers should be viewed as operational planners. They establish information policy based on guidance received from the commander. A public affairs officer assigned to the division should plan and conduct media relations refresher training for the division. This training will enhance the division personnel's ability to address varied interests and agendas of the international media. When the division operates with a JTF, a Joint Information Bureau (JIB) should be established. A JIB representative should then attend briefings the division conducts for the media's benefit. Likewise, a division representative should attend meetings conducted at the CMOC.

There is a wide range of competence among members of the media. Most are professional and ethical. They often have no military background and will work to gather the facts. They may have sources of information not available to the commander and their ability to gather information should never be underrated. Most members of the media will remain impartial; however, some individuals have their own biases which are difficult, if not impossible, to overcome. International media will have a widely diverse perspective on the operation. In fact, some may be politically aligned with organizations with an opposing or unsympathetic view of the operation and the commander's position. Some general rules for dealing with the media include —

- Deal honestly and in a timely manner with the media.
- Aggressively counter inaccurate information.
- Allow the media to talk to the Marines. Guidance for the troops should include —
  - Feel free to talk to the media.
  - Stay within your area of expertise.
  - Do not speculate.
  - Do not comment on policy.
- Do not put the media into a position of appearing as agents of the force commander.
- Do not conduct staged events ("dog and pony shows").
- Conduct briefings on a regular basis to keep information flowing to and from the media.
- Understand the media's obsession with speed — maintain daily contact.
- Leaders must take the time to articulate their positions — use short, simple language.
- Realize that news is almost always skewed toward the side of those willing to talk to the media and against those that say "no comment."
- Realize there are reporters who do not want to be accurate — political spin may be interjected into an otherwise positive story.
- Do not take offense to honestly told stories of operational setbacks.

Postconflict Operations

The division may be required to transition from combat operations to postconflict operations. Postconflict operations focus on restoring order and minimizing confusion following the operation, reestablishing the host nation infrastructure, and preparing forces for redeployment. Under the guidance of the DOS and the JTF, the division may be directed to help reinforce or reestablish formal institutions eliminated during combat operations and improve postcombat population attitudes toward the U.S.

Many tasks that are not usually done by Marine forces may become the division's responsibility until host nation or U.S. government agencies reestablish presence. Postconflict operations increasingly become interagency in nature as the ambassador and country team resume a larger role. The objective of these activities is to return to an environment of peace as expeditiously as possible, but also to increase the probability of sustained peace.

The division consolidates in key locations and reorganizes during the initial stages of postconflict operations. During this time, equipment and facilities are repaired, EPWs are processed, and units are repositioned and prepared for future operations. The division may simultaneously conduct peacetime activities and search and attack missions. The priority of effort is always to bring combat operations to a satisfactory conclusion. As hostilities terminate, the division prepares to task organize and direct its efforts toward peacetime activities.

The G-5 begins to coordinate civil affairs operations within the division AO. The division tasks available civil affairs (CA) units to —

- Identify available local resources, facilities, and support.
- Assist the commander in meeting legal and moral obligations to the local populace.
- Serve as liaison with other U.S. government agencies and the host nation.
- Assist the G-2 in assessing the current threat.
- Act as the staff focal point for cultural considerations.
- Conduct a needs assessment of the local populace.
- At the request of the host nation, establish a temporary civil administration to maintain law and order and to provide life-sustaining services until the host nation can resume normal operations.

Subordinate units of the division not involved in combat operations may be tasked by the division to —

- Assist in the performance of law and order functions in urban areas.
- Provide security.
- Establish contact with rural, isolated populace.
- Assist special operations forces to stabilize rural areas of dissent.
- Implement programs designed to disarm the populace.
- Respond to threats to the host nation government at the request of the host nation and the country team.
- Train host nation self-defense forces.
- Assist in reconstruction of urban areas.
- Provide humanitarian assistance.

Chapter 10

Combat Service Support

Overview

Combat service support provides the essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces. CSS functions include, but are not limited to, providing supply, maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health services, and other services required to permit supported units to accomplish their mission.

Principles of Combat Service Support

The principles of combat service support are applied based on METT-T. The principles are guides for planning, organization, management, and execution. The principles of combat service support are as follows:

- **Responsiveness.** Responsiveness is the provision of the right support at the right time and in the right place. Among the principles of combat service support, the principle of responsiveness is the most critical.

- **Simplicity.** Simplicity is avoidance of complexity. It fosters efficiency in both the planning and execution of CSS operations. Mission-type orders and standardized procedures contribute to simplicity.

- **Flexibility.** Flexibility is the ability to adapt CSS structures and procedures to changing situations, missions, and concepts of operations.

- **Economy.** Economy is the provision of support at the least cost in terms of the resources available and is necessary to accomplish the mission.

- **Attainability.** Attainability is the ability to provide the essential supplies and services required to begin combat operations.

- **Sustainability.** Sustainability is the ability to maintain support throughout the operation. Sustainability is an element of military capability.

- **Survivability.** Survivability is the inherent capacity of the organization and its capabilities to prevail in the face of potential destruction.

Functional Areas of Combat Service Support

The six functional areas of combat service support provide a basis for an integrated, analytical approach to the process of planning and executing logistic support operations. They focus on the readiness and sustainability aspects of military capability.

Supply

Supply is the procurement, distribution, maintenance while in storage, and salvage of supplies, including the determination of kind and quantity of supplies. Supplies are all items necessary for the equipment and maintenance, and operation of military forces. FMFM 4-27, *MAGTF Supply Operations* (under development), provides a comprehensive discussion of the supply function. For planning, management, and administrative purposes, supplies are divided into ten classes, with particular emphasis on classes I, III, V, and IX for the division.

Class I

Subsistence, including gratuitous health and welfare items.

Rations. Front-line units carry enough combat rations in organic combat vehicles to last 3-5 days. When the situation permits, hot meals may be prepared. It is normal, however, for division units to use combat rations during combat operations. Rations are delivered by the FSSG to supply points in the division rear area based on strength, environmental conditions, and duration of the operation. Within the division, supply point and unit distribution is used. The table of organization (T/O) is useful for determining the requirements for food items. Also, the table of authorized material (TAM), under the class I section, contains data for computation of requirements and packing data.

Water. Water requirements depend on the tactical situation, personnel consumption, vehicle maintenance, decontamination, bath/shower/laundry availability and frequency, and method of transport/resupply. When calculating the amount of water necessary, use the T/O in determining total number of personnel. The table of equipment (T/E) is useful in determining what equipment is available to carry and store water. FMFRP 4-18, *Bulk Liquids Operations* (under development), provides detailed information for computing water requirements. Water distribution is made through water points operated by the FSSG. Water distribution within the division may be directed by the division G-4.

Class II

Clothing, individual equipment, tentage, organizational tool sets and tool kits, hand tools, and administrative and housekeeping supplies and equipment. These supplies are normally issued through supply point distribution. However, isolated units may receive these items through unit distribution. Requests are forwarded to the division G-4, then to the FSSG for items not stocked at the division.

Class III

POLs: petroleum fuels, lubricants, hydraulic and insulating oils, preservatives, liquid and compressed gases, bulk chemical products, coolants, deicing and antifreeze compounds, together with components and additives of such products; and coal. The G-4 and the FSSG work together to plan fuel resupply requirements. In developing the plan, they determine handling, storage, and movement capabilities; analyze the tactical plan; and establish fuel requirements. The T/E provides the amount of equipment which require fuel. The TAM provides planning data for climate conditions, oils, and greases. It also provides a listing of POLs and planning data for all fuel consuming vehicles and equipment in the Marine Corps inventory. FMFRP 4-18, *Bulk Liquids Operations* (under development), provides detailed information for computing class III requirements.

Class IV

Construction: construction materials, to include installed equipment and all fortification/barrier materials. The TAM provides data on individual engineer construction materials (i.e., barbed wire, sandbags, and lumber).

Class V

Ammunition: ammunition of all types (including chemical, biological, radiological, and special weapons), bombs, explosives, mines, fuses, detonators, pyrotechnics, missiles, rockets, propellants, and other associated items. The objective is to provide ammunition as far forward as possible to relieve the burden on the using units since they themselves will be limited in their ability to conduct normal resupply. Planning is the key to successful ammunition resupply. MCO 8010.1_ contains combat planning rates for each type of unit/weapon. Planning must include —

- Basic loads.
- Required supply rate.
- Controlled supply rate.
- Movement capabilities.

Basic Loads. The unit's basic load is that quantity of ammunition that must be on hand to sustain it until resupply can be accomplished. Commanders at all levels must carefully analyze the directed basic load and recommend changes as required. The basic load should not exceed what the unit can carry in organic transportation. Units that are not uploaded must establish and frequently exercise loading plans to reduce deployment time. Upload plans should be continually reviewed and revised.

Required Supply Rate (RSR). The RSR development is the responsibility of the G-3, in consultation with

the G-4. Early in the planning process, a gross requirement may be necessary. Using the best information available, the G-3 considers the concept of operation and the number and types of weapons to be armed. The subordinate units develop RSRs. These rates are determined at the fighting position for each weapon and include a detailed analysis of the requirements for the weapon. Leaders determine the number of targets that may appear and the number that can be engaged in a given period of time. RSRs are consolidated and coordinated by the G-4 who compares requirements with ammunition availability. The RSR is expressed in terms of rounds per weapon per day or DOA.

Controlled Supply Rate (CSR). The G-3 and G-4, in coordination with the FSSG, establish the CSR for those munitions in short supply. The CSR is the number of rounds per weapon per day that will be available to the tactical commander. The division CSR is published to provide regiment and separate battalion commanders with their unit's allocation of short supply ammunition.

Movement Capabilities. The G-4 must determine how the ammunition will be moved to the using unit. He coordinates with the FSSG on the location of the ammunition supply point and the volume of ammunition that will be moved by FSSG transportation assets to the division's ammunition transfer points. When possible, the FSSG vehicles move ammunition directly to an ammunition transfer point in the regimental trains areas. A comprehensive movement plan must be developed and exercised to ensure that the combat forces can be adequately supported. If the ammunition transfer point does not have the requested quantities, the combat unit goes to the ammunition supply point. Other techniques to reduce handling, conserve transportation, and streamline the resupply system include —

- Preconfigured loads for high-demand consumers.
- Prepositioning high-demand ammunition.
- Establishing type-loads for each type of unit.
- Establishing trailer transfer points.
- Using throughput delivery to the consumer.
- Positioning small stocks near unit battle positions.

Class VI

Personnel demand (nonmilitary sales items): Because exchanges are not usually brought into forward areas early on in an operation, the sundries pack provides units with exchange items until exchanges are established.

Class VII

Major end items: a final combination of end products which is ready for its intended use; e.g. launchers, tanks, mobile machine shops, and vehicles. The T/E provides allowances for major end items. The TAM provides the combat active replacement factor (CARF) which reflects the anticipated combat attrition of equipment on a monthly basis. Consideration should be given to weapon systems replacement operations. The intensity of future battles will produce heavy losses of both personnel and material. It is imperative that weapon systems and complete crews be replaced quickly and efficiently. Weapon system replacement operations is a method of supplying the commander with fully operational replacement weapon systems, both vehicle and crew.

The division manages and allocates weapon systems based on priorities established by the division commander. The division provides replacement weapon systems directly to the subordinate units. When there are insufficient weapon system replacements to meet requirements, the commander or G-3 establishes assignment priorities.

Class VIII

Medical material, including medical unique repair parts. The authorized medical allowance list (AMAL) and authorized dental allowance list (ADAL) assists in determining the initial issue of medical and dental supplies.

Class IX

Repair parts and components, to include kits, assemblies and subassemblies, repairable and nonrepairable, required for maintenance support of all equipment. During the predeployment phase, a class IX block is tailored to support the division. The block is built based on historical usage rates.

Class X

Material to support nonmilitary programs; e.g., agricultural and economic development, not included in classes I-IX.

Distribution

The two normal methods of distribution are *supply point distribution* and *unit distribution*. Supply point distribution is the method of distributing supplies in which the receiving unit is issued supplies at a supply point (depot, airhead, railhead, combat train site, distribution point) and moves the supplies in organic transportation. Unit distribution is the method of distributing supplies in which the receiving unit is issued supplies in its own area, the transportation being furnished by the issuing agency. The receiving unit is then responsible for its own internal distribution.

Distribution Method Selection

As a general rule, the division commander must use a combination of unit distribution and supply point distribution. He gives first priority for unit distribution to those engaged units having limited organic transportation. He gives lesser priority to engaged units having organic transportation. He assigns the lowest priority to units which are not in contact with the enemy.

From the consumers' viewpoint, unit distribution is the preferred method. However, the division seldom has enough transportation assets to permit unit distribution to all organizations. The division commander must make the decision on the type of distribution. He makes his decision based on an analysis and recommendations from the CSSE/ACE commander. A decision to use unit distribution has a significant impact on the distribution system.

When the division commander selects unit distribution, the CSSE/ACE commander develops the transportation network from the supported organization to the rear. Their planning must stop when they use up all available equipment. This may generate shortages in rear areas. The CSS units may be unable to move enough supplies among wholesale and retail activities. Conversely, the CSSE/ACE commander may develop the transportation network from the rear forward, relying on supply point distribution. This has significant impact on tactical operations. It may restrict operations for units which have limited organic transportation.

Trains

A train is a means of internally task-organizing and employing the organic CSS assets of the tactical unit. They are the link between the forward/subordinate elements of the tactical units and the supporting CSSE. The organization and capabilities of trains vary with the mission and tactical situation. Depending on the type of unit and the transportation available, trains may be fully mobile. Usually trains are moveable rather than mobile. Ordinarily, trains are used at the regiment and battalion levels. Regimental trains may consist of the S-1 and S-4, a limited staff, and their equipment. Regimental trains are normally located in the regiment's rear area. The regimental S-4 is responsible for the support areas selected, relocation, security, and operations of the trains. These must be coordinated with the division G-4 to ensure continuous support. See FMFM 4-27, *MAGTF Supply Operations* (under development), for a complete discussion of the trains concept.

Unit Trains. Unit trains centralize the CSS assets of the supported unit at a single location under the control of the unit commander. Unit trains are most appropriate in the defense or in low tempo operations. The commander uses this option when the tactical situation dictates self-contained train operations. On occasion, the terrain may require this configuration. Unit trains provide simplicity, economy, and survivability against ground attack.

Battalion Trains. Normally, trains supporting battalion-sized units will be echeloned into *combat trains and field trains*. Combat trains are organic elements which provide critical combat service support in forward areas. Combat trains are tailored for the tactical situation. They contain POL; ammunition and other ordnance items; maintenance contact teams with a recovery and limited repair capability; and medical support. The exact composition depends on METT-T. The combat trains area must not take up space needed by the forward units, and supply and maintenance vehicle traffic must not impede the freedom of movement of combat and combat support units. Combat trains at the battalion level will normally include the battalion aid station. Field

trains consist of the remaining organic CSS elements located further to the rear. The commander selects this option to improve responsiveness, flexibility, and survivability against air attack. This option is preferable when the unit is in the offense.

Positioning

Seldom will a site be found which has all of the desired characteristics for the ideal train location; therefore, those characteristics most important to the mission and tactical situation should be given priority. The most important criterion is responsiveness and survivability.

A good train location has —

- Defensible terrain to allow the best use of limited personnel.
- Enough space to permit dispersion of both vehicles and activities.
- Concealment from hostile ground and air observation.
- Firm ground to support materials handling equipment operations and heavy ammunition and POL vehicles.
- A helicopter landing site for helicopter resupply and medical evacuation.
- An adequate road network between the train and the forward elements and between the train and the CSSE.
- Good communications with forward elements and with the supporting CSSE.
- A source of water.
- No terrain features which are obstacles to CSS operations or which give the enemy targeting sources.

Built-up areas are good locations for trains because they provide cover and concealment for vehicles and sheltered areas for maintenance at night. When located in built-up areas, trains should occupy buildings near the edge of the area to help prevent being cut off and trapped.

Displacement

Proper positioning of trains minimizes displacements and increases the quantity and quality of combat service support. When displacing trains, the technique most suitable to the tactical situation is selected. Trains may be displaced in their entirety concurrently with the maneuver unit or by echelon. Echelonment of the force trains will provide immediate responsive support, flexibility in usage, and increased survivability of assets. When trains are echeloned into combat and field trains, the S-4 will normally control the combat trains and designate the commander of the field trains. Echeloned displacement enhances continuity of combat service support.

Maintenance

Maintenance is all actions taken to retain material in a serviceable condition or to restore it to serviceability. It includes inspection and classification, servicing, adjustment, and tuning, testing and calibration, repair, modification, rebuild and overhaul, reclamation, and recovery and evacuation. FMFRP 4-15, *Commander's Guide to Maintenance*, provides a more detailed discussion of the maintenance function. There are three levels of maintenance — *organizational, intermediate,* and *depot.*

- **Organizational maintenance.** Organizational maintenance is that maintenance which is the responsibility of, and performed by, a using or owning organization on its assigned equipment. Its phases normally consist of inspecting, servicing, lubricating, adjusting, and the replacing of parts, minor assemblies, and subassemblies. Includes 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance.

- **Intermediate maintenance.** Intermediate maintenance is that maintenance which is the responsibility of and performed by designated maintenance activities for direct support of using organizations. It normally consists of calibration, repair, or replacement of damaged or unserviceable parts, components, or assemblies, the emergency manufacture of nonavailable parts, and providing technical assistance to using organizations. Some units (tank, AAV, and LAV) are authorized to perform certain intermediate maintenance. Includes 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance.

- **Depot maintenance.** Depot maintenance is that maintenance which is performed on material requiring major overhaul or a complete rebuild of parts, assemblies, subassemblies, and end items, including the manufacture of parts,

modifications, testing, and reclamation as required. Includes 5th echelon maintenance.

Repair and recovery are accomplished as far forward as possible at the lowest capable echelon of maintenance. When equipment cannot be repaired on site, it is moved only as far as necessary for repair. If unit maintenance personnel cannot repair the vehicle —

- Additional parts or major assemblies are sent forward, as required.
- Maintenance support teams, if not already on site, are sent forward with parts and equipment to assist in repair.
- The vehicle may be evacuated to the rear to await parts or more specialized maintenance support teams from FSSG.

It may be necessary to use controlled substitution (of parts) — selective interchange — in order to return other vehicles to combat. This decision must be based on the tactical situation and the capability of the unit and its support unit to deal with the specific maintenance/recovery problem. It is desired to allow controlled substitution to be made as close to the site of damaged equipment as possible, preferably by battalion maintenance officers. However, guidelines should be established by the division commander to preclude uncontrolled cannibalization of damaged vehicles. Maintenance collecting points can be established where designated forward support maintenance personnel determine which of the more seriously damaged vehicles should be subjected to selective interchange and which should be repaired and returned to action.

Transportation

Transportation is the movement from one location to another by means of railways, highways, waterways, pipelines, oceans, and airways. It includes movement by military and/or commercial assets. Throughput is the measurement of the transportation and distribution systems; sustainability is the product of the throughput system. FMFM 4-1, *Combat Service Support Operations*, contains a more detailed discussion of the transportation function. The subfunctions of transportation are —

- Embarkation.
- Landing support.
- Motor transport.
- Port and terminal operations.
- Air delivery.
- Freight/passenger transportation.
- Materials handling equipment.

General Engineering

Engineering support is always METT-T dependent. This requires extensive engineer intelligence derived from collection assets, topographic units, and engineer reconnaissance. The functions of engineering are mobility, countermobility, survivability, and general engineering. There are distinctions between the functions and the various types of engineer support, combat support, and combat service support organic to the MEF and division. CSS engineer support provided by the engineer support battalion of the FSSG is largely general engineering. It differs from combat and combat support engineering provided by the combat engineer battalion in that general engineering is a planned and coordinated activity not directly associated with the immediate support of the division. Refer to FMFM 13, *MAGTF Engineer Operations*, for a detailed discussion of engineering functions. Subfunctions of general engineering are —

- Engineer reconnaissance.
- Horizontal and vertical construction.
- Facilities maintenance.
- Demolition and obstacle removal.
- Explosive ordnance disposal.
- Utilities support.
- Mobile electric power.
- Hygiene and laundry services.
- Production and distribution of potable water.
- Bulk fuel storage.

Health Service

The objective of the health services system is to provide the care to preserve and restore the health of division personnel. This objective has two subordinate objectives. The first is to return ill or injured personnel to duty as soon as possible. The second is to reduce mortality and disability. The health services system must provide the best possible care to the sick and injured and promote good health and prevention of disease and injury. FMFM 4-50, *Health*

Service Support, provides a detailed discussion of the health service function. The subfunctions of health service include —

- Health maintenance
- Casualty collection
- Casualty treatment
- Temporary hospitalization
- Casualty evacuation

Patients are treated as far forward as possible. Those requiring a more sophisticated level of medical care are evacuated using complementary systems of ground and air ambulances. The normal chain of evacuation is from the point of injury or company collection point to the battalion aid station, to the treatment facility operated by the supporting medical company, to a combat zone hospital located in the MEF rear area.

Services

Services support the commander's decision-making process, the conduct of operations, and the morale of division personnel. See FMFM 4-1 for a detailed discussion of the services function. Subfunctions of services are —

- Disbursing.
- Postal.
- Exchange services.
- Security support.
- Information systems.
- Legal services.
- Civil affairs support.
- Graves registration.

Planning

The G-4 is responsible for planning logistic support for the division. The G-4's concept of support must be coordinated and integrated with the G-3's concept of operations. The concept of support, in fact, legitimizes the concept of operations. Throughout the planning for and execution of the operation, the G-4 must constantly reevaluate support requirements and unit capabilities. To provide responsive and sustained support, the G-4 must anticipate requirements which exceed organic capabilities.

The G-4 advises the division commander and G-3 on the readiness status of major equipment and weapon systems. He must keep abreast of the operational plans which the G-3 is formulating. The availability and contemplated employment of organic CSS assets influence his planning and his requirements determination.

The G-4 focuses on the identification of requirements, priorities, and allocations for CSS. The focal points of his efforts are MEF planning guidance and the tentative courses of action developed by the G-3. In view of the division's limited organic CSS capabilities, early and continuous liaison and coordination is required. The G-4 and his subordinate S-4s must constantly coordinate with the supporting FSSG units.

In coordination with the G-3, the division G-4 determine CSS requirements, assigns priorities, and allocates the CSS resources of the division. He coordinates with the MEF G-4 and FSSG G-3 concerning the integration of organic CSS capabilities. For example, he would coordinate the integration of truck company and assault amphibian battalion assets into the overall concept of combat service support.

The FSSG G-3 coordinates with the G-3 of the division to support development of their concepts of operations and schemes of maneuver. He coordinates with the division G-3 and G-4 to identify requirements and develop estimates of supportability for their concepts of operation. Based on the approved concepts of operation, the FSSG G-3 recommends the task organization of the FSSG.

Coordination

Liaison is essential for coordination of effort between supporting and supported units. Direct liaison between the elements of the MEF simplifies the completion of the staff effort.

Supported Unit Responsibilities

The division commander, through the coordinated efforts of his G-3/G-4 initiates detailed planning for combat service support. CSS planning by division units begin with determination of requirements, assignment of priorities, and allocation of resources.

Determination of Requirements. The division commander determines and identifies those CSS requirements beyond his organic capabilities necessary to accomplish his assigned mission. Assignment of a mission by the division to a subordinate unit implies that the division is responsible for providing the means to accomplish that mission. This entails a certain analysis of the capabilities of the subordinate unit to be sure the mission is appropriate to that unit. Such an analysis is part of the staff estimate process.

When a subordinate commander receives a mission, he is responsible for evaluating his specific capabilities and support requirements. He must evaluate his mission in terms of the specified and implied tasks involved in accomplishing that assigned mission. Deficiencies may require additional augmentation of a specific type. Within its organic capabilities, the division will provide assets to alleviate those deficiencies. Any other deficiencies that cannot be resolved by the division require a modified mission or procurement of more assets.

Assignment of Priorities. The division commander establishes and assigns priorities associated with the execution of the division concept of operations and scheme of maneuver. This assignment of priorities, in turn, will significantly affect the concept of support for combat service support developed by the FSSG.

Allocation of Resources. The division commander allocates available CSS resources to the subordinate units. This includes those assets which he desires to retain as a reserve. These allocations must support and complement his concept of operations. In large measure, they also reflect his previous decisions concerning requirements and priorities.

Tactical Timing. The division commander must concern himself with the tactical timing of combat service support and the availability of required support in time to support the scheme of maneuver. If he initiates tactical actions before logistic support is available, the commander is taking a substantial risk.

Lines of Communication. Lines of communication (LOC) link the sources of logistic support and the division's combat units. Overextended LOCs are vulnerable and require greater expenditures of transportation assets and time to support forward units. For this reason, commanders must frequently consider forward staging of critical CSS assets. Ideally, LOCs should be located so that shifts in direction of the operation can be accomplished without major shifts in the sustaining effort.

Supporting Unit Responsibilities

On a continuing basis, the FSSG commander, with the MEF G-4, advises the MEF commander on CSS capabilities and the methods which provide the best support of the MEF concept of operations. The FSSG commander advises the MEF commander of any deficiencies and recommends resolutions for those deficiencies. The FSSG commander must monitor and support the collective requirements of the entire MEF and the separate requirements of each element.

Supporting the Offense

The availability of adequate supplies and transportation to sustain the operation becomes more critical as the operation progresses. LOCs are strained, and requirements for repair and replacement of weapons mount. NBC contamination on the battlefield compounds these problems and degrades the performance of CSS units. CSS commanders and planners must anticipate these problems and ensure these considerations are included in their planning. During offensive planning, CSS considerations include —

- Forward positioning of essential combat service support such as ammunition, POL, and maintenance, preferably at night.
- Increased consumption of POL.
- Using preplanned and preconfigured push packages of essential items including classes I, II, III, V, and VIII supplies.
- Using throughput distribution whenever feasible.
- Attaching CSS elements to supported maneuver units; however, CSS elements need to be as mobile as the units they support.
- Echeloning support forward and initiating operations at the new site before ceasing operations at the old site.
- Using captured enemy supplies and equipment, particularly vehicles and POL.

- Planning for adequate communications between maneuver and CSS units.
- Preparing for increased casualties and requirements.
- Uploading as much material as possible.
- Ensuring that CSS preparations for the attack do not give away tactical plans.
- Coordinating terrain management to preclude attempted occupation by more than one unit.
- Planning for transition to the defense.

Supporting the Defense

The aims of CSS activities in the defense are to support defensive battles and to facilitate rapid transition to the offense. Defensive operations take many forms. They range from strictly positional to wholly mobile defenses. CSS commanders must be involved early in defensive planning. This allows them to plan support for the defense and to anticipate changing priorities. During defensive planning, CSS considerations include the following:

- Consider stockpiling limited amounts of ammunition and POL in centrally located battle positions in the forward portion of the main battle area that are likely to be occupied.
- Ensure the rear echelon monitors and tracks the ongoing battle to anticipate CSS requirements.
- Push forward tailored packages of support on a scheduled basis. These regular shipments of ammunition, POL, and previously requested repair parts to the combat trains help eliminate the need to call for supplies repeatedly. They reduce the chance that a lapse in communications will interrupt supply. Resupply continues until the receiving unit issues instructions to the contrary.
- Resupply during periods of reduced visibility to reduce enemy interference.
- Dispatch maintenance support teams forward to reduce the need to evacuate equipment.
- Consider providing the security forces with prepositioned stocks of critical supplies in subsequent defensive positions throughout the security force area.
- Plan for increased demand of decontaminants and MOPP equipment.
- Plan for high expenditures of ammunition.
- Plan for decreased vehicle maintenance.
- Plan for increased demand for obstacle and fortification materials.
- Establish ambulance exchange points for efficient use of ambulances.
- Coordinate with the G-5 concerning refugee control and CSS requirements.

Support for the Retrograde Operations

Combat Service Support for retrograde operations is particularly complex because many activities may be taking place concurrently. Maneuver units at any given time may be defending, delaying, attacking, or withdrawing. All must be supported under the overall retrograde operation. CSS elements must be prepared to —

- Echelon in depth and rearward.
- Limit the flow of supplies forward to only the most essential positions. All other supplies and equipment are evacuated early.
- Evacuate supplies and equipment to planned points along withdrawal routes.
- Keep supply and evacuation routes open and decontaminated.
- Evacuate patients early, develop alternate means of evacuation, and augment field ambulance capabilities when possible.
- Recover or evacuate equipment rather than risk being overrun while repairing at forward sites.
- Move all nonessential CSS units and facilitates to the rear as early as possible.
- Supply and evacuate at night and during other periods of limited visibility.
- Implement the division commander's policy of controlled exchange.
- Maintain full knowledge of the current tactical situation.

APPENDIX A

Notional Headquarters Echelon Organization



Figure A-1. Tactical Echelon Organization



Figure A-2. Main Echelon Organization



Figure A-3. Information Connectivity

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Appendix B

Tactical Decisionmaking

The division commander makes decisions and communicates decisions. The staff facilitates the commander's decisionmaking process and ensures that subordinates conduct operations within the intent of that decision. Tactical decisionmaking is a continuous and dynamic process that must allow decisions about current operations to occur simultaneously with the planning and decisions concerning future operations.

Rapid Planning

Rapid planning is that planning conducted in a time-sensitive environment. It is usually associated with crisis action where the division must act quickly in response to an immediate military need. Operations other than war (OOTW) such as noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), operations in support of diplomatic initiatives, and response to natural or manmade disasters are common, crisis-response operations. It should be noted that rapid planning is not planning by omission but an application of techniques designed to reduce the planning time requirements of a more deliberate planning process.

Deliberate Planning

Deliberate planning is most often associated with conventional military operations and is conducted prior to the onset of hostilities or in support of a future operational phase of an ongoing campaign. Deliberate planning involves the full participation of the staff and the coordinated consideration of the tactical situation and mission assigned. Rapid and deliberate planning are product-oriented, the product being the decision of the commander and the dissemination of that decision. The commander must still consider all factors when deciding which planning process to use, the overarching difference being the time available. An understanding of the deliberate planning process, therefore, becomes essential to planning in any environment.

Joint Planning

Planning of division operations are influenced by the planning conducted at the MEF and JTF or theater level. Joint force commanders (JFCs) receive guidance and direction from the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to the responsible theater commander. JFCs issue prioritized mission-type orders to subordinate commanders and define command relationships to facilitate mission accomplishment consistent with their concept of operations.

JFCs will conduct campaigns to accomplish their assigned mission. A *campaign* is a series of related joint major operations that consist of tactical, operational, and strategic operational objectives. A *campaign plan* describes how these operations are connected in time, space, and purpose. Within a campaign, major operations consist of coordinated actions in a single phase of a campaign, and they usually decide the course of the campaign. Campaigns must be kept simple and must be focused on clearly defined objectives. Complex plans will require more time and effort to plan and coordinate. Campaign planning is a continuous activity and is based on evolving assumptions.

Campaign plans establish command relationships among the subordinate commands by describing the concept of operations, assigning tasks and objectives, and task-organizing the force. Campaign plans —

- Provide broad concepts of operations and sustainment for achieving multinational, national, and theater strategic objectives.
- Provide an orderly schedule of decisions.
- Achieve unity of effort with air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces, in conjunction with interagency and multinational forces, as required.
- Incorporate the combatant commander's strategic and operational intent.

- Orient on the strategic center of gravity and operational critical vulnerabilities of the threat.
- Protect the friendly center of gravity and attack the enemy critical vulnerabilities.
- Phase the operation, as required.
- Establish the organization of subordinate forces and designate command relationships.
- Serve as the basis for subordinate planning and clearly define what constitutes success, to include termination objectives and potential post-hostilities activities.
- Provide strategic direction; operational focus; and tasks, objectives, and concepts to subordinates.
- Provide direction for the employment of nuclear weapons.
- Form the basis for developing supporting plans and the framework for the series of operations plans for phases of a campaign.

Supporting plans are prepared by supporting commanders to satisfy the requirements of the supported commander's plan. Typically, supporting command plans provide forces, force enhancements, or functional support such as logistics, communications, and transportation. They address such operations as NBC, mobilization, deployment, redeployment, and Service support operations.

Joint Task Force Staff Organization

The JFC will organize a staff as necessary to ensure accomplishment of the mission. The organization of the staff will depend on the tasks and responsibilities retained at the unified or joint force command level. The composition, location, and facilities of the unified or joint headquarters will have a major influence on what the commander and his staff can accomplish. The composition of the JFC's staff should reflect the nature of the forces assigned and the character of the contemplated operations to ensure expertise is resident in the staff concerning the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the force.

Arranging Joint Operations

JFCs will determine the best arrangement of major operations, often a combination of simultaneous and sequential operations to achieve the desired end state quickly with the least expenditure of resources. Geography, strategic lift, command structure, logistic build-up, and enemy capability are considered when commanders determine the arrangement of operations.

Phases

A phase represents a period during which a large portion of the force is involved in similar or mutually supporting activities. Phasing of operations may be sequential or concurrent. During planning, commanders establish the conditions for the transition from one phase to another, even though the point where one phase ends and another begins is often difficult to define in absolute terms. The commander adjusts the phases to exploit opportunities presented by the enemy or when benefits of a phase exceed or fall short of expectations. A transition to another phase, such as a shift from deployment to defensive operations, indicates a shift in emphasis.

Phasing assists commanders to think through the entire operation. The primary benefit of phasing is that it assists commanders in achieving major objectives that cannot be attained all at once by planning manageable subordinate operations to gain progressive advantages. The MEF and division commanders must consider the roles their organizations have in each phase. Campaign phasing considers aspects such as *prehostilities, lodgement, decisive combat and stabilization, follow-through,* and *post-hostilities.*

Prehostilities

Actions during a prehostilities phase may be initiating deterrence, seeking to set the terms for battle, and enhancing friendly freedom of action while containing enemy capabilities. The friendly force should not seek battle until it has set the terms or established the conditions for battle in its favor. The

prehostilities phase may also encompass predeployment activities such as task organization of the force, organization for deployment, and establishment of a viable C^2W and logistic infrastructure capable of supporting the JFC's concept of operations.

Lodgment

The lodgment phase allows the movement and buildup of a decisive combat force in the operational area. Establishment of a lodgment may require host nation ports and airfields or forcible entry followed by occupation and expansion of lodgment areas.

Decisive Combat and Stabilization

The decisive combat and stabilization phase initially focuses on the rapid buildup of joint force capabilities. Appropriate sequencing for forces into the operational area can contribute to the stabilization of the situation through the deterrent value of the deployed force. Should deterrence fail, the built-up capabilities allow the JFC to conduct decisive combat action as early as possible. Decisive action implies winning and may include control of enemy territory and population and destruction of the enemy's ability and will to continue.

Follow-Through

During a follow-through phase, the JFC conducts activities to bring the operation to a successful conclusion. These actions include ensuring political objectives are achieved and sustained. In essence, such a phase focuses on ensuring that the results achieved endure.

Post-Hostilities

JFCs may retain responsibility for operations, or they may transfer control of the situation to another authority and redeploy their forces. JFCs identify post-hostilities requirements as early as possible to accomplish these missions and simultaneously redeploy assets that are no longer needed to resolve the crisis.

Deliberate Planning Process

The command and staff action of the division for a specific mission is facilitated by the anticipatory planning of the staff. The staff determines preliminary estimates based on potential missions and the outcome of current operations in order to reduce the time required to arrive at a decision when a new mission is received. There are nine major steps in the deliberate planning process which are initiated on receipt of the mission. See figure B-1.

Receive the Mission

The receipt of the mission is not a planning step but the activity that initiates the division commander's planning process. The mission may be received via a number of means to include written orders, oral orders, electronic means, graphic depiction, or a combination of these methods. Missions may also be deduced by the commander based on the higher commander's intent or the outcome of a current operation. Regardless of how the mission is received, the commander initiates the planning process for the mission at hand and then issues a warning order to his subordinates. This initial warning order may lack specifics but provides information to the subordinate of a pending operational change. Warning orders are issued as required throughout the process in order to update subordinates sufficiently to prepare for the operation.

Mission Analysis

Mission analysis consists of command and staff actions related to determining information requirements through the gathering of facts and making assumptions, analysis of the MAGTF's mission and intent, and determination of the unit's mission and specified and implied tasks. The division commander's mission analysis is the first and perhaps the most important step in the planning process. It identifies for the commander and staff the salient tasks that must be performed in order to accomplish the assigned mission. Mission analysis is a continuous process, the products of which may be altered based on new intelligence or a changed tactical situation. A new mission, coming either from a higher headquarters or from the deduction of a mission through the analysis of the current operation, provides new direction to this continuous process for that particular operation.



Figure B-1. Staff Planning Steps.

Information Requirements

During the course of his mission analysis, the commander determines the information requirements on the area of operations, on the relative combat power of friendly and enemy forces, and on enemy capabilities. That information which is not available must be collected and integrated into the estimate process.

Facts. The staff determines facts concerning each staff officer's functional area. These facts provide the commander an accurate understanding of the current situation from which he may deduce assumptions and assessments of capabilities and operational factors.

G-1: The G-1 provides a current report on the personnel status of the organization, its subordinate units, and attached and supporting elements. The personnel status includes assessments of tangible and intangible factors such as —

- Personnel strengths and morale.
- Replacements and medical return to duty.
- Personnel readiness.
- Critical shortages.
- Host nation support.
- Military law/discipline.

G-2: The G-2 provides a description of the battlespace and threat. This description will be incomplete at this point but will be as accurate as current information and analysis permits. Detailed intelligence is developed through the IPB process. The results of the IPB process will —

- **Define the battlespace.** The area of interest is developed and evaluated in terms of depth, width, airspace, and time. This evaluation is designed to focus information collection in support of the CCIRs. Characteristics of the battlespace are identified which require in-depth study and evaluation of their potential effects on both friendly and enemy operations.

- **Describe the battlespace.** The G-2 evaluates the effects of the environment and identifies the opportunities and limitations that the environment offers to both friendly and enemy operations. Particular factors which are examined include —

  - **Terrain.** The division commander and staff must fully appreciate the opportunities and limitations afforded by the terrain and fit an operational concept to that environment. Particular attention is given to the military aspects of terrain — observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach and mobility corridors (OCOKA). This evaluation provides a variety of information to the staff including avenues of approach deep, and close, rear, key, and/or decisive areas.

  - **Weather.** Weather and visibility conditions create advantages and disadvantages for opposing forces. The commander and his staff must acquire an understanding of the prevailing climate and expected weather conditions to exploit the opportunities weather offers while minimizing its adverse effects.

  - **Infrastructure.** The transportation network, telecommunications system, power grid, and other manmade facilities can have a significant effect on the conduct of operations. The commander and his staff must be aware of the capabilities and functioning of the local infrastructure to support friendly operations or deny its usage to the enemy.

  - **Local population.** The presence of a local population cannot be ignored in the planning and conduct of combat operations. Key aspects of the local population which must be taken into consideration include the size and density, ethnic composition, religion, culture, political orientation, education, and level of health and sanitation.

- **Evaluate the threat.** The G-2 provides a detailed description of enemy forces in the area of interest. In addition to the basic order of battle information, the G-2 attempts to provide insight into the intangible factors that influence combat effectiveness — training, tactics, status of logistics, and leadership. The objective is to develop a picture of the enemy that highlights his strengths, uncovers his vulnerabilities, and identifies his center of gravity. In addition, the G-2 provides any indications of future enemy actions revealed during this evaluation.

G-3: The G-3 will determine the operational factors of concern to the commander based on the mission and friendly capabilities.

- **Mission and commander's intent.** The G-3 states the mission and intent of commanders that are one and two levels above his organization.

- **Current task-organization.** The G-3 provides the current task organization of the force down to battalion level.

- **Current unit status.** The G-3 provides the capability of friendly forces based on training, mobility, command and control warfare, and any attrition or shortages in critical personnel or equipment. The commander must appreciate any deterioration in capability and must not assume that the enemy has a capability based on the type-force with full combat strength that currently exists. He also provides information concerning current subordinate unit locations and activities.

- **Sister service combat support.** This support includes tactical and operational aviation support, naval surface fire support, Army armor and long-range artillery support, etc.

- **Status of adjacent and supporting units.** The G-3 provides current information regarding location, mission, and capabilities of flank, forward, and rear adjacent and supporting units, higher headquarters, uncommitted units, and the higher unit's reserve.

- **Time.** In-depth analysis of available time should be based on reversed planning. Based on the operation to be conducted, present location, and the distance from the area of operations, the G-3 should be able to determine the amount of time it will take to move to attack positions or point of departure. This time combined with the division's known decision-cycle time will give an initial indication of the amount of time available for any other actions desired by the command.

G-4: The G-4 provides an accurate and current assessment of the logistic situation of the division, subordinate units, and attached and supporting units.

- Patient-holding capacity and evacuation policy.
- Medical assets (class VIII).
- Preventive medicine program.
- Classes I, II, III(P), IV, VI, VII, and X.
- Class V status and distribution.
- Class III(B) status and distribution.
- Maintenance status, repair times, evacuation policy, and assets.
- Critical LOCs and transportation assets.
- Rear area security capability.

Assumptions. The division commander receives information available from his staff and from higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters. Gaps in information at this early stage are covered by making assumptions. Assumptions replace necessary but missing facts. Assumptions listed in the MAGTF's plan may be appropriate assumptions for the division's planning if the assumptions affect the mission. An assumption is appropriate if it meets both tests of validity and necessity. **Validity** defines whether or not as assumption is likely to occur. "Assuming away" potential problems is an example of using an invalid assumption. **Necessity** defines whether or not the assumption is absolutely essential for the development of a plan. If planning can continue without making the assumption, the assumption fails the test of necessity and is consequently inappropriate. Staff officers must continuously reevaluate assumptions as part of the estimate process. Additional facts should replace assumptions as early as possible in order to reduce uncertainty in the execution of the plan.

G-1: The G-1 considers personnel factors and makes assumptions that will be made about those factors that could change. These include —

- Percent of personnel strength of the division and identification of units with critical shortages one and two levels down.
- Status of critical MOSs of the force as a whole and identification of units with critical shortages one and two levels down.
- Replacement flow.

G-2: The G-2 and the division engineer draw conclusions about the terrain, including the best avenues of approach, best defensible ground, proposed forward edge of the battlefield area and line of departure, and the effects of terrain on both enemy and friendly courses of action. The planner should consider the potential effects of forecasted weather on friendly and enemy operations.

- **Enemy forces.** The G-2 develops possible enemy courses of action based on known enemy locations and activities, terrain analysis, and situational and doctrinal templates. He determines enemy capabilities that could affect friendly operations and identifies high value targets for each enemy course of action. The G-2 will develop as many enemy courses of action as planning time will allow in order to help the commander identify the probable courses of action. The most likely and most dangerous courses of action are developed more extensively and become the basis for development of friendly branches and sequels. The staff should anticipate the enemy's objectives, missions, and intentions to help plan actions that will preempt the enemy commander's intent.

- **Friendly intelligence capabilities.** These capabilities include status of intelligence support, organic and supporting collection assets, effects of intelligence considerations on possible operations, and effects of the area of operations on possible courses of action.

G-3: The G-3 makes assumptions about the status of forces at the time of the operation and the general ability of the unit to conduct the mission.

- **Status of maneuver units.** These assumptions include the leadership, mobility, and the ability to transition from current operations to the contemplated operation.

- **Status of combat support units.** These assumptions concern fire support units, Sister service support, and target acquisition assets. They also include air defense concerns and NBC protective and decontamination assets.

- **Engineer support.** Assumptions for engineer support encompass obstacle breeching, river crossing, obstacle emplacement, and excavation of survivable positions.

- **C^2W support.** Assumptions for command and control warfare include organic and supporting offensive C^2W assets, which include mobile subscriber equipment, multichannel communications, and tactical satellite assets.

- **Aviation.** Status of organic and supporting aviation units. MAGTF aviation units organized as maneuver forces are discussed in status of maneuver units above.

- **Military police.** Assumptions for MP include battlefield circulation control, security, and control of EPWs.

- **Time.** Based on the information collected during facts and assumptions, the G-3 evaluates time relative to when the unit must begin movement to accomplish the mission.

G-4: The G-4 discusses significant differences between the current status of logistics in the functional areas identified and the anticipated status of the organization at the time it begins the operation. This includes projected resupply rates and host nation support.

Analysis of Higher Mission and Intent

The C/S organizes the staff to analyze the MEF mission and intent. His guidance includes the amount of time the staff will have for the analysis and where and when he will be briefed on the results. Each staff member has a role to play. The staff should have received copies of the MEF operation order or plan. All staff members continue situation updates focused on the new mission and simultaneously begin the analysis in their respective areas of responsibilities. Each principal staff officer must understand what is essential to the commander and the other principal staff officers. This can be achieved only after team training and experience so everyone understands the personality of the commander and characteristics of the staff. Once essential information is known, the principal staff member has his staff section focus on that information and has them keep him apprised of changes so he can evaluate their impact and then advise the commander and the rest of the staff.

Information may be found in all portions of the higher order or plan. Much of this information is required in later steps of the decisionmaking process; however, it must be identified during mission analysis to determine its impact on the mission. Analysis of the higher mission and intent includes —

- Purpose of the higher headquarters mission and intent of the higher commander and the commander two levels up. This is determining the why of the mission. Knowledge of the intent is necessary to allow commanders to develop plans that support the overall operation.
- A review of the area of operations to understand the higher headquarters mission and intent. The area of operations is that area identified in the higher order or plan, normally on the operation overlay, as the responsibility of the division. The area might be further defined in the execution paragraph of the order. For deduced missions, the area is determined based on the commander/G-3 estimate of the area necessary to accomplish the mission.
- A review of the overall deception plan, the deception objective and target of the commander two levels up. The staff must review the deception objective and target of the commander two levels up and the overall deception program (objective, target, story, plan, and activities) of the MAGTF commander. This review ensures that none of the division's planning compromises any higher deception efforts. When higher commands have not developed deception plans or have produced very simple plans, greater planning flexibility is possible.
- Identification of tasks to be performed — *specified, implied,* and *essential.*
  - Specified tasks are stated in the higher headquarters order or plan. They come primarily from paragraphs two and three but may be found elsewhere, such as in coordinating instructions or annexes. Any task that pertains to any element of the unit should be identified and recorded.
  - Implied tasks are those tasks not specifically stated in the order or plan that must be accomplished to satisfy the overall mission or to satisfy any of the specified tasks. Implied tasks come from further analysis of the order and analysis in conjunction with the known enemy situation and the terrain. Examples of implied tasks include river crossing, passage of lines, and clear built-up areas. Inherent, routine, or SOP tasks are not included in the list of tasks. Examples of those tasks note included are establishing liaison, maintaining roads in sector, refueling, etc.
  - From the list of specified and implied tasks identified earlier, those tasks that define the success of the mission are identified as essential. Although the commander is responsible for the identification of the essential tasks and the mission, the staff develops a tentative list of essential tasks and a preliminary restated mission. To properly identify the essential tasks, the staff and commander must be aware of the intent of the commander ordering the mission and that of his superior.

- **Identification of limitations.** Limitations are restrictions placed on a commander specifying things that cannot be done and/or things that must be done. Limitations, in most cases, prescribe some detail or force organization, maneuver, or ROE.

- **Identification of assets available.** The staff considers assets allocated in the task organization, attachments and detachments, or in organizations for combat in the execution paragraph. More importantly, the relationship between mission and assets is critical. The folding together of time, space, and assets is critical to the success of a mission.

- **Acceptable levels of risk.** The higher headquarters might specify a risk the commander is willing to accept to accomplish the mission or might provide guidance pertaining to the use of friendly capabilities, etc. The level of acceptable risk can be deduced from analysis of mission and intent.

- **Initial time analysis.** The element of time is not clearly identified for analysis in any of the staff estimates. However, time analysis must be an integral part of the mission analysis and must be conducted continuously until the mission is accomplished. The commander must balance detailed planning against attaining speed and surprise by immediate action. The analysis of time uses the following guidelines:

- **Determine time available.** Time available begins with receipt of the mission and ends with the time of execution and completion of the scheme of maneuver stated in the order.

- **Know the decision cycle.** A decision cycle is the total time required from the time the commander obtains information, has it processed, makes a decision, issues orders, and has subordinates execute the operation. This is a necessary tool to properly plan time allocation.

- **Time allocation.** Once the division commander has a general understanding of his mission and the time available, he must allocate the time for the various phases of the operation. This allocation is often by reverse planning. Knowing the time to execute the operation, the commander must consider the amount of time needed for the unit to move to the point of execution; he must then allocate time for rehearsal and finally for planning. Since subordinate units also require planning time, the amount of time available for planning must also be allocated. The commander should consider the 1/3 - 2/3 rule. Each headquarters should use roughly one-third of the planning time available and allow two-thirds of the time for subordinate units. Each unit should use only the minimum amount of time necessary to plan an operation. The allocation of time must take into account the decision cycle of the unit doing the planning and that of the enemy.

The division commander can maximize planning time available by using timely warning orders, making sound assumptions, issuing complete guidance, and ensuring close coordination between units and staffs. Once the time is allocated, the commander must communicate his decision to the staff. Throughout this analysis, the staff considers information that could affect the operation. Time is critical. During this step, a lack of information might cause a poorly trained staff to delay and thus waste time. When information is not available, the staff must make reasonable assumptions and move on with the planning. The important thing here is not to waste time waiting for unavailable information but to continue the process.

Restated Mission

The division's mission addresses the who, what, when, where, and why of the operation. The division commander and his staff produce a mission statement derived from the MEF's mission, the division's tasking, and a mission analysis. The *division commander* approves the results of the mission analysis. He makes the final decision on what tasks are essential and provides the restated mission. The mission statement provides the focus for subsequent staff planning.

Commander's Planning Guidance

On completion of staff briefings and after he approves the analysis and issues his restated mission, the division commander provides initial planning guidance to the staff. The commander may continue to issue guidance throughout the decisionmaking process; however, to focus the attention of the staff, some initial guidance should be given. His planning guidance is important, since it provides a common starting point for course of action development. The amount of planning guidance varies with each mission, the volume and validity of information, and the situation. The commander's initial guidance is usually incomplete, but is developed and expanded as more information is obtained. The commander's planning guidance must include his initial intent and may also include the purpose of the operation; offensive or defensive phases and forms of maneuver or type of defense the commander plans to use; and endstate or the relationship between the force as a whole. In addition, the following guidance may be included:

- **Specific courses of action.** Specific courses of action the commander may be developed or not considered by the G-3. The commander's guidance forms the latitude the G-3 has to develop courses of action. The guidance may be very explicit, or it may be minimal providing a wide latitude for the G-3 to develop courses of action. The commander must exercise caution so his guidance does not stifle the staff's initiative or mislead them.

- **Course of action development.** A course of action is a possible plan open to the commander that would accomplish the mission. To develop courses of action, the staff must focus on key information necessary to make decisions and assimilate the data from mission analysis. The course of action may be revised, modified, or changed during wargaming. The number of courses of action developed should be manageable.

- **Feasible courses of action.** The ultimate goal is to develop several feasible courses of action for every enemy course of action developed by the G-2 during the formulation of assumptions. If time is limited, the G-3 or the commander must decide on the number of courses of action that will be addressed. Normally, three courses of action are presented, however, regardless of the number presented, courses of action must meet the criteria of suitability, feasibility, acceptability, variety, and completeness.

Often, courses of action are combined or desired elements moved from one to another. A course of action should include the five elements listed below:

- **What.** The type of action.
- **When.** The time the action will begin.
- **Where.** The assigned sectors or zones.
- **How.** The use of available assets addressing elements of the battlefield in broad terms.
- **Why.** The purpose of the operation.

Courses of Action Development

While developing courses of action, the staff goes through several steps. These steps are as follows:

Step One: Analyze Relative Force Ratios. Relative force ratios are the overall relationship of the combat power of friendly verses enemy forces including significant strengths and vulnerabilities. Analyzing relative force ratios provides conclusions about friendly capabilities pertaining to the operation being planned. It indicates what types of operations may be possible from the enemy and the friendly points of view. It also helps determine enemy weaknesses. The basic units compared are maneuver units and supporting fire support units. Other combat multipliers may also be used.

Step Two: Array Initial Forces. This step determines the forces necessary to accomplish the mission and provides a basis for the scheme of maneuver. During this step, the planner must consider the mission and the commander's guidance, the avenues of approach, and as many possible enemy courses of action as time permits, starting with the most probable. Five elements that are considered for the array of forces are as follows:

- **Determine the ratio of friendly units required.** Historical experience has shown that a defender has approximately a 50-50 probability of successfully defeating an attacking force approximately three times his equivalent strength. The planner will attempt to defend on each avenue of approach with, roughly, a 1-to-3 force ratio or attack with at least a 5- or 6-to-1 ratio.

- **Determine the size of unit to be arrayed.** The size of the unit to be arrayed is determined based on the size of the avenue of approach. Normally, a commander will identify avenues of approach suitable for the maneuver of a force one level down and array units two levels down. For example, the division will identify regimental-sized avenues of approach and array battalion-sized units.

- **Determine a proposed FEBA or line of departure.** Orders from higher headquarters should indicate the desired location of the FEBA in the defense or line of departure in the offense. The terrain analysis should attempt to validate the selection or determine a recommended change which must be resolved with higher headquarters.

- **Develop the deception plan.** Identify the deception objective, the target, and the story. Since aspects of the story may influence the positioning of units, the major elements of the story must be conceived before developing any

courses of action. Formulation of a plausible deception plan requires close cooperation between the operations officer and the intelligence officer.

- **Make initial array of friendly forces.** The initial array of forces begins at the expected point of initial contact. The array of ground forces is done two levels down. Consider force ratio requirements for each task. The initial array focuses on generic ground maneuver units without regard to specific type. During this step, the planner does not assign missions to these units but merely gains an appreciation of what forces should be allocated to accomplish the mission. The completed initial array helps the planner identify the total number of units required to be allocated. Most importantly, the planner will develop a base of knowledge through wargaming from which decisions can be made on items such as reducing the number of troops in certain areas (economy of force) and accepting risk. Alternate methods of dealing with the enemy will be identified during the development of a scheme of maneuver.

Step Three: Develop the Scheme of Maneuver. The scheme of maneuver is the narrative description of how the forces arrayed in the previous step will accomplish the commander's intent. The scheme must describe how the organization will arrive at the endstate which the commander articulated. The scheme of maneuver is developed by taking the initial array and refining it to encompass the actions determined appropriate to address the various battlefield activities (deep, close, and rear operations, security, and reserve). The following considerations apply:

- Reevaluate the terrain and enemy.
- Reevaluate the force ratio and accepting risk.
- The impact of shortages and/or use for forces uncommitted during the array of initial forces.
- The types of operations identified as possible during the relative combat power analysis.
- Maneuver objectives and identifying specific targets, e.g., an independent tank regiment.
- The location of terrain objectives and counterattack objectives.
- The location of the main effort and supporting effort(s).
- Address all maneuver forces. Any forces remaining from the initial array should be used when developing the scheme of maneuver to provide depth to the battle, provide security, or act as a reserve. The planner must consider how fires will support the maneuver forces in the various elements of the battlefield. If there are insufficient maneuver forces, the scheme should consider the use of combat support assets to assist the maneuver forces. The specifics of support will not be addressed until wargaming; however, the scheme of maneuver must address the use of combat support to accomplish a particular portion of any of the battlefield activities.
- Convert generic forces. Converting generic forces arrayed to specific type forces is a conscious decision by the planner to identify which type of forces will be allocated for the identified missions. To accomplish this conversion, the planner considers the terrain, the enemy, and the mission of the arrayed forces. This conversion is the initial step in identifying the task organization of the unit.

Step Four: Determine the Fire Support Plan. A fire support plan is a tactical plan which contains information necessary for the employment of fire support in a given operation. The fire support plan is an umbrella document prepared by the FSC. It is the basis with which each supporting arms agency conducts its own fire planning. Fire support planning should address at a minimum — how fire support is to be used; how targets are to be acquired; what targets are to be attacked; when targets are to be attacked; and how targets are to be attacked.

Step Five: Determine Command and Control Means and Maneuver Control Measures. A major subordinate headquarters should control at least two subordinate units but normally no more than five. This allocation of forces provides for an adequate span of control of assigned units and sufficient units for conduct of the subordinate's assigned mission. Maneuver control measures are based on the establishment of C^2 means and the scheme of maneuver. Control measures are the minimum required to control the operation. They include major subordinate

unit boundaries, axes of advance, objectives, phase lines, fire support coordination measures, assembly areas, etc. The control measures should not normally split avenues of approach or key terrain but should allow one unit to have responsibility for the area. In addition, space should be provided on the flanks of each avenue of approach to allow for maneuver and fires. The sector or zone designated for the main effort may be narrower than others (which adds weight to that sector.) Sectors or zones for a secondary effort or economy of force may be wider than that of the main effort. Phase lines are also developed at this time to implement expected branches and sequels to facilitate changes.

Step Six: Prepare Course of Action Statement(s) and Sketch(es). The G-3 prepares a course of action statement and supporting sketch for each course of action developed. The statement and sketch cover what, when, where, how, and why as they relate to the battlefield activities. They clearly and briefly state the purpose of the operation, the main effort, the scheme of maneuver, and significant risk.

The course of action statement provides the how of the operation. The sketch provides a generic picture of the statement. The sketch is the outline of the operation overlay. At a minimum, the sketch should include —

- Avenues of approach, major terrain features, and major obstacles.
- Major subordinate unit boundaries.
- Control measures such as phase lines, zones of action or defensive sectors, assembly areas, strongpoints, battle positions, objectives, engagement areas, and the main effort.
- Allocated forces. Allocating forces provides a clearer picture of the scheme of maneuver.
- In both the offense and defense, the sketch should show the type, composition, and general location of ground forces. The sketch may be drawn identifying units by type or by using decision graphics.
- The combination of a course of action statement and a course of action sketch must provide a clear picture of how the division will defeat the enemy. Additionally, it must specifically explain the scheme of maneuver by outlining how generic subordinate units accomplish the mission. It should identify the main and supporting efforts. If a significant risk has been identified during the development, the amount of risk should be identified in the statement.
- In many plans, additional course of action sketches may be desired. Descriptions of the endstate, the deception plan, and branches and sequels are examples of additional sketches the commander may desire.

Step Seven: Preparation of Staff Estimates. Once courses of action have been developed, the staff prepares estimates of supportability in their particular functional area. This staff analysis identifies the best course of action for recommendation to the division commander. Analysis actually begins during course of action development as the staff is intimately involved in that step of the process. However, courses of action are subject to approval of the commander and may be modified prior to formal staff estimates. Furthermore, during course of action development, the staff may have identified a course of action that is obviously not feasible in an area of responsibility. That course of action is immediately discarded. During this analysis, information identified by any staff member that might affect another's analysis must be shared. Each staff member analyzes the courses of action using wargaming techniques.

Wargaming

Wargaming is a conscious attempt to visualize the flow of a battle given friendly strengths and dispositions, enemy assets and possible courses of action, and a set piece of ground. It attempts to foresee the action, reaction, and counteraction dynamics of a battle. The G-3 is responsible for the conduct of the wargame. Wargaming stimulates thought about the operation so the staff officer will obtain ideas and insights that otherwise might not have occurred. This process highlights tasks that appear to be particularly important to the operation and provides a degree of familiarity with tactical possibilities that might otherwise be difficult to achieve. During the wargame, the course of action may be changed or modified, or a new one may be developed, because of the identification of other critical events, tasks, requirements, or problems. As a result, you can determine whether the force allocation, dispositions, and scheme of maneuver are adequate or need to be

adjusted. Shortfalls; acceptable or unacceptable risks; and possible future developments, options, and contingencies are identified for the plan or order. The wargamer must observe the following general rules:

- List the advantages and disadvantages as they become obvious during the wargaming process.
- Remain unbiased.
- Continually assess the feasibility of the course of action to see if it meets the requirements of the mission. If the course of action fails to remain feasible at any time during the wargame, stop the wargame and reject the course of action without further analysis.
- Avoid comparing one course of action with another during the wargame.
- Avoid drawing premature conclusions and then presenting facts to support those conclusions.

Wargaming Steps

There are seven steps to wargaming a course of action.

Step One: Gather the tools. The commander prioritizes the enemy and friendly courses of action to be wargamed. The wargame will require appropriate maps, enemy templates, and the current friendly positions posted.

Step Two: List all friendly forces. Consider all organic, assigned, attached, and OPCON combat, combat support, and combat service support units that the commander can commit to battle. Include priority of support provided by higher headquarters. This list should be constant for all courses of action analyzed.

Step Three: List the assumptions delivered during mission analysis. Assumptions are invaluable tools during wargaming. An assumption must be logical, realistic, and stated positively.

Step Four: List known critical events and decision points. Critical events are normally those specified or implied tasks that are required to be completed for mission accomplishment. Decision points relate to critical events. They identify decisions that must be made to ensure timely execution and coordinated use of resources to achieve desired effects on the battlefield. Critical events and decision points can be anticipated before wargaming. When available time is short, the planner must reduce the list to one that is manageable. This will require military judgment to determine which have the highest probability of changing the outcome of the battle.

Step Five: Select a wargaming method. A number of techniques can be used to organize the area to be analyzed.

- **Avenue-in-depth technique.** This technique focuses on one avenue at a time starting with the main effort. It is a good technique to use for offensive operations or in the defense where canalizing terrain exists.

- **Belt technique.** This technique divides the battlefield into areas that run the width of the sector; it analyzes the subcomponent battles and engagements sequentially across the width of the sector. This is the preferred method as it ensures simultaneous consideration of all forces that could affect a particular event. As a minimum, the belts should include initial contact either along the FEBA or line of contact, or in the security area; initial penetration or initial contact along the FEBA; and passage of the reserve or commitment of a counterattack.

- **Box technique.** The box technique is a microanalysis of a few critical areas, such as an engagement area, a river crossing site, or a flank avenue of approach into the sector. This technique is less time consuming. An initial assumption is made that the friendly units can handle most of the situations on the battlefield and the planner can focus on the most essential tasks. This technique is used when time is extremely limited such as in a hasty attack.

Step Six: Select a technique to record and display the results. Recording the results of the wargame will ensure that, once the operation has been fully analyzed, you will have a record from which the planner can adjust the original task organization; the course of action statement; and the course of action sketch. Additionally, annotations of the advantages and disadvantages may be used during comparison. Regardless of the recording method chosen,

wargaming requires the participation of the entire staff. Two techniques are narrative and sketch note.

- **Narrative technique.** This technique describes the visualization of the operation in sequence in sentence form. It provides extensive detail and clarity. The major drawback is the volume of the results and the time required.

- **Sketch note technique.** This technique uses brief notes concerning critical locations, requirements, or tasks. These notes will reference specific locations on the map or they may relate to general considerations covering broad areas on the map.

Step Seven: Wargame the battle and assess the results. Wargaming analyzes each selected event by identifying the components of its subevents or tasks one level down and assets two levels down. Begin the wargame of a course of action by visualizing the battle from initial unit locations that were determined during course of action development. Follow a logical sequence within the method selected for organizing the area of operations.

Wargaming Sequence

The wargame sequence is action, reaction, counteraction. Note the necessary branches and potential sequels that develop as a result of the drills.

- **Action:** Wargame by identifying the subevents required to complete the event. Subevents are actions of major subordinate headquarters or battlefield activities. Start by looking at those actions initiated by the command and its subordinate units analyzing the event. The question "If I do this, what will the enemy do?" will lead to the second step.

- **Reaction:** Next analyze the reactions of the opposing forces in relation to the action as well as the units involved. Consider all possible reaction forces including templated forces outside the area of operations that could be assigned a counterattack mission. The question "If he does this what can I do?" leads to the final step, counteraction.

- **Counteraction:** Counteractions are those actions that the wargaming command takes in response to the reactions of the enemy. Address these counteractions in the context of the battlefield activities and identify the assets required.

During the above sequence, the assets required for each action or counteraction are identified. The commander and staff must consider all combat multipliers that may enhance the relative combat strength of the unit.

Wargaming Results

The results of the wargame will drive the following:

- Refinements or modifications to the course of action. Changes include the composition and location of the main effort, supporting efforts, and the reserve; and adjustments to control measures.
- Identification of branches. Branches are of decisive importance because they will permit the commander to retain flexibility. The operations officer may identify options for changing dispositions, orientation, or direction of movement and accepting or declining battle in anticipation of the enemy's range of capabilities.
- Identification of essential elements of friendly information (EEFI). Having refined a course of action, the operations officer identifies its characteristic EEFI and is able to develop the deception plan and force protection measures associated with that course of action.
- Identification of tasks to maneuver units. These tasks include responsibility for a particular element of the course of action's scheme of maneuver, planning for identified contingencies, responsibility for specific deception events and priorities of support.
- Identification of high-payoff targets. From HVTs associated with each enemy course of action, determine which HVTs can be successfully acquired and attacked. The staff then develops the high payoff target list and the attack guidance matrix.
- An estimate of battle duration of each critical event and the entire battle. Calculate battle duration by considering distance, rate of movement, terrain, weather, and other factors.

- Identification of advantages and disadvantages. These may be in any form, such as acceptable and unacceptable risks, the effectiveness of completing a portion of the event or mission, or the effect a unit's losses will have on future division operations.
- A projection of the percentage of total enemy force defeated in each critical event and overall.
- Identification of additional critical events. The wargame identifies other events that must be successfully handled to assure victory.
- Additional requirements for combat support.
- A determination of the information necessary to plan for sequels. The outcomes of wargaming may not match perfectly the endstate articulated by the division commander in his statement of intent. Therefore, they will affect the planning for sequels.
- The G-2 identifies enemy reactions, projects enemy losses, and verifies NAIs and TAIs.
- The G-4 determines the requirements for combat service support to include locations for prepositioning, additional obstacle materials, varieties and quantities of ammunition, transportation demands, and requirements for reconstitution.
- Estimated attrition. Projected battle losses are weighed against the risk criteria prevents undue damage to the command.
- Requirements for external support. This support includes that from higher and adjacent forces. This is the identification of the shortfalls critical to the success of the operation.
- Risk. At the end of the wargame, the purpose of identifying the risk is to allow the commander to make an appropriate decision based on the situation. Risk is inevitable on the battlefield, and an attempt to eliminate it may be unreasonable and overly cautious. Simply stated, risk is the likelihood that a course of action will not accomplish the mission or a portion of the mission.
- Advantages and disadvantages. The staff must identify, analyze, and evaluate advantages and disadvantages for each course of action. The rationale for each should be annotated for use in the final part, which is comparison.

Staff Estimates

Once courses of action are analyzed, staffs compare the feasible courses of action to identify the one that has the highest probability of success against the enemy course of action of greatest concern to the division commander. This course of action also has branches that will facilitate success against other possible enemy courses of action. The actual comparison may follow any technique that will allow a recommendation to be reached. A decision matrix is one of these techniques. Each staff officer may use his own matrix for comparison in his own area of responsibility. On completion of the staff analyses, the staff will meet again to identify the course of action to be recommended to the commander. Led by the G-3, each staff member will present his findings for consideration by the others. The staff's responsibility is to arrive at a decision on which course of action to recommend. If the staff cannot reach a decision, the C/S will resolve the differences.

Commander's Estimate of the Situation and Decision

The staff briefs the commander and outlines each course of action to include the advantages and disadvantages of each. The brief will include the branches and sequels identified during the wargame. The method of presentation should not be such as to prejudice the commander. Each member of the staff prepares to answer any questions from the commander and develops appropriate briefing charts for this purpose. The wargame is not briefed but it may be used to answer questions or to expand on a particular critical event as needed.

The commander reaches a decision based on his experience, trust and confidence in his staff, and his estimate of the situation. The commander may agree with the staff recommendation or he may select another course of action. The commander may direct the use of one of the courses of action with modification or one not previously considered. There is risk in doing this since the staff will not have analyzed the course of action to determine the advantages and disadvantages of the results.

On receiving the staff estimates, the commander must refine the course of action into a clear decision. The decision is a clear, concise statement of his

intent, the general scheme of maneuver, and supporting fires for the operation. The commander should include in his decision statement the risk he is willing to accept to accomplish the mission. The decision should be directed toward seizing the initiative rather than merely reacting to the enemy's actions.

The decision and concept of operation is announced by the commander. The commander expands the wording of the selected course of action into a statement of the concept of operation. The commander elaborates on this decision when he outlines his concept to the staff. The concept should always address the battlefield activities, include his intent, and a clear designation of the main effort. Upon receiving the commander's decision, the operations officer prepares and issues another warning order to the command.

Prepare the Plan

Military orders seek to communicate information that governs action. All orders, whether oral or written, should be characterized by the following principles:

- **Clarity:** The reader should not have to interpret words and phrases.
- **Completeness:** All required information and instructions must be included.
- **Brevity:** Orders should avoid unnecessary detail without sacrificing clarity and completeness.
- **Initiative:** Orders should be mission-type, telling what should be done, not how to do it, in order to foster initiative by subordinates.
- **Positive expression:** Orders should avoid indecisive, vague, and ambiguous language; they should be positive.
- **Timeliness:** A 70-percent solution on time is better than a 100-percent solution that arrives too late.

Commander's Approval

The division commander approves the plan prepared by the staff prior to issuance to subordinate commanders. Ordinarily, the commander is appraised of the specifics of the order as it is prepared, thus expediting the transmittal to the force.

Issue the Order

Once approved, the order is issued to the force. The order may be issued through oral, written, or graphic means.

Oral Orders

Oral orders are the most direct method of communicating the commander's decision to his subordinates. They are best issued by the commander in person to his subordinate commanders to ensure clarity of intent. The recipient records the order verbatim or in note form. Oral orders may be confirmed in writing, especially when the order is issued well in advance of the contemplated action. However, the rapidity of action which characterizes modern combat frequently makes this impossible.

Written Orders

Written orders may be issued when subordinates are widely separated on the battlefield or embarked in different ships prior to the operation. Written orders vary in size and scope depending upon time available and the complexity of the operation.

Graphic Means

When orders are communicated by graphic means, they take the form of overlay orders. Combat plans and orders may be prepared almost entirely by means of graphic representation. When this is done, the essential elements of the orders are printed on the overlay as signs and symbols and a minimum amount of complementary written material is printed directly on the overlay. It is essential that the overlay order contain a reference to the map on which it is based and that it provide a means to register the map on the overlay. The complete mission statement is always written on the overlay even though it is also shown graphically.

Execution and Supervision

The commander and staff continually process the latest information, determining where and how it affects the operation. They enter the decisionmaking process based on the type of information received, arrive at a decision, determine the actions required, and issue the orders to execute those actions. Actions and orders are ongoing at all levels of command, each dealing with their areas of responsibility. Supervision is ongoing throughout the decisionmaking process whether it pertains to current or future operations. Through supervision, the commander ensures that his decisions are implemented and his intent understood.

Targeting and the Decision Cycle

The decide, detect, deliver, and assess targeting methodology is an integral part of the decision cycle from receipt of the mission through execution. Each part of the methodology occurs both simultaneously and sequentially. As decisions are made in planning future operations, current operations staff elements execute detection and attack of targets based on prior decisions. The decide function is the most important and requires close interaction between the commander and intelligence, plans, operations, and fire support personnel. Key staff products include the intelligence preparation of the battlespace, target value analysis (TVA), and intelligence estimate. The decide function gives a clear picture of the priorities that apply to the tasking of target acquisition assets, information processing, the selection of an attack means, and the requirement for combat assessment. The resulting operation order contains the commander's high-payoff target list (HPTL), the attack guidance matrix (AGM), target selection standards (TSS), and any requirements for BDA. The detect function is conducted during execution. The target priorities developed in the decide function are used to expedite the processing of targets. The main objective of the deliver function is the attack of targets in accordance with the commander's attack guidance. The commander and staff assess the results of mission execution in the assess function.

Glossary

Section I. Acronyms

AAV ..... assault amphibious vehicle
AAW ..... antiair warfare
ACA ..... airspace coordination area
ACE ..... aviation combat element
AC/S ..... assistant chief of staff
AGM ..... air-to-ground missile
AOFDA ..... U. S. Aid Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
AO ..... area of operations
AOA ..... amphibious objective area
AOR ..... area of responsibility
arty ..... artillery
ATF ..... amphibious task force
ATO ..... air tasking order
AVLB ..... armored vehicle-launched bridge

BDA ..... battle damage assessment
Bn ..... battalion

CA ..... civil affairs
CARE ..... call library
CAS ..... close air support
CATF ..... commander, amphibious task force
C^2 ..... command and control
C^2I ..... command, control, and intelligence
C^2W ..... command and control warfare
C^4I ..... command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
CCIR ..... commander's critical information requirements
CE ..... command element
CEOI ..... communications-electronics operating instructions
CFFZ ..... call for fire zones
CFL ..... coordinated fire line
CINC ..... commander in chief
CIT ..... counterintelligence team
CLF ..... commander, landing force
CMOC ..... civil military operations center
COC ..... combat operations center
COMSEC ..... communications security
CONUS ..... continental United States
CP ..... command post
C/S ..... chief of staff
CSS ..... combat service support
CSSD ..... combat service support detachment
CSSE ..... combat service support element
CSSOC ... combat service support operations center

DART ..... disaster assistance response team
DAS ..... deep air support
DASC ..... direct air support center
DOD ..... Department of Defense
DOS ..... Department of State
DS ..... direct support
DZ ..... drop zone

EA ..... electronic attack
EAC ..... Emergency Action Committee
ECCM ..... electronic counter-countermeasures
EEFI ..... essential elements of friendly information
EPW ..... enemy prisoner of war
EW ..... electronic warfare

FAC ..... forward air controller
FASCAM ..... family of scatterable mines
FEBA ..... forward edge of the battle area
FEMA ... Federal Emergency Management Agency
FFA ..... free-fire area
FFCC ..... force fires coordination center
FFIR ..... friendly force information requirement
FLOT ..... forward line of own troops
FO ..... forward observer
FSC ..... fire support coordinator
FSCC ..... fire support coordination center
FSCL ..... fire support coordination line
FSSG ..... force service support group

GCE ..... ground combat element
GS ..... general support

HLZ ..... helicopter landing zone
HPT ..... high-payoff target
HPTL ..... high-payoff target list
HST ..... helicopter support team
HVT ..... high-value target

IPB ..... intelligence preparation of the battlefield

JFC ..... joint force commander
JIB ..... Joint Information Bureau
JTF ..... joint task force

LAR ..... light armored reconnaissance
LF ..... landing force
LFOC ..... landing force operations center
LNO ..... liaison officer
LOC ..... lines of communications
LZ ..... landing zone

MAGTF ..... Marine air-ground task force
MCFSS ..... Marine Corps Fire Support System
MCM ..... mine countermeasures
MEF ..... Marine expeditionary force
METT-T ..... mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available
MLRS ..... multiple launch rocket system
MOS ..... military occupational specialty
MOUT .... military operations on urbanized terrain
MP ..... military police
MSR ..... main supply route

NAI ..... named areas of interest
NATO ..... North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC ..... nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA ..... National Command Authorities
NCO ..... noncommissioned officer
NEF ..... naval expeditionary force
NFA ..... no-fire area
NGF ..... naval gunfire
NGFO ..... naval gunfire officer
NSFS ..... naval surface fire support

OMFTS ..... operational maneuver from the sea
OOTW ..... operations other than war
OP ..... observation post
OPSEC ..... operations security

PIR ..... priority intelligence requirement
PLRS ..... position location reporting system
POL ..... petroleum, oils, and lubricants
PSYOPS ..... psychological operations

R&S ..... reconnaissance and surveillance
recon ..... reconnaissance
RFA ..... restrictive fire area
RFL ..... restrictive fire line
ROE ..... rules of engagement
RSTA ..... reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition

SAC ..... supporting arms coordinator
SACC ..... supporting arms coordination center
SAO ..... security assistance office
SARC ..... surveillance and reconnaissance center
SEAD ..... suppression of enemy defenses
SFCP ..... shore fire control party
SJA ..... staff judge advocate
SNCO ..... staff noncommissioned officer
SOP ..... standing operating procedure

TACC ..... tactical air command center (USMC); tactical air control center (USN)
TACLOG ..... tactical-logistical group
TACP ..... tactical air control party
TAI ..... target areas of interest
TAOR ..... tactical area of responsibility
TCF ..... tactical combat force
TVA ..... target value analysis

UAV ..... unmanned aerial vehicle
UNICEF ..... United Nation's Children's Fund
USAID ..... U. S. Agency for International Development

Section II. Definitions

A

Adjutant - An officer who performs the general duties of a special staff officer under the cognizance of the G-1/S-1 with respect to personnel administration and office management.

air mission commander - A mission commander who shall be a properly qualified naval aviator or naval flight officer, should be designated when separate aircraft formations, each led by its own formation leader, are required for a common support mission or whenever a formation of four or more aircraft must perform a multiple sortie mission. The mission commander shall direct a coordinated plan of action and shall be responsible for the effectiveness of the mission.

air officer - An officer (aviator/naval flight officer) who functions as chief advisor to the commander on all aviation matters. An air officer is normally found at battalion level and higher within the ground combat element and within the Marine air-ground task force command element and combat service support element headquarters staffs. The air officer is the senior member of the tactical air control party. The battalion air officer supervises the training and operation of the two battalion forward air control parties.

air support liaison team - A team task organized by the Marine air support squadron to maintain liaison between the direct air support center and the fire support coordination center (FSCC). The ASLT is not a direct air support center, but may augment an echelon capability during displacement of the direct air support center. An ASLT may be used to provide a team to the senior FSCC when the direct air support center is not able to physically collocate with the fire support coordination center because of mobility or communications requirements with other agencies and supporting aircraft.

airspace coordination area - A block of airspace in the target area in which friendly aircraft are reasonably safe from friendly surface fires.

area reconnaissance - A directed effort to obtain detailed information concerning the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area such as a town, ridge line, woods, or other features critical to operations.

assault position - That position between the line of departure and the objective in an attack from which forces assault the objective. Ideally, it is the last covered and concealed position before reaching the objective (primarily used by dismounted infantry).

assault support - The use of aircraft to provide tactical mobility and logistics support for the MAGTF, the movement of high priority cargo and personnel within the immediate area of operations, in-flight refueling, and the evacuation of personnel and cargo.

attack - An offensive action characterized by movement supported by fire with the objective of defeating or destroying the enemy.

B

barrier plan - The part of the operation order or plan that deals with the use of barriers (obstacles designed or employed to canalize, direct, restrict, delay, or stop the movement of an opposing force), closely integrated with the scheme of maneuver and the fire support plan, to lend maximum support to the accomplishment of the assigned mission.

battle position - A defensive location oriented on the most likely enemy avenue of approach from which a unit may defend or attack. Such units can be as large as reinforced battalions and as small as

platoons. The unit assigned to the battle position is located within the general outline of the battle position, but other forces may operate outside the battle position to provide early detection of enemy forces and all-round security.

battlespace - All aspects of air, surface, subsurface, land, space, and electromagnetic spectrum which encompass the area of influence and area of interest.

breach - The employment of any means available to break through or secure a passage through an enemy defense, obstacle, minefield, or fortification.

C

C^2 support forces - The personnel, equipment, facilities, communications, and procedures involved with reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence, fire support coordination, tactical air control, electronic warfare, automated data processing, sensor management, signals intelligence, deception, space systems, and other information-related areas.

clear enemy in zone - A requirement to eliminate organized resistance in an assigned zone by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of enemy forces that could interfere with the units ability to accomplish its mission.

close operations - Military actions conducted to project power decisively against enemy forces which pose an immediate or near term threat to the success of current battles and engagements. These military actions are conducted by committed forces and their readily available tactical reserves, using maneuver and combined arms.

combat operations center - The primary operational agency required to control the tactical operations of a command that employs ground and aviation combat, combat support, and combat service support elements or portions thereof. The combat operations center continually monitors, records, and supervises operations in the name of the commander and includes the necessary personnel and communications to do the same.

combat patrol - A tactical unit that is sent out from the main body to engage in independent fighting. It may be to provide security or to harass, destroy, or capture enemy troops, equipment, or installations. Operations include raids, ambushes, and security missions.

combat service support detachment - A separate task organization of combat service support assets formed for the purpose of providing rearming, refueling, and/or repair capabilities to the Marine air-ground task force or designated subordinate elements; e.g. a battalion conducting independent operations or an aircraft squadron operating at a remote airfield. The combat service support element normally provides the command element of a combat service support detachment.

combined arms - The tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by a force to integrate fire-power and mobility to produce a desired effect upon the enemy.

command and control support system - An organized assembly of C^2S forces or elements task organized and arrayed to overlay the C^2 infra-structure with C^2 support that collects, transports, processes, disseminates, and protects information essential to the commander and subordinate elements in the generation and decisive application of combat power. A command and control support system includes subsystems that support command, control, communications, computers, surveillance, reconnais-sance, intelligence, interoperability, C^2 protection, and counter C^2 operations, their associated re-sources, and technology.

composite MAGTF - A MAGTF formed using forces from two or more other MAGTFs.

converging axes attack - A type of tank-infantry attack where the tank-infantry team approaches a common objective on two different axes.

coordinated fire line - A line beyond which conventional surface fire support means (mortars, field artillery, and naval gunfire ships) may fire at any time within the zone of the establishing headquarters without additional coordination.

countermobility - The construction of obstacles and emplacement of minefields to delay, disrupt, and destroy the enemy by reinforcement of the terrain. The primary purpose of countermobility operations is to slow or divert the enemy, to increase time for target acquisition, and to increase weapon effectiveness.

Country Team - The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the Chief of the US diplomatic mission.

course of action - **1.** Any sequence of activities which an individual or unit may follow. **2.** A possible plan open to an individual or commander which would accomplish, or is related to accomplishment of, his mission. **3.** The scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission. **4.** A line of conduct in an engagement.

critical information - Knowledge crucial to the commander which requires his immediate attention and without which his ability to command, control, and conduct combat operations would be degraded.

cross-attachment - The exchange of subordinate units between units for a temporary period.

D

deception operation - A military operation conducted to mislead the enemy . A unit conducting a deception operation may or may not make contact with the enemy. Deception operations include demonstrations, diversions, displays, feints, and ruses.

deep air support - Air action against enemy targets at such a distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each mission with fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. Deep air support mission are flown on either side of the fire support coordination line; the lack of a requirement for close coordination with the fire and movement of friendly forces is the qualifying factor. Note: The acronym DAS stands for deep air support and not direct air support.

deep operations - Military actions conducted against enemy capabilities which pose a potential threat to friendly forces. These military actions are designed to isolate, shape, and dominate the battlespace and influence future operations.

defense - A coordinated effort by a force to defeat an attacker and prevent him from achieving his objectives.

defensive operations - Operations conducted with the immediate purpose of causing an enemy attack to fail. Defensive operations also may achieve one or more of the following: gain time; concentrate forces elsewhere; wear down enemy forces as a prelude to offensive operations; and retain tactical, strategic, or political objectives.

delaying action - A type of retrograde operation in which space is traded for time, and maximum punishment is inflicted on the enemy without accepting decisive engagement, penetration, or being bypassed.

direct air support - Air support flown in direct response to a specific request from the supported unit.

directed net - A net in which no station other than the net control station can communicate with any other station, except for transmission of urgent messages, without first obtaining the permission of the net control station.

E

encirclement - The loss of freedom of maneuver resulting from enemy control of all ground routes of evacuation and reinforcement.

encircling force - A force employed in a pursuit to envelop an enemy force which has lost the capability to defend or delay in an organized fashion. It seeks to cut off escape routes and, with direct pressure forces, attacks and destroys the enemy forces.

engineer reconnaissance - The gathering of specific, detailed, technical information required by supporting engineer forces in order to prepare for and accomplish assigned missions.

F

feint - A limited-objective attack involving contact with the enemy, varying in size from a raid to a supporting attack. Feints are used to cause the enemy to react in three predictable ways: to employ his reserves improperly, to shift his supporting fires, or to reveal his defensive fires.

fire support - Assistance to elements of the Marine air-ground task force engaged with the enemy rendered by other firing units, including (but not limited to) artillery, mortars, naval surface fire support, and offensive air support.

force sustainment - Capabilities, equipment, and operations which ensure continuity, freedom of action, logistics support, and command and control.

free-fire area - A specifically designated area into which any weapon system may be fired without any additional coordination.

frontal attack - An offensive maneuver in which the main action is directed against the front of the enemy forces and over the most direct approaches.

H

helicopterborne operation - A military action in which combat forces and their equipment maneuver about the battlefield by helicopters or vertical-landed aircraft. Aviation activities are under the control of the aviation combat element commander who is assigned in direct or general support of one or more combat element(s).

J

joint intelligence center - In amphibious operations, a single intelligence organization formed to satisfy the similar intelligence requirements of the commander, amphibious task force and commander, landing force. The joint intelligence center is formed to eliminate duplicate procedures and streamline intelligence functioning.

L

L-hour - In amphibious operations, the time at which the first helicopter of the helicopterborne assault wave touches down in the landing zone.

limit of advance - An easily recognized terrain feature beyond which attacking elements will not advance.

line of contact - A general trace delineating the location where two opposing forces are engaged.

linkup - An operation wherein two friendly ground forces join together in a hostile area.

M

main body - The principal part of a tactical command or formation. It does not include detached elements of the command such as advanced guards, flank guards, covering forces, etc.

main effort - The designated unit that is given the preponderance of combat power and support to ensure success. All units and organizations support the main effort.

maneuver warfare - A philosophy for action that seeks to collapse the enemy's cohesion and effectiveness through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot adequately cope.

maritime prepositioning force - A task organization of units under one commander formed for the purpose of introducing a MAGTF and its associated equipment and supplies into a secure area. The maritime prepositioning force is composed of a command element, a maritime prepositioning ships squadron, a MAGTF, and a Navy support element.

medical regulating - A casualty regulating system designed to coordinate the movement of casualties from the site of injury or the onset of disease through successive echelons of medical care to a medical treatment facility that can provide the appropriate level of care.

N

naval control organization - In amphibious operations, a temporary control agency established by the commander, amphibious task force to coordinate the assault waves of landing craft, amphibious vehicles, landing ships, and helicopters during the waterborne and helicopterborne ship-to-objective maneuver.

no-fire area - A designated area into which neither fires nor effects of fires will occur. Two exceptions occur: (a) the establishing headquarters asks for or approves fire or (b) an enemy force takes refuge in the area, poses a major threat, and there is insufficient time to clear the fires needed to defend the friendly force.

O

obstacle - Any obstruction designed or employed to disrupt, fix, turn, or block the movement of an opposing force, and to impose additional losses in personnel, time, and equipment on the opposing force. Obstacles can exist naturally or can be manmade, or can be a combination of both. The effectiveness of an obstacle is enhanced considerably when covered by observation and fire. Obstacles can include abatis, antitank ditches, blown bridges, built-up areas, minefields, rivers, road craters, terrain, and wire.

offensive air support - Those air operations conducted against enemy installations, facilities, and personnel to directly assist the attainment of MAGTF objectives by the destruction of enemy resources or the isolation of his military force.

P

parallel planning - Planning by parallel chains of command refers to the planning procedures resulting from the close and continuous coordination necessary between corresponding naval and troop echelons.

position - 1. A location or area occupied by a military unit. 2. The location of a weapon, unit, or individual from which fire is delivered upon a target.

a. **primary position** - A position which provides the best means to accomplish the assigned missions.

b. **alternate position** - A position to be occupied when the primary position becomes untenable or unsuitable for carrying out its task. The alternate position is located so that the individual can continue to fulfill his original task.

c. **supplemental position** - A position which provides the best means to accomplish a task that cannot be accomplished from the primary or alternate position.

power projection - The application of measured, precise offensive military force at a chosen time and place, using maneuver and combined arms against enemy forces.

priority of fire - Guidance to a fire support planner to organize and employ fire support means in accordance with the relative importance of the maneuver units missions.

program of targets - A number of individual targets or groups, or both, planned on targets of similar nature and fired on schedule, listed in an artillery fire plan table.

pursuit by fire - When the assault through the assigned objective is completed, the squad fires upon withdrawing enemy forces until they are no longer visible or are beyond effective range.

R

rear operations - Military actions conducted to support and permit force sustainment and to provide security for such actions.

recovery operations - Those operations executed to recover personnel and/or equipment.

restrictive fire area - An area in which specific restrictions are imposed and into which fires that would exceed those restrictions will not be delivered without coordination with the establishing headquarters. The purpose of the restrictive fire area is to regulate fires into an area according to the stated restrictions.

restrictive fire line - A line established between converging friendly forces that prohibits fires, or effects from fires, across the line without coordination with the affected force. The purpose of the restrictive fire line is to prevent interference between converging friendly forces.

route reconnaissance - A directed effort to obtain detailed information of a specified route and all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along that route.

ruse - A trick designed to deceive the enemy, thereby obtaining an advantage. It is characterized by deliberately exposing false information to the collection means of the enemy.

S

security area - The forward of the three echelons of a defensive sector. It is the area forward of the forward edge of the battle area out to the forward positions initially assigned to the security forces. The ground combat element commander may extend the lateral boundaries of the subordinate units forward of the forward edge of the battle area, giving them responsibility for the security area within sector to the forward limit of their boundaries, or he may assign a security force to be operated across the entire combat element frontage.

security force - The detachment deployed between the main body and the enemy (to the front, flanks, or rear of the main body) tasked with the protection of the main body. The security force may be assigned a screening, guard, or covering mission.

seize - To clear a designated area and obtain control of it.

show of force - A mission carried out to demonstrate U.S. resolve, whereby U.S. forces are deployed to defuse a situation that may be detrimental to U.S. interests or national objectives.

specified tasks - Those tasks delineated in the mission received from the higher headquarters.

strike operation - An operation designed to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective.

successive positions - Defensive fighting positions located one after another on the battlefield. A force can conduct a delaying action from successive positions.

T

tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel - A mission performed by an assigned and briefed aircrew for the specific purpose of the recovery of personnel, equipment, and/or aircraft when the tactical situation precludes search and rescue assets from responding and when survivors and their location have been confirmed.

targeting - In its largest sense, targeting is the analysis of enemy situations relative to the commander's mission, objectives, and capabilities at the commander's disposal, to identify and nominate specific vulnerabilities that, if exploited, will accomplish the commander's purpose through delaying, disrupting, disabling, or destroying enemy forces or resources critical to the enemy (Joint Pub 1-02).

target precedence list - The commanders list of types of mobile potential targets arranged in the order in which they are to be attacked. It establishes target priorities for reactive targeting.

techniques - The general and detailed methods used by troops and/or commanders to perform assigned missions and functions, specifically, the methods of using equipment and personnel.

throughput system - The logistic infrastructure that links; **a**. production logistics to consumer logistics, and **b**. the sources of operating forces' military capability to the sustainability of those forces. It is associated distribution systems (ports, bases, and airfields), civilian agencies, and supporting forces and service troops which operate those facilities and installations.

turn away - A turn away amphibious rehearsal is dependent upon time and equipment considerations. If sufficient time or equipment replacements are not available for a ramp down rehearsal, a turn away rehearsal may be in order simply to test timing, communications, and understanding of assigned tasks.

U

uncommitted force - A force that is not in contact with an enemy and is not already deployed on a specific mission or course of action.

Z

zone reconnaissance - A directed effort to obtain detailed information concerning all routes, obstacles (to include chemical or radiological contamination), terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries. A zone reconnaissance normally is assigned when the enemy situation is vague or when information concerning cross-country trafficability is desired.

References

Joint Publications

Joint Pub 1-02	Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

Fleet Marine Force Manuals

FMFM 0-14	Marine Corps Supplement to the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
FMFM 1-7/ NWP 22-2	Supporting Arms in Amphibious Operations
FMFM 3-21	MAGTF Intelligence Operations
FMFM 3-30	Communications
FMFM 4-1	Combat Service Support Operations
FMFM 4-27	MAGTF Supply Operations (under development)
FMFM 4-50	Health Service Support
FMFM 5-60	Control of Aircraft and Missiles
FMFM 6	Ground Combat Operations
FMFM 6-9	Marine Artillery Support
FMFM 6-18	Techniques and Procedures for Fire Support Coordination
FMFM 6-18-1	MCFSS Techniques and Procedures
FMFM 6-21	Tactical Fundamentals of Helicopterborne Operations
FMFM 7-26	River Crossing Operations
FMFM 7-32	Raid Operations
FMFM 13	MAGTF Engineer Operations

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publications

FMFRP 4-18	Bulk Liquids Operations (under development)

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